A framework for secure mobility in wireless overlay networks by Chen, Hejun
A Framework for Secure Mobility in
Wireless Overlay Networks
by
Hejun Chen

A Framework for Secure Mobility in
Wireless Overlay Networks
by
Hejun Chen
Dissertation
submitted in fulfillment
of the requirements
for the degree
Magister Technologiae
in
Information Technology
in the
Faculty of Engineering, the Built Environment and
Information Technology
of the
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University
Promoter: Prof. Reinhardt A. Botha
January 2006

Declaration
I, Hejun Chen, hereby declare that:
• The work in this dissertation is my own work.
• All sources used or referred to have been documented and recognized.
• This dissertation has not previously been submitted in full or partial
fulfillment of the requirements for an equivalent or higher qualification
at any other recognized educational institute.
Hejun Chen
i
ii DECLARATION
Abstract
Various wireless networks are widely deployed world wide. Current tech-
nologies employed in these networks vary widely in terms of bandwidths,
latencies, frequencies, and media access methods. Most existing wireless net-
work technologies can be divided into two categories: those that provide
a low-bandwidth service over a wide geographic area, for example UMTS,
and those that provide a high bandwidth service over a narrow geographic
area, for example 802.11. Although it would be desirable to provide a high-
bandwidth service over a wide coverage region to mobile users all the time,
no single wireless network technology simultaneously satisfies these require-
ments. Wireless Overlay Networks, a hierarchical structure of wireless per-
sonal area, local area, and wide area data networks, is considered as an
efficient and scalable way to solve this problem.
Due to the wide deployment of UMTS and 802.11 WLAN, this study at-
tempts to combine them to implement the concept of Wireless Overlay Net-
works. Furthermore, the information transmitted over this Wireless Overlay
Networks is protected in terms of authentication, integrity and confidential-
ity. To achieve this goal, this study aims to combine GPRS, Mobile IP and
IPSec to propose a framework for secure mobility in Wireless Overlay Net-
works.
The framework is developed in three steps:
• Firstly, this study addresses the problem of combining GPRS and Mo-
bile IP, so that GPRS users are provided with Mobile IP service. This
results in presenting a uniform Mobile IP interface to peers regardless
of whether mobile users use UMTS or 802.11 WLAN.
• Secondly, this study discovers the existing problem when combining
Mobile IP and IPSec, and proposes a Dual Home Agent Architecture
to achieve secure mobility.
iii
iv ABSTRACT
• Finally, based on the output of the previous two steps, a complete
framework is proposed, which achieves secure mobility inWireless Over-
lay Networks, specifically, in UMTS and 802.11 WLAN.
The framework also implements seamless handover when mobile users
switch between UMTS and 802.11. This results in UMTS and 802.11 WLAN
looking like a single network when participating in this framework, and
presents seamless and secure mobility.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
No single wireless network technology simultaneously provides a low latency,
high bandwidth, and wide area data service to a large number of mobile
users. Wireless Overlay Networks, a hierarchical structure of wireless per-
sonal area, local area, and wide area data networks, address the problem
of providing network connectivity to a large number of mobile users in an
efficient and scalable way. Furthermore, the network connectivity needs to
be offered with the guarantee of security not being violated, regardless of
which network mobile users attach to. This, in high-level terms, defines the
principle problem of this study: “How is secure mobility achieved in wireless
overlay networks?”.
1.1 Problem Statement
To address the problem of secure mobility in wireless overlay networks, there
are several sub-problems that need to be addressed:
• How can mobility be achieved in an effective manner regardless of
whether movement is in a wide area or a narrow area?
• How can seamless handover be realized between different wireless net-
works?
• How can the security characteristics of information transferred over
wireless networks be protected, specifically when multiple wireless net-
works are involved?
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As these issues are rather broad, the next sections will further explore
current developments in the field, as well as describe a specific scenario which
will then be used to set more specific objectives in Section 1.5.
1.2 Background
It is widely recognized that the mobile cellular telecommunication systems
have evolved along a path: 1G→ 2G→ 3G. The first generation, 1G, is based
on analogue or semi-analogue technologies. Examples include the Nordic
Mobile Telephone (NMT) system and the American Mobile Phone System
(AMPS) (Schiller, 2003, pp. 9 – 15). The emphasis of services offered by 1G
was on speech and speech-related services. 1G networks were developed with
national scope only. Often the main technical requirements were agreed upon
by the governmental telecommunication and domestic industry without wider
publication of the specifications. 1G networks, therefore, were incompatible
with each other.
With the common intention of a more global mobile communication sys-
tem, various international specification bodies specified individual communi-
cation standards. Despite diversity between these standards, a common char-
acteristic is that they are all digitized. Thus a generic name, 2G, umbrellas
these standards. Two mainstream 2G standards are Code Division Multiple
Access (CDMA) IS-95 and the Global System for Mobile Communication
(GSM) (Eberspacher et al., 2001). The emphasis of 2G is on compatibility
and international transparency; the system is regional (like European-wide)
or semi-global. Besides the traditional speech service these networks are able
to provide some data services and more sophisticated supplementary services.
It was at this time that the need of data services, especially the need
of access to the Internet, increased. This simulated the advent of various
enabling data service technologies. A generic name, 2.5G, covers all these
technologies, including high-speed circuit-switched data (HSCSD), general
packet radio services (GRPS), and enhanced data rates for global evolution
(EDGE) (Korhonen, 2001, p. 5 – 8). Among them, GPRS is a key milestone
for GSM data services, as it introduced a brand-new, packet-switched domain
(Bates, 2002, pp. 52 – 53). The GPRS backbone is completely built on IP-
based networks, which is more suited to data services.
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However, due to the regional nature of the standardization, the concept
of globalization did not succeed completely. Inter-operability between the
various networks became a big problem.
The third generation, 3G, is expected to complete the globalization pro-
cess of mobile communication. The main idea behind 3G is to prepare a
universal infrastructure, able to carry various existing and also future ser-
vices. The infrastructure should be designed to allow technology changes and
evolution to the network without rendering existing services unstable. The
emphasis thus is more on data services (Korhonen, 2001, p. 9).
The 3G landscape can be captured by the classic picture of a layered
architecture of radio cells in Figure 1.1. There are mega-cells for satellites,
macro-cells for wide-area coverage (rural areas), micro-cells for urban cover-
age, and pico-cells for indoor use. Typically, a mixture of public and private
use occurs (Wisely et al., 2002, p. 27).
 
Figure 1.1: Classic 3G Layer Diagram (Wisely et al., 2002, p. 27)
As envisioned above, 3G intends to provide a world-wide universal mobile
communication system. It will offer true broadband data: video on demand,
videophones, and high bandwidth games. 3G systems differ from 2G voice
and text messaging services in terms of both the bandwidth and data capa-
bilities.
With the goal of a world-wide universal mobile communication system,
3G was originally conceived as being a single world-wide standard. However,
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by the time 3G was born, there were two proposed 3G systems and five air
interface standards (Korhonen, 2001, p. 13 ). Besides the various Wireless
Wide Area Network (WWAN) access technologies offered by 3G, there also
exists various Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) access technologies,
which provide high-bandwidth over a narrow geographical area, relative to
WWAN’s low-bandwidth over a wide geographical area (Stemm & Katz,
1998). The question needs to be asked why a single network cannot provide
all services with high-bandwidth over a wide geographical area at all times,
as desired in 3G’s ‘Martini’ version — ‘anytime, anyplace, anywhere’ (Wisely
et al., 2002, p. 29). The following two aspects provide reasons why.
One aspect is economical. The existing 2G operators and manufacturers
desire to reuse as much existing equipment, development effort, and services
as possible (Wisely et al., 2002, p. 29), so that they can maximize the revenue
of their investment. This is their primary concern.
The other aspect is technological. As stated by Stemm and Katz (1998),
no single wireless network technology simultaneously provides a low-latency,
high-bandwidth, wide-area data services to a large number of mobile users.
Although technologies progress faster and faster, this statement is still true
at this point in time.
Thus, currently end users cannot enjoy services anytime, anyplace, any-
where without the complication of carrying a multitude of devices in their
pockets. However, if this goal is reviewed with a prudent look, it appears
as if it does not necessarily require a single network. What is required is a
ubiquitous service regardless of using a single network or multiple networks.
Two aspects play a role to attain an ubiquitous service. Firstly, technol-
ogy. Integration technology is required to integrate all existing heterogeneous
network resources in such a way that each service is delivered via the net-
work that is most efficient for that service (Wu & Havinga, 2001). Secondly,
business. A number of roaming agreements between operators are required
to enable seamless roaming between heterogeneous networks in terms of au-
thentication, authorization and accounting.
As far as technology is concerned, there are two key factors that signifi-
cantly impact on the integration of heterogeneous networks. One is on the
physical layer and user end while the other is on the network layer.
The user terminal should be equipped with a multiple wireless air interface
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module so that it can switch to different networks easily and transparently
without user interaction. The Nokia D211, shown in Figure 1.2, is this
kind of multiple-mode equipment. It is a PCMCIA card which can connect
to the GPRS or WLAN network according to the real time condition. A
laptop equipped with this card will be able to access both GPRS and WLAN
networks.
Figure 1.2: Nokia D211 Multiple-mode PCMCIA Card
An innovative technology, Software-Defined Radio (SDR), has already
emerged to enable more flexible multiple-mode equipment. SDR is defined
as a radio with enough programmability, with “enough” being a purpose-
fully loose term (Berezdivin, Breinig, & Topp, 2002). It was reported that
Sandbridge Technologies in the USA has successfully implemented a com-
plete “3G” multimedia handset design utilizing its SB3010(TM) flexible base-
band processor to perform all baseband and multimedia functions in software
(Glossner et al., 2005). This will dramatically stimulate the application of
SDR technology in the multiple-mode terminal.
Besides the physical layer and user end factor, another key factor for the
integration of heterogeneous networks is on the network layer. A protocol
should exist to glue all the heterogeneous networks together. The Internet
Protocol (IP), originally designed to interwork between different networks,
seems to be such a protocol. The explosive growth of the Internet also shows
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IP’s strong vitality. It is predicted that the key role of IP in future mobile
data systems will probably be the provision of efficient and cost effective
interworking between heterogeneous overlay networks (Guardini, D’Urso, &
Fasano, 2000).
However, traditionally, IP-based networks have been designed with the
assumption that they are fixed. Although the concept works well in a fixed
environment, when it comes to mobile environments, a major problem arises
because an IP address has two contradictory semantics (Perkins, 1998). On
the one hand, the IP address serves as an identifier of the mobile terminal for
the upper protocols — this should be the same regardless of the sub-network
it attaches to. On the other hand, the IP address also serves as a locator
of the mobile terminal for routing the datagram to its destination — this
requires change to reflect the sub-network the mobile terminal has moved to.
A solution, Mobile IP (Perkins, 1996b), has been proposed by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) to address this problem. The essential idea
is that each Mobile Node is allocated two IP addresses:
• Home Address (HoA), which is permanently assigned to a Mobile Node,
and acts as its identifier, and
• Care-of Address (CoA), which is temporarily assigned to a Mobile
Node, and acts as its locator reflecting its actual location.
This leads to the introduction of two new entities into the Internet in-
frastructure:
• Home Agent (HA), which resides on a Mobile Node’s home network.
The Home Agent tunnels packets destined for the Mobile Node’s home
address to its Care-of Address when it is away from the home network,
and maintains current location information for the Mobile Node.
• Foreign Agent (FA), which resides on a Mobile Node’s visited network,
that is, the foreign network. The Foreign Agent provides routing ser-
vices to the Mobile Node while registered. The Foreign Agent detun-
nels and delivers packets to the Mobile Node that were tunnelled by
the Mobile Node’s Home Agent.
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From an information security perspective, referring to the NSTISSC Se-
curity Model (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, pp. 10 – 15), the aforementioned
solution only addresses the problem partially, that is, it ensures availabil-
ity only. This calls for a security mechanism in terms of authentication,
confidentiality, and integrity characteristics of the user data. The need is
emphasized when considering that roaming data will be delivered between
different administrative domains which lack sufficient mutual trust.
For the purpose of protecting the authenticity, confidentiality, and in-
tegrity of the data, the IETF has proposed a security architecture for the
Internet, IPSec (Kent & Atkinson, 1998c). Like IP, it was originally de-
signed for fixed networks, and therefore lacks mobility support. At a glance,
a combination of Mobile IP and IPSec seems to be a possible solution to mo-
bility and security support in the integration of heterogeneous networks in
the 3G era (Rantala, 2004). However, the research community has indicated
that there is a big challenge in combining Mobile IP and IPSec (Adrangi &
Levkowetz, 2005).
1.3 Scenario
Starting with the classic 3G layer diagram in Figure 1.1, and delving further
into the network details, a more detailed scenario diagram can be derived, as
illustrated in Figure 1.3. All further discussions in this study will be based
on this scenario.
Figure 1.3 adopts some notations from Vaarala and Klovning (2005), and
extends its usage based on the same representation.
From a horizontal perspective, the scenario is divided into two separate
administrative domains, an untrusted external domain (it is often the Inter-
net) and a trusted internal domain (it is often an intranet). In general, the
internal domain is a corporate intranet. The corporate intranet can deploy
wireless networks inside the corporate administrative domain. Each Mobile
Node (MN) has a Security Association with the internal domain and belongs
to a home network. When a Mobile Node roams inside the internal domain, it
is designated as i-MN in this study. The internal subnetwork, which it visits,
is designated as i-Foreign Network. The Correspondent Node (CN) inside the
internal domain is designated as i-CN. When the Mobile Node roams outside
10 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
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the internal domain, it is designated as x-MN. Any external foreign network
is designated as the x-Foreign network. Similarly, the Correspondent Node
outside the internal domain is designated as x-CN.
Note that i-MN and x-MN represent different roles of the same entity
rather than different entities. A Mobile Node always belongs to the internal
domain, regardless of whether it is designated as i-MN or x-MN. This rela-
tionship is represented as a Security Association between the Mobile Node
and the internal domain. In contrast, x-CN always represents an external
domain node, while i-CN always represents an internal domain node.
From a vertical perspective, according to the coverage range, the scenario
is divided into four layers (Stemm & Katz, 1998). Higher layers in the hi-
erarchy provide a lower bandwidth per unit area connection over a larger
geographic area. The top layer is satellite network. It provides the widest
regional-area coverage, which forms the mega-cells. The second layer is Wire-
less Wide Area Networks (WWANs). It provides a metropolitan-area cov-
erage, which forms the macro-cells. The third layer is Wireless Local Area
Networks (WLANs). It generally provides a campus-area coverage, which
forms the micro-cells. The bottom layer is Wireless Personal Area Networks
(WPANs). It provides a room-size coverage, which forms the pico-cells. Of
the various layers the satellite network and WWANs, generally, are operator-
deployed. The WLANs are often enterprise-deployed, but sometimes can
be operator-deployed as a complement of the operator’s own WWAN. The
WPANs can be enterprise-deployed or family-deployed.
When projecting the vertical view into the horizontal view, the satellite
network and WWANs absolutely fall into the x-Foreign Network, because
they are operator-deployed, relative to any corporate intranet, they are to-
tally external domains. The WLANs can be Home Network, i-Foreign Net-
work, or x-Foreign Network depending on the practical deployment. The
same holds for the WPANs.
1.3.1 Handover
When the Mobile Node moves, it has to switch to different networks in order
to keep communicating according to various parameters, such as signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR), cost, and bandwidth. This procedure is called handover,
or handoff.
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It is worth noting that there are two distinguishing types of handover.
One is the horizontal handover, which means a handover between base sta-
tions that are using the same type of wireless network interface (Stemm &
Katz, 1998). It typically takes place in the same layer in Figure 1.3. The
other is the vertical handover, which means a handover between base stations
that are using different wireless network technologies. The vertical handover,
in turn, can be divided into two categories: an upward handover is a hand-
over to a wireless network with a larger cell size (and lower bandwidth per
unit area), and a downward vertical handover is a handover to a wireless
network with a smaller cell size (and higher bandwidth per unit area). Both
handover types may probably lead to administrative domain switch.
Another factor, that should be taken into account when deciding on the
handover, is the handover overhead. Although smaller coverage generally, but
not always, means higher bandwidth, it also means more frequent handover.
Handover is a very time-consuming and resource-consuming operation. As a
result of the tradeoff between bandwidth and handover overhead, a Mobile
Node should connect to the higher layer with larger coverage only where the
WLAN is not available. Once the WLAN is available again, the Mobile Node
should immediately switch back to the WLAN. This way the Mobile Node
can enable seamless handover and keep continual communication. A rule
of thumb is that the WLAN serves as a primary access network, and other
wireless networks serve as secondary access networks to provide continual
communication when the primary network is unavailable.
From the above analysis, it is concluded that the handover will play an
important role in the integration of heterogeneous networks. However, based
on the above-mentioned rule of thumb, this study only considers handover
parameter signal-to-noise ratio and bandwidth.
1.3.2 Routing
The appropriate handover between different networks enables Mobile Nodes
to keep continual and ubiquitous communication anywhere. After handover,
the packets should be delivered to Mobile Nodes correctly, regardless of which
wireless network they attach to. This involves the routing of packets. For
the sake of future discussion, four communication paths are identified in this
scenario:
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• i-MN ↔ i-CN
• i-MN ↔ x-CN
• x-MN ↔ i-CN
• x-MN ↔ x-CN
These four communication paths have different representations. Path i-
MN ↔ i-CN presents the internal traffic. Path x-MN ↔ i-CN presents the
remote access to the internal resource when Mobile Nodes move away from
the internal domain. Path i-MN ↔ x-CN and x-MN ↔ x-CN present access
to the Internet regardless of whether Mobile Nodes are located inside or
outside the internal domain.
1.3.3 Security
To protect against violation of information over the above-mentioned four
communication paths, appropriate security services should be provided in
place. According to the National Security Telecommunications and Informa-
tion System Security Committee, the characteristics include availability, ac-
curacy, authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, utility, and possession (Whit-
man & Mattord, 2003, p. 10). Canavan (2001, p. 9), however, pointed out
that in the context of network security, only availability, authenticity, confi-
dentiality, and integrity are relevant. Only these characteristics are therefore
involved in this study.
Depending on the domain that the communication paths involve, security
services are provided to different degrees. Generally, it is assumed that the
internal domain is viewed as a trusted network, and each node in the internal
networks trusts each other. Therefore, end-to-end security for path i-MN ↔
i-CN is not necessary, while end-to-end security for x-MN↔ i-CN is necessary
due to an untrusted external domain being introduced.
Although end-to-end security is needed for paths i-MN↔ x-CN and x-MN
↔ x-CN, due to the lack of a Security Association between them, end-to-
end security is difficult to implement between them using a predefined key
security mechanism.
Apart from the aforementioned diverse considerations, a common security
consideration for all communication paths is the wireless link. Generally, the
14 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
wireless link is considered the weakest link along the communication path,
and thus it should be secured first.
1.3.4 Mobility
Mobility has been classified in many ways. Where the internal and external
domains are concerned, a typical classification, promoted by Adrangi and
Levkowetz (2005), is:
• Mobility inside the Intranet, in which Mobile Nodes move inside the
Intranet, communicating with the internal Correspondent Nodes.
• Mobility outside the Intranet, in which Mobile Nodes move outside the
Intranet, communicating with the internal Correspondent Nodes.
The entities involved in this classification is illustrated in Figure 1.4.
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Figure 1.4: Mobility inside and outside the Intranet
As shown in Figure 1.4, this classification involves only i-MN, i-CN, and
x-MN, excluding x-CN. Since all these entities belong to the internal domain,
even if x-MN goes outside the internal domain, this study defines mobility
between these entities as Internal Mobility. It involves the communication
paths: i-MN ↔ i-CN and x-MN ↔ i-CN. On the opposite side, mobility
between i-MN, x-MN, and x-CN is defined as External Mobility, because it
introduces an external entity, namely x-CN. It involves the communication
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paths i-MN ↔ x-CN and x-MN ↔ x-CN, as illustrated in Figure 1.5. It is
worth noting that currently most research effort focuses on internal mobility,
and relatively little research is done on external mobility.
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Figure 1.5: Internal and External Mobility
Apart from the classification in the horizontal direction, a classification
in the vertical direction is also made. This includes global mobility, macro-
mobility, and micro-mobility. This will be intensively discussed in Section 5.4
on page 120. Figure 1.6 depicts these two classifications.
  
	    
	 	    
	  	    

  ﬀﬁ	     ﬂ   
	ﬃ    
	ﬃﬀ      ! "#ﬂ $ 	    %  ! "#ﬂ & 
Figure 1.6: Mobility Classification
1.4 Goal and Scope
After recognizing where the challenge exists and analyzing the above scenario,
this study seeks to explore a probable framework for seamlessly integrating
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heterogeneous networks with mobility and security support in place, provid-
ing the user with Internet access and remote access to the enterprise intranet,
as well as pervasive reachability. Considering the wide deployment of GSM
and its derivate, UMTS, as well as IEEE 802.11 WLAN, this study chooses
UMTS and IEEE 802.11 as the representatives of WWAN and WLAN respec-
tively. It aims to combine GPRS, Mobile IP, and IPSec to realize seamless
handover between GPRS and WLAN, as well as seamless global roaming,
while ensuring security.
With reference to Figure 1.5, internal mobility is protected under IPSec.
However, IPSec is unsuitable to ensure security for external mobility, since
the external entity generally does not have security associations with the
internal domain. Other upper layer security mechanisms, for example, the
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) (Freier, Karlton, & Kocher, 1996) and Transport
Layer Security (TLS) (Dierks & Allen, 1999), may be a good choice for
external mobility, but to limit the scope are purposefully omitted from this
study. In addition, there is an existing standard for wireless link security,
that is, Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) (Schafer, 2003, p. 303). Likewise,
this is not the focus of this study.
This study will not involve physical and link layer technology. Thus the
Software-Defined Radio (SDR) will be excluded from this study. The study
rather focuses on the network layer. It involves IEEE 802.11 and UMTS
networks.
From a system view, the UMTS can be divided crudely into three parts:
the air interface, the radio access network and the core network (Wisely et
al., 2002, p. 22). That is the Wideband Code Division Multiple Access
(WCDMA), the Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN) and
the Core Network, as shown in Figure 2.1 on page 26.
This study will focus on the Core Network and Radio Access Network of
the UMTS system, especially the packet-switched domain, that is, the GPRS
domain, because that is “where IP can make a difference to the performance
and architecture of a 3G network” (Wisely et al., 2002, p. 22). Air interface
and hardware are not this study’s concern.
As before mentioned, global roaming will be one of this study’s objectives,
but only the technological aspect will be involved in this study; the business
aspect on how roaming agreements are signed is not relevant to this study.
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Although IPv6 is considered revolutionary for the new Internet model,
changing to IPv6 must be an evolutionary process (SPIRENT, 2004). As
reported by ADTRAN (2005), there is a limited demand for IPv6 in the U.S.
market. Both IPv6 and IPv4 will need to co-exist and inter-operate for an
extended transitional period. IPv4 thus still has large business value. Due
to IPv4’s wide deployment and high maturity, all IP-relative protocols and
standards in this study are based on IPv4. However, the impact of IPv6 on
the framework proposed by this study, will be evaluated in the conclusion
chapter.
This study attempts to propose a high level framework. As such it is not
a practical project, and does not produce implementable specifications. The
next section summarizes the objectives.
1.5 Objectives
As mentioned in Section 1.4, the goal of this study is to develop a framework
that combine GPRS, Mobile IP, and IPSec, which realizes seamless handover
between GPRS and WLAN, while ensuring security.
To successfully achieve this goal, the following objectives need to be ad-
dressed:
• An effective IP mobility approach should be selected depending on
different geographical ranges.
• A mechanism should be found to ensure seamless handover between
GPRS and WLAN.
• Mobile IP services should be offered in the GPRS network.
• Mobile IP should cooperate with IPSec to provide mobility and security
simultaneously.
These objectives will be realized systematically.
1.6 Methodology
The methodology followed in this study was primarily a literature study.
The emphasis of which was on the review of existing RFC documents and
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Internet drafts from the IETF, as well as the specifications and technical re-
ports from the international telecommunication research organization, such
as 3GPP, 3GPP2, ETSI and so forth. Although few books were at our
disposal, academic papers from appropriate international conferences and
referred journals were reasonably available through digital libraries and per-
sonal websites on the Internet.
The synthesis of the framework relied on argumentation and drawing
analogies to similar problems. The framework was presented in the form
of a dissertation, as well as an academic paper. Verification of the frame-
work would be attempted in terms of best practices and, possibly, network
simulations.
1.7 Related Work
Some of the aforementioned issues were addressed partially by other re-
searchers. Guardini et al. (2000) pointed out that IP would play a key
role in an interworking wireless network. Wisely et al. (2002) further proved
this standpoint from the IP design principles perspective.
Das, Misra, and Agrawal (2000) classified IP mobility as Micro-mobility,
Macro-mobility, and Global mobility in a hierarchical manner. Their solu-
tion, TeleMIP, chooses the most effective method according to the current
scope.
Stemm and Katz (1998) presented the concept of the vertical handover,
which theorized seamless handover between heterogeneous networks. A lot of
practical work has been done based on this concept. OmniCon, for example,
created a virtual network device to enable interworking between IEEE802.11
and GPRS (Sharma, Baek, Dodia, & Chiueh, 2004). Recently, the LCE-CL
testbed was also deployed to examine the performance of handover between
IEEE802.11 and GPRS (Vidales, Mapp, Stajano, Crowcroft, & Bernardos,
2005), and got some experimental results.
As to the integration of MIPv4 and GPRS, ETSI introduced a three-
step approach toward this target (European Telecommunications Standards
Institute, 2001).
The research community addresses the problem of combining Mobile IP
and IPSec in two ways:
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• add security to Mobile IP, or
• add mobility to IPSec.
Since currently the firewall and IPSec have much wider deployments than
Mobile IP, this study intends to add mobility to IPSec rather than add se-
curity to Mobile IP.
The idea of combining Mobile IP and IPSec has the root in the Mobile IP
Security system (MoIPS, 1995 – 1997) (Zao et al., 1997). Zao and Condell
(1997) summarized this idea in the form of an Internet draft. Another early
attempt of combining Mobile IP and IPSec was given in the Secure Mobile
Networking project (SMN) of the Portland State University in July 1995
(Binkley, 2001). The comments from this project formed the Internet draft,
“Security Considerations for Mobility and Firewalls” (Binkley & Richard-
son, 1998). SecMIP proposed a solution that the Home Agent was hidden
behind a de-militarized zone (DMZ) (Braun & Danzeisen, 2001). This so-
lution required that the IPSec security association had to be renegotiated
every time when the Mobile Node obtained a new Care-of Address (COA),
which led to a significant delay. For addressing this problem, the concept
of dual home agents was introduced. The Secure Universal Mobility project
(SUM) proposed this kind of architecture (Dutta et al., 2004). In this pro-
posal, an internal Home Agent tunnels the packet destined for a Mobile
Node to the IPSec gateway, which in turn tunnel it to an external Home
Agent. Finally, the external Home Agent tunnel it to the Mobile Node as
if the external Home Agent expands the IPSec tunnel. Since the outer end
of IPSec is in the external Home Agent, which hides the Care-of Address
changes from IPSec gateway, the IPSec security association does not need to
be renegotiated every time when the Care-of Address changes. However, this
introduced the overhead of triple encapsulation, which may not be suitable
for real-time communication. A recent research study was done on provid-
ing low-latency secure mobile communications based on the previous SUM
architecture (Choyi & Barbeau, 2005).
Recently, there has been much activity within the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) to develop solutions to maintain IPSec connectivity while
a mobile device changes its IP address. An Internet draft has been accepted
as the RFC document in August 2005, which pointed out the existing prob-
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lems in integrating Mobile IP and IPSec (Adrangi & Levkowetz, 2005). A
solution has been proposed in the form of an Internet draft to address these
problems (Vaarala & Klovning, 2005). This solution involved both the en-
terprise and the Internet environments.
Rantala (2004) specially discussed the enterprise use of Mobile IP and
IPSec. EURESCOM’s FIT-MIP project addressed the global mobility prob-
lem (Morand & Tessier, 2002).
However, none of them provided a whole framework to achieve this study’s
goal. Thus this study seeks to stand on the shoulders of these contributors
to propose a complete framework towards this study’s goal.
1.8 Overview of This Study
The layout of the dissertation is illustrated in Figure 1.7 and is divided into
three parts:
Part I introduces knowledge that the reader needs to understand the
proposed framework and consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 provides some
background and defines the scope and problems of the topic. Chapter 2 pro-
vides a brief introduction of GPRS network as well as 3G systems. Chapter
3 introduces the concept of wireless overlay network and network models of
implementing this concept. Chapter 4 describes IP’s design principles and
examines its drawbacks. Chapter 5 describes Mobile IP and discusses the
effective IP mobility solution. Chapter 6 provides an overall description of
IPSec.
Part II presents the proposed framework and consists of three chap-
ters. Chapter 7 introduces offering Mobile IP services to GPRS networks.
Chapter 8 investigates the various scenarios of combining Mobile IP and
IPSec and introduces a dual home agent architecture for the integration of
IPSec and Mobile IP.Chapter 9 proposes a complete framework for seamless
handover between GPRS and WLAN without losing security characteristics.
Part III is the epilogue and contains only Chapter 10. It concludes this
dissertation, evaluates the proposed framework and indicates future work.
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Chapter 2
GPRS — A Key Milestone
towards 3G
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the objectives of this study is to
find a mechanism to realize seamless handover between GPRS networks and
802.11 WLAN. To understand such an mechanism, this chapter will examine
the various aspects of the GPRS network.
General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) is a key milestone for GSM data
service (Bates, 2002, p. 52), because it introduces a brand-new, packet-
switched and IP-based domain into GSM network (European Telecommuni-
cations Standards Institute, 2000a), which is more suited to data services.
Furthermore, GPRS also provides an added step towards third-generation
(3G) networks, as predicted by Regis J.(Bud) Bates, President of TC Inter-
national consulting, Inc.:
“GPRS will enable the network operators to implement IP-based
core architecture for data applications. This will continue to pro-
liferate new services and mark the steps to 3G services for inte-
grated voice and data applications.” (Bates, 2002, p. 54)
Nowadays the broad deployment of GPRS world wide has justified this
prediction. With the deployment of GPRS, 3G has progressed from con-
cept to realization. Therefore, regardless of from a theoretical or practical
perspective, GPRS is worth proper attention at this point in time.
Due to the significant relationship between 3G and GPRS, an introduc-
tion of 3G will be provided first in this chapter. Then an overview of GPRS
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will be given. After that, the various aspects of GPRS will be described in
proper detail in terms of routing, addressing scheme, procedures and mobility
management. Specific attention will be paid to handovers.
2.1 Introduction to 3G
Probably the best description of the original concept of 3G is captured in
Alan Clapton’s quote — head of British Telecom’s 3G development:
“3G ... The evolution of mobile communications towards the goal
of universal personal communications, a range of services that
can be anticipated being introduced early in the next century to
provide customers with wireless access to the information super
highway and meeting the ‘Martini’ vision of communications with
anyone, anywhere and in any medium” (Clapton & Groves, 1996)
A classic graphical description for this scenario has been shown in Fig-
ure 1.1 on page 5.
However, reviewing 3G’s history, this scenario was not really realized in
practice. 3G has progressed from its ‘Martini’ vision — ‘anytime, anyplace,
anywhere’, to a system much closer, in many respects, to the existing 2G net-
works. The major reason for this was the desire by the existing 2G operators
and manufacturers to reuse as much existing equipment, development effort,
and services as possible (Wisely et al., 2002, p. 29). This is an important
factor in understanding the development of the 3G system below.
2.1.1 Overview of 3G Standards
Although 3G was originally conceived as being a single world-wide standard,
by the time it was born, there were two proposed 3G systems and five air
interface standards. It is the result of a tradeoff between realism and ide-
alism. The whole project was termed as the IMT-2000 family of standards
(Schiller, 2003, p. 136). IMT-2000 is a total “umbrella specification” of all
3G standards, which covers all aspects of 3G systems. From a system view,
3G systems can be divided very crudely into three parts: the Air Interface,
the Radio Access Network (RAN) and the Core Network (CN) (Wisely et
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al., 2002, p. 22). All 3G standards will be investigated in a comprehensive
and brief way according to this division.
The two proposed 3G systems are Universal Mobile Telecommunications
System (UMTS) (European Telecommunications Standards Institute, 2000b,
2002), developed and promoted by Europe and Japan, and CDMA2000 (3rd
Generation Partnership Project 2, 2001), developed and promoted by North
America. There are also two standardization bodies to support them respec-
tively, 3GPP (www.3gpp.org) for UMTS, and 3GPP2 (www.3gpp2.org) for
CDMA2000.
The five air interface standards concerned are Wideband CDMA, CDMA2000,
TD/CDMA, UMC-136 (EDGE), and DECT, as summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Air Interface Standards of IMT2000 Family
IMT2000 designation Common Term Duplex type
IMT-DS Direct Spread CDMA Wideband CDMA FDD
IMT-MC Multi Carrier CDMA CDMA2000 FDD
IMT-TC Time Division CDMA TD-CDMA TDD
IMT-SC Single Carrier UMC-136 FDD
IMT-FT Frequency Time DECT TDD
As to the core network, for the purpose of reusing, they are chosen based
on the existing 2G Core Network: in the case of UMTS an evolved GSM
Core Network is used; and in the case of CDMA2000 an evolved ANSI-41
Core Network is used.
Since new air interfaces were adopted, the Radio Access Network, as the
glue linking the Core Network and Base Stations, had to be new for both
UMTS and CDMA2000. In UMTS, a new Radio Access Network, Universal
Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN), was produced to adapt to the
new air interface. In the CDMA2000, upgrades to the Base Transceiver
Station (BTS) and Base Station Controller (BSC) were required (Smith &
Collins, 2002, p. 159), due to the introduction of packet data services and
the new air interface.
Due to the wide deployment of GSM, its descendant, UMTS, received the
most attention. Since GPRS is a part of both GSM and UMTS, the rest of
this section will focus on UMTS. As will be seen later, GSM technology played
a remarkable role in the background to UMTS (Kaaranen et al., 2001, p. 9).
Knowledge of GSM is therefore helpful for understanding UMTS. However,
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Figure 2.1: High Level UMTS Architecture (Korhonen, 2001, p. 206)
GSM will not be mentioned in this study. Interested readers are referred to a
plethora of literature available on GSM. In particular, a good description can
be found in the book “GSM Switching, Services and Protocols” (Eberspacher
et al., 2001).
UMTS is updated regularly under the control of 3GPP. Until now, 3GPP
has released four versions of UMTS: 3GPP Release 99 (R99), sometimes
called Release 3 (R3), 3GPP Release 4 (R4), 3GPP Release 5 (R5) and 3GPP
Release 6 (R6). Due to 3GPP R99’s wide deployment and high maturity, the
description of UMTS in this study is based on 3GPP R99 unless otherwise
stated.
2.1.2 UMTS Network Architecture
A complete UMTS architecture consists of the user terminal and network
entities. In the context of 3G systems, the user terminal is called User Equip-
ment (UE) and contains two separate parts: Mobile Equipment (ME) and
the UMTS Service Identity Module (USIM) (Kaaranen et al., 2001, p. 9).
The network entities in turn are divided into two parts: the Radio Access
Network (in UMTS it is called UTRAN) and the Core Network. A high level
architecture is depicted in Figure 2.1.
The interfaces, between the User Equipment and the UTRAN (Uu in-
terface), and between the UTRAN and the Core Network (Iu interface),
are open multi-vendor interfaces. The Uu interface is the place where the
WCDMA technology can take effect. However, it is not this study’s focus.
This study will focus on UTRAN and the Core Network (CN) as well as the
Iu interface between them, because “that is where IP could make a difference
to the performance and architecture of a 3G network” (Wisely et al., 2002,
p. 22).
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Figure 2.2: UMTS Network Architecture (Kaaranen et al., 2001, p. 10)
Figure 2.2 provides much more details of the UMTS architecture. This
will be described in detail in the subsequent subsections. For now, observe
that the UMTS infrastructures are constructed in a hierarchical fashion, as
shown in Figure 2.3. This leads to hierarchical Mobility Management.
A UMTS network consists of at least one administrative region, which is
assigned to a Mobile Switching Center (MSC). Each administrative region is
made up of at least one Location Area (LA). Sometimes the LA is also called
the visited area. A LA consists of several cell groups. Each cell group is
assigned to a Radio Network Controller (RNC). Therefore for each LA there
exists at least one Base Station (BS), but cells of one RNC may belong to
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Figure 2.3: UMTS System Hierarchy (Eberspacher et al., 2001, p. 29)
different Location Areas.
Radio Access Network
As shown in Figure 2.2, there are two types of Radio Access Networks, the
UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN) and GSM/EDGE Radio
Access Network (GERAN). GERAN derives from the GSM with Enhanced
Data for GSM Evolution (EDGE) technology, which is introduced into UMTS
in 3GPP R4/5 as an alternative to building a UMTS mobile network. How-
ever, this study does not intend to handle it in detail. A good description of
it can be found in Halonen, Romero, and Melero (2003, p. 585).
The other Radio Access Network, UTRAN, forms the focus of this study.
It consists of Radio Network Subsystems, and each Radio Network Subsystem
(RNS) in turn contains a different number of Base Stations (BS or, officially,
Node B) and one Radio Network Controller (RNC).
The main task of UTRAN is to create and maintain the Radio Access
Bearer (RAB) for communication between User Equipment (UE) and Core
Network (CN) (Kaaranen et al., 2001, p. 99). This task is distributed to the
Base Station and Radio Network Controller.
The Base Station can be considered as the radio edge of the UTRAN.
Thus its underlying task is to perform radio signal receiving and transmit-
ting, signal filtering and amplifying, and signal modulation and demodula-
tion. Although the Base Station’s main task is the underlying signal process,
nevertheless, there are also other UTRAN control functions in which the
Base Station is involved. On the one hand, the Base Station plays a partly
supportive role in some functions, including fulfilling, collecting and filtering
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radio measurements, and providing them to the Radio Network Controller
to execute its control functions. On the other hand, the Base Station plays
a central role in code generating, power control executing and Operation &
Maintenance, particularly in the network element or at the cell level.
The Radio Network Controller is the switching and controlling element of
the UTRAN. On the whole, the functions of the Radio Network Controller
can be divided into two parts: UTRAN Radio Resource Management (RRM)
and control functions (Kaaranen et al., 2001, p. 111). Radio Resource Man-
agement uses a collection of algorithms to ensure the stability of the radio
path and the Quality of Service (QoS) of radio connection by the effective
sharing and managing of radio resources. UTRAN control functions are those
relevant to setup, maintenance and release of the Radio Access Bearer.
Core Network
The Core Network (CN) can be seen as the basic platform for all communi-
cation services provided to UMTS subscribers, including switching of circuit-
switched calls and routing of packet data (Kaaranen et al., 2001, p. 143).
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the UMTS Core Network primarily consists of
two basic domains: Circuit-Switched (CS) domain and Packet-Switched (PS)
domain. One of the reasons for such a division is to reflect the traffic char-
acteristics in each domain. These two domains are described briefly below:
• Circuit-Switched Domain: this domain delivers circuit-switched traffic,
and is based on the traditional telecommunication network technolo-
gies, such as Integrated Service Digital Network (ISDN) and Signalling
System #7 (SS7). This domain contains two major elements: the Mo-
bile Switching Center (MSC) and the Gateway Mobile Switching Center
(GMSC).
• Packet-Switched Domain: this domain delivers the packet data traffic,
and is based on IP-based network technologies. This is where GPRS
comes in, which will be discussed later in Section 2.2. Its two major
counterparts to the Circuit-Switched Domain are the Serving GPRS
Support Node (SGSN) and the Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN).
In addition to the above mentioned basic domains, there are two extra
elements in the Core Network, which are described in brief below:
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• IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS): this subsystem was introduced in
3GPP Release 5. What makes a difference between a subsystem and
the above domains is the following: the Core Network domains have an
direct interface to one or more access networks, as shown in Figure 2.2,
while the Core Network subsystem does not have such a direct interface
with access networks. Instead, it connects to one or more Core Network
domains to perform its functionalities (Kaaranen et al., 2001, p. 145).
This subsystem’s primary purpose is to enable applications in mobile
devices to establish peer-to-peer connections.
• Broadcast (BC) Domain: although it has been defined to be part of the
Core Network, its implementation with the 3G network is for further
study. For the consideration of integrity, it is mentioned here.
Besides the domains and subsystems mentioned above, some function-
alities that are common to all Core Network domains and subsystems are
mainly collected in a series of registers as illustrated in Figure 2.2. These
functionalities are distributed into the separate elements: the Home Loca-
tion Register (HLR), the Visitor Location Register(VLR), the Authentication
Center (AuC) and the Equipment Identity Register (EIR). Physically, the
Visitor Location Register is often implemented at the Mobile Switch Center,
while other registers are located in a central site, as shown in Figure 2.2.
The details of these elements, including the above mentioned Circuit-
Switched elements, are not handled in this dissertation. A good description
of them can be found in Korhonen (2001, pp. 208 – 213). The Packet-
Switched elements, that is the GPRS specific elements, will be discussed in
detail in Section 2.2. However, it is necessary to highlight the functionality
provided by these elements here:
• Mobility Management (MM): this functionality is performed primarily
through the Home Location Register and the Visitor Location Regis-
ter. The former serves as a central database for the subscriber informa-
tion, for example, addressing information. This information can help
pinpoint the user/terminal location within the Mobility Management
hierarchy shown in Figure 2.3. The latter contains pretty much the
same information, but, only for the visiting subscribers on a tempo-
rary basis. That is why it is often co-located with the Mobile Switch
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Center. In this way, user mobility is supported through the Circuit-
Switched domain, the Packet-Switched domain and the IP Multimedia
Subsystem.
• User security information generation, user security support and access
authorization: these functionalities are mainly maintained by the Au-
thentication Center, which sends signals to the Core Network domains
and subsystems through the Home Location Register.
• Identification handling: these elements, in corporation with each other,
provide the appropriate relations among all the identifiers uniquely
determining the user in the system. These identifiers will be examined
in more detail in Section 2.1.4.
It is worth noting that all those register elements, except for the Visitor
Location Register and the Equipment Identity Register, are integrated into
a new entity called the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) in the 3GPP R5.
Nevertheless the same functionalities are offered via the Home Subscriber
Server.
2.1.3 Interfaces and Protocols
The various entities in UMTS are connected together via various interfaces
regardless of being wired or wireless. These interfaces are also shown in
Figure 2.4 utilizing the GSM/GPRS naming convention, where applicable.
They can be roughly divided into two levels: the interfaces (Uu and Iu)
splitting the UMTS into three parts, and the interfaces between the entities
inside a part. The former are truly open, which means they are well-specified,
and the specification is such that the equipment on different ends of the
interface can be acquired from different manufacturers (Korhonen, 2001, p.
221). The latter are often, but not always, proprietary. A trend is that they
are becoming more and more open.
The following is a brief description of these interfaces:
Uu interface is situated between UE and UTRAN. It is the air interface
of UMTS. In other words, it is where the WCDMA technologies come
in. Some new features that WCDMA brings to this interface will be
introduced later.
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Figure 2.4: UMTS Interfaces (Korhonen, 2001, p. 207)
Iu interface is situated between UTRAN and CN. Depending on the do-
main it attaches to, it is often denoted as:
• IuCS, when it attaches to the CS domain and delivers CS traffic,
• IuPS, when it attaches to the PS domain and delivers PS traffic.
MAP interface stands for the Mobile Application Part (MAP) interface,
which was originally designed for control signalling in the GSM Circuit-
Switched services. It is a umbrella name for all interfaces between Core
Network entities. With the introduction of Packet-Switched services
by the GPRS, it became necessary to extend the MAP protocol to the
interfaces between GPRS support nodes and the home network nodes
(Kaaranen et al., 2001, p. 293). Thus it contains the following two
categories of interfaces:
• Interface C, D, E, F and G, which originate from the Circuit-
Switched domain,
• Interface Gc, Gr, Gf and Gs, which originate from the Packet-
Switched domain.
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Iub and Iur interface connect different Radio Network Controllers together,
which make soft handover possible.
2.1.4 Addresses and Identifiers
One of the major tasks of a communication system is to decide what scheme
is used to identify an entity in the system. Thus an identifier for each entity
is needed for the purpose of identifying, addressing, or both. Generally,
an equipment entity should be both identifiable and addressable while the
entity, like a user, requires identifiability only. GSM distinguishes explicitly
between user and equipment, and deals with their identification separately
(Eberspacher et al., 2001, p. 30). The user equipment and user each have
their own internationally unique identifiers separately. This concept is also
adopted by UMTS.
In UMTS, the user subscription-specific information is stored in the Uni-
versal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM), the Subscriber Identity Module
(SIM) in the case of GSM. This USIM usually comes in the form of a chip
card, which is transferable between mobile stations. This allows for distin-
guishing between the terminal mobility and personal mobility (Wisely et al.,
2002, p. 144).
Many identifiers have been defined. They are needed for the management
of subscriber mobility and for addressing all the other network elements.
The most important addresses and identifiers are presented in the following
subsections.
International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI)
The IMEI uniquely identifies mobile stations globally. It is a kind of serial
number. The IMEI is allocated by the equipment manufacturer and reg-
istered by the network operator, who stores it in the Equipment Identity
Register (EIR). By means of the IMEI one recognizes obsolete, stolen, or
nonfunctional equipment and, for example, can deny service. This purpose
is achieved by means of three lists within the EIR: white list, black list and
grey list. A detailed description of how it works can be found in the book
“Introduction to 3G Mobile Communications” (Korhonen, 2001, p. 209).
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International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
When registering for service with a mobile network operator, each subscriber
gets a unique identifier, the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI).
This IMSI is stored in the USIM. User Equipment can only be operated if a
USIM with a valid IMSI is inserted into equipment with a valid IMEI. This
allows the associated subscriber to be billed. The IMSI consists of several
parts:
• Mobile Country Code (MCC): 3 decimal places, internationally stan-
dardized.
• Mobile Network Code (MNC): 2 decimal places, for unique identifica-
tion of mobile networks within a country.
• Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (MSIN): maximum 10 deci-
mal places, identification number of the subscriber in his or her mobile
home network.
According to this addressing scheme, subscriber identification utilizes a
maximum of 15 decimal digits, and IMSI = MCC + MNC + MSIN. While
the MCC is defined internationally, the National Mobile Subscriber Identity
(NMSI = MNC + MSIN) is assigned by the operator of the home Public
Land Mobile Network (PLMN).
Mobile Subscriber ISDN Number (MSISDN)
Simply speaking, the MSISDN is the “real telephone number” of user equip-
ment. It is assigned to the subscriber in his or her USIM, such that a mobile
station can have several MSISDNs depending on the USIM. The separation
of call number (MSISDN) and subscriber identity (IMSI) primarily serves
to protect the confidentiality of the IMSI. In contrast to the MSISDN, the
IMSI need not be made public. With this separation, one can not derive
the subscriber identity from the MSISDN, unless the association of IMSI
and MSISDN, stored in the Home Location Register, has been disclosed.
A rule of thumb is that the IMSI used for subscriber identification should
not be known publicly, to make it more difficult to assume a false identity
(Eberspacher et al., 2001, p. 32).
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The MSISDN categories follow the international Integrated Service Digi-
tal Network (ISDN) numbering plan and therefore have the following struc-
ture:
• Country Code (CC): up to 3 decimal places, internationally standard-
ized.
• National Destination Code (NDC): typically 2-3 decimal places.
• Subscriber Number (SN): maximum 10 decimal places.
The subscriber number is the concatenation MSISDN = CC + NDC +
SN and thus has a maximum of 15 decimal digits. It is stored centrally in
the Home Location Register.
Location Area Identity (LAI)
Each LA of a Public Land Mobile Network has its own identifier. The Lo-
cation Area Identifier (LAI) is also structured hierarchically and is interna-
tionally unique since the Location Area itself is hierarchical, as introduced
in Section 2.1.2. LAI consists of an internationally standardized part and an
operator-dependent part:
• Country Code (CC): 3 decimal places
• Mobile Network Code (MNC): 2 decimal places
• Location Area Code (LAC): maximum 5 decimal places, or maximum
twice 8 bits
This LAI is broadcasted regularly by the base station on the Broadcast
Control Channel (BCCH). Thus, each cell is identified uniquely on the radio
channel as belonging to a LA, and each MS can determine its current location
through the LAI. If the LAI that is “heard” by the MS changes, the MS
notices this LA change and requests the updating of its location information
in the Visitor Location Register and Home Location Register.
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Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI)
The Visitor Location Register (VLR), being responsible for the current lo-
cation of a subscriber, can assign a Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
(TMSI), which has only local significance in the area handled by the VLR.
It is used in place of the IMSI for the definite identification and addressing
of the mobile station. In this way nobody can derive the identity of the
subscriber by listening to the radio channel, since this TMSI is only assigned
during the mobile station’s presence in the area of one VLR, and can even
be changed during this period (10 hopping).
The mobile station stores the TMSI on the USIM card. The TMSI is
stored on the network side only in the VLR and is not passed to the HLR.
A TMSI may therefore be assigned in an operator-specific way.
Together with the current location area, a TMSI allows a subscriber to be
identified uniquely, i.e. for the ongoing communication the IMSI is replaced
by the 2-tuple (TMSI, LAI).
Other Identifiers
Beside the above primary identifiers, there are also several other identifiers,
which are listed here for the purpose of completeness:
• Mobile Station Roaming Number (MSRN): the MSRN is a temporary
location-dependent ISDN number. It is assigned by the locally respon-
sible VLR to each mobile station in its area. Calls are routed to the MS
by using the MSRN. On request, the MSRN is passed from the HLR
to the GMSC. The MSRN has the same structure as the MSISDN.
• Local Mobile Subscriber Identity (LMSI): the LMSI serves as a search-
ing key to each visiting mobile station to accelerate database access.
It is assigned by VLR when the mobile station registers with the VLR
and is also sent to the HLR.
• Cell Identifier (CI): within a LA, the individual cells are uniquely iden-
tified with a Cell Identifier (CI), maximum 2 × 8 bits. Together with
the Global Cell Identity (LAI + CI), cells are thus also internationally
defined in a unique way.
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• Identification of MSCs and Location Registers: MSCs and location
registers (HLR, VLR) are addressed with ISDN numbers. In addition,
they may have a Signalling Point Code (SPC) within a PLMN, which
can be used to address them uniquely within the SS7 network.
2.1.5 Handover
Mobile phones can maintain their connections in cellular networks when mov-
ing from one cell area to another. This benefits from a procedure, called
handover or handoff, which switches a connection from one Base Station
(BS) to another (Korhonen, 2001, p. 38).
Handovers in UMTS are fundamentally different from handovers in GSM.
This is owed to the following two characteristics:
• In WCDMA radio access technology, employed by UMTS, all base sta-
tions use the same frequency while in TDMA, employed by GSM, dif-
ferent frequencies are used to multiplex the radio resource.
• Due to using the same frequency, the UMTS User Equipment can utilize
a multi-path receiving technology, called RAKE receiver (Korhonen,
2001, p. 32). A RAKE receiver is made of correlators, also known
as RAKE fingers, each receiving a multi-path signal. This makes it
possible for a User Equipment to simultaneously connect to more than
one base station.
A User Equipment (UE) communicating with multiple Base Stations can
spend a large part of the connection time in a Soft Handover state (Korho-
nen, 2001, p. 38). A special type of Soft Handover is Softer Handover, which
is a soft handover between cells under the same Base Station. According
to a hierarchical structure, there are other types of handovers, such as In-
ternal Handover and External Handover with the latter in turn divided into
Intra-MSC Handover and Inter-MSC Handover. This hierarchical handover
structure is shown in Figure 2.5. The concept of Soft Handover is applica-
ble through the entire hierarchical structure. There are also other kinds of
handovers that are not included in this hierarchical structure, for example,
Hard Handover and Inter-system Handover. The following subsections will
discuss handovers in brief.
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Figure 2.5: UMTS Handover
Soft Handover
As aforementioned, a User Equipment can simultaneously connect to multiple
Base Stations. In the uplink direction, the signals collected by the cells are
combined in the Base Station if all the cells attached by the User Equipment
belong to that Base Station. In the downlink direction, that Base Station
selects a cell as primary cell to send signal to the User Equipment. In this
way when the User Equipment moves between these cells, cell handover is
handled seamlessly, and no Radio Network Controller (RNC) is involved.
This handover is called Softer Handover, for example, the handover identified
by number 1 in Figure 2.5.
When the handover identified by number 2 takes place, in the uplink
direction the signal is collected by the BS1 and BS2 first, respectively. Then
the signals are combined in the RNC1. In the downlink direction, according
to the result of signal measurement, the RNC1 selects the appropriate cell,
for example, Cell3, as the primary cell to send the downlink signal. This
ensures the connection to the User Equipment is not broken before the User
Equipment loses the connection with Cell2. No Mobile Switching Center
(MSC) is involved in this situation. This kind of handover, which occurs
between the cells controlled by the same RNC, is called Internal Handover.
It also includes Softer Handover.
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All other handovers require participation of at least one MSC and are
called external handovers. When handover 3 takes place, this involves two
Radio Network Controllers (RNCs), RNC1 and RNC2. At this time, the
RNC1 plays a role of Serving Radio Networking Controller (SRNC). It is
in charge of all control between the User Equipment and the UTRAN. The
RNC2 plays a role of Drift Radio Network Controller (DRNC). It relays the
signal, collected from the Cell5, to the RNC1 via the Iur interface shown in
Figure 2.4. The RNC1 serves as an anchor to combine all signals and send
them to the MSC1 even if the User Equipment leaves all cells controlled by
the RNC1. Obviously it is not effective, because this wastes the resource of
the RNC1 and loads up the Iur interface. A procedure, Relocation, needs to
occur, which moves the SRNC role from the RNC1 to the RNC2. Relocation
is conducted by the MSC of that two RNCs. In this case, it is MSC1. Thus
it is called Intra-MSC handover.
When the User Equipment moves over a cell boundary and enters the
area of responsibility of a new MSC, the Inter-MSC handover occurs, for
example, Handover 4 in Figure 2.5. In this situation, the signals collected by
the new MSC, for example, MSC2, are always relayed to the MSC that the
User Equipment attached to at the beginning of the connection, for example,
MSC1. In this case, the MSC1 constantly keeps an anchor role, combining
signals and sending them to the destination, for the entire life time of the
connection. This is different from the case of SRNC and DRNC where their
roles constantly change with the movement of the User Equipment.
Hard Handover
Hard handover is also known as an inter-frequency handover, during which
the used radio frequency of the User Equipment changes. It is so called
break-before-make handover. It is not seamless. It is not handled in detail
in this study. Some description of it can be found in (Korhonen, 2001, pp.
44 – 45).
Inter-system Handover
Inter-system Handover is the handover between two different radio access
technologies. 3GPP has specified inter-system handover between GSM and
UTRAN systems. This is not discussed here. In contrast, the Inter-system
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Handover between UTRAN and 802.11 WLAN will be intensively discussed
in Section 3.3 on page 69.
2.2 GPRS Overview
The GPRS is originally designed to allow the service subscriber of GSM to
send data to and receive data from external Packet Data Networks (PDNs)
in an end-to-end packet transfer mode, without utilizing network resources in
Circuit Switched mode (European Telecommunications Standards Institute,
2000a). This introduces a new Packet-Switched domain into GSM, which is
inherited by GSM’s descendant, UMTS, with some modification in protocol
stack. It is worth noting that here the PDN means general packet data
networks, including not only IP networks, but also Point-to-Point Protocol
(PPP) networks and X.25 networks. That is why it is called “General Packet
Data Service”. However, in practice the GPRS is commonly used to provide
access primarily to IP PDNs, especially to the Internet (Salkintzis, 2004, p.
3-2). Thus in this study the focus is on IP-based networks only. In this
sense, from a view of the external IP networks, a GPRS network can be seen
as a special IP network, which offers IP connectivity to the mobile station
(MS, in GPRS terminology) on the move (Salkintzis, 2004, p. 3-2). In other
words, the GPRS network resembles a typical IP network in the sense that it
provides typical IP routing and interfaces to the external world through one
or more IP routers. A high level conceptual reference model is illustrated in
Figure 2.6.
Starting with this conceptual model, the rest of this section will describe
GPRS from a conceptual view first. Then GPRS system architecture, which
implements this concept, will be given. Finally, the interfaces and protocols
involved in this architecture will be examined in brief.
2.2.1 Conceptual View of GPRS
Mobile users can get access to the remote IP networks via a special access
router, which in GPRS terminology is called Gateway GPRS Support Node
(GGSN). From the perspective of the external IP network, for example, the
Internet, the GPRS network can be seen as an access network to the Inter-
net as a typical dial-up access network (Salkintzis, 2004, p. 3-2). In this
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Figure 2.6: High Level Conceptual Model of the GPRS Network (Salkintzis,
2004, p. 3-3)
sense, the GGSN serves as an interface to the external Packet Data Network
(PDN) where, on the other end, another network element, the Serving GPRS
Support Node (SGSN) offers access points to the mobile stations. When the
mobile station moves, it attaches to the closest SGSN to gain access to the
external PDN. The GGSN serves as an anchor, which forwards packets des-
tined for the mobile station to its SGSN (Eberspacher et al., 2001, p. 70).
In this way the GPRS hides the movement of the mobile station from the
external PDN.
With such a conceptual understanding of what the GPRS does, there are
several essential issues that need to be clarified:
• IP network and UMTS use different addressing schemes. In an IP
network a terminal is identified by its IP address while in the case of
an UMTS network, a terminal is addressed by the IMSI of its user. As
a result, a Mobile Station has two identifers depending on the context
in which it is used. How is an identifier converted to another identifier
when necessary? A one-to-one association between a Mobile Station’s
IP address and its IMSI should be established.
• After knowing the corresponding relationship between IP address and
IMSI, the question arises how the IP packet from the external IP net-
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Figure 2.7: GPRS System Architecture (Bates, 2002, p. 82)
work is delivered to the destination mobile station identified by its
IMSI, and vice versa. That is a matter of routing.
• Another issue is when the Mobile Station moves to a new place, how
the IP data destined to this Mobile Station is delivered to it correctly.
That is a matter of Mobility Management.
These issues will be addressed later in this chapter. Before doing that, a
complete GPRS system architecture is introduced for the purpose of reference
in future discussion.
2.2.2 GPRS System Architecture
The previous section has introduced the conceptual model of GPRS. This
section further describes a detailed system architecture of GPRS, and notes
how this architecture implements the above mentioned conceptual model.
The GPRS system architecture, as a part of the UMTS, has been presented
in Figure 2.2 on page 27. Nevertheless, a dedicated architecture diagram of
GPRS is shown in Figure 2.7 for the sake of discussion. In the figure, the
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solid lines present the data flow while the dashed lines present the signalling
flow.
As seen in Figure 2.2 on page 27, the support of GPRS does not represent
a major upgrade to the existing CS domain infrastructures. The greatest
impact is the addition of two new elements:
• the Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN), and
• the Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN).
SGSN delivers data packets from and to the mobile stations within its
service area. Its tasks include packet routing and transfer, functions for
attach/detach of mobile stations and their authentication, and logical link
management. The location register of the SGSN stores location information,
for example, current cell, current Visitor Location Register, and user profiles
of all GPRS users registered with this SGSN (Bates, 2002, pp. 108 – 110).
GGSN acts as an interface to external packet data networks. It converts
IP packets coming from the SGSN into the appropriate Packet Data Protocol
(PDP) format (IP or X.25) and sends them out on the corresponding external
network. In the other direction, the PDP address of incoming data packets
is converted to the GPRS address of the destination user. The readdressed
packets are sent to the responsible SGSN. For this purpose the GGSN stores
the current SGSN addresses and profiles of registered users in its location
register (Bates, 2002, pp. 110 – 111).
In general, there is a many-to-many relationship between the SGSNs and
GGSNs: a GGSN is the interface to an external network for several SGSNs;
a SGSN may route its packets to different GGSNs (Eberspacher et al., 2001,
p. 243).
In addition to the above two new elements, the GPRS also needs access to
the common database functional elements introduced in Section 2.1.2, such as
VLR, HLR, EIR, and AuC. However, some software upgrades need to be done
to contain some new data relevant to the GPRS. The access to these elements
is performed via an extension of the Mobile Application Part (MAP) protocol
(Korhonen, 2001, p. 231). Each MAP interface in Circuit-Switched domain
has its counterpart in the Packet-Switched domain, as shown in Figure 2.4
on page 32.
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Figure 2.8: GPRS Protocol Stack in UMTS (Kaaranen et al., 2001, p. 344)
It is worth noting that although the GPRS supports general packet data
protocol transfer, the GPRS backbone is built on an IP-based network. Thus
the communication between GSNs uses the IP protocol. However, the com-
munication between GSNs and the database elements (VLR, HLR, EIR, and
AuC) uses Signalling System #7 (SS7) network (Bates, 2002, pp. 114 – 115).
2.2.3 Interfaces and Protocols
In UTRAN, GPRS adopts the same interfaces as the CS domain. In the core
network, there are several new GPRS-specific interfaces, which are described
below:
• Gn: the interface between GSNs in the same PLMN,
• Gi: the interface between GGSN and the external PDNs,
• Gp: the interface between SGSN and the GGSN in the external PLMN,
• the GPRS extension of the MAP protocol.
A complete protocol stack in the interfaces along the communication from
the UE to the external application server is illustrated in Figure 2.8.
This protocol stack is based on UMTS. However, due to the lack of the in-
formation about GPRS in UMTS, the successive discussion is based on GPRS
in GSM. To establish a common reference frame for the future discussion, a
protocol stack based on GSM is shown in Figure 2.9.
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Figure 2.9: GPRS Protocol Stack in GSM (Eberspacher et al., 2001, p. 253)
2.3 GPRS Data Routing and Address Con-
version
As mentioned above, a GPRS network can be seen as an access network to the
external IP network. The GGSN serves as an anchor while the SGSN serves
as an access point. Data transfer between the SGSN and GGSN is performed
by means of a tunnelling mechanism. SGSNs tunnel data to GGSN using
the GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (GTP), shown in Figure 2.9, and vice versa
(Eberspacher et al., 2001, p. 70). Tunnelling is only a part of the whole
routing along the communication path between the external IP network and
the mobile station. The routing of the whole path is performed via a series
of identifiers stored in each node along the communication path, including
Tunnel ID (TID), which identifies a tunnel between a SGSN and a GGSN.
Simply speaking, this is a matter of address conversion.
To facilitate the discussion of address conversion and routing, the rest of
this section will expand the conceptual model in Figure 2.6 into a realistic
scenario. Based on this scenario, we will discuss how a packet identified by an
IP address is routed to a mobile station identified by an IMSI. This includes
both data transfer from the MS and data transfer to the MS.
Note that due to the lack of resource about GPRS in UMTS and inconsis-
tency of terms between UMTS and GSM, the following discussion is based on
GPRS interfaces and protocols in GSM shown in Figure 2.9 unless otherwise
stated. Despite this, it still enhances understanding as the concepts are the
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same.
2.3.1 Scenario
Based on Figure 2.6, a scenario is assumed here where two Mobile Stations,
MS1 and MS2, gain access to the external Packet Data Networks (PDNs)
via SGSN1 and GGSN1. In the case of MS1, it tries to gain access to three
different PDNs simultaneously, namely a PPP network, an X.25 network, and
the Internet. The MS2 tries to access to the Internet and a private Intranet.
A detailed stack, with various key identifiers, is illustrated in Figure 2.10.
Before discussing this scenario, the definition of the APN is introduced.
Access Point Name (APN) identifies each connection between the GPRS
network and an external PDN (Salkintzis, 2004, p. 3-9). It is simi-
lar to a domain name used in the Internet. It is represented as PDN
name.PLMN name.grps. PDN name is a sequence of labels in the form
label1.label2.... and identifies an external PDN. PLMN name iden-
tifies the Public Land Mobile Network that is used to provide access
to the external PDN. The encoding of PLMN name depends on the
Mobile Country Code (MCC) and the Mobile Network Code (MNC)
allocated to the given PLMN. For instance, for a PLMN with MCC
= 10 and MNC = 202, PLMN name is mnc202.mcc010. To simplify
the illustration, APN in Figure 2.10 is shown as APNn, where n is a
decimal number.
2.3.2 Identifiers
As mentioned above, the conversion between the International Mobile Sub-
scriber Identity (IMSI) and the IP address is performed by using a series
of identifers in each node. As shown in Figure 2.10, a table is assumed to
contain these identifiers in each node, that is, the Mobile Station, SGSN, and
GGSN. The implementation of the tables is vendor-specific, but the concept
is the same. It is worth noting that the MS is identified by Packet Temporary
Mobile Subscriber Identity (P-TMSI) (Kaaranen et al., 2001, p. 157) in the
SGSN table while it is identified by an IP address in the GGSN table.
2.3. GPRS DATA ROUTING AND ADDRESS CONVERSION 47
Figure 2.10: Protocol Stack with the Key Identifiers in the Scenario
At the Mobile Station (MS) end, the table holds the mapping information
of the NSAPI to the upper network layer. In the case of MS1, NSAPI1
corresponds to the PPP network layer, NSAPI2 to the IP network layer, and
NSAPI3 to the X.25 network layer.
At the SGSN end, the SGSN does not know the IP address of the MS.
It uses a Link Layer identifier to distinguish different Mobile Stations. This
identifier is called the Temporary Logical Link Identifer (TLLI). A TLLI
uniquely identifies a link to a Mobile Station. Thus a combination of TLLI
and NSAPI (TLLI, NSAPI) uniquely determines access to an external PDN,
identified by an APN. The SGSN also uses the Tunnel Identifier (TID) to
uniquely identify a tunnel between the SGSN and the GGSN. Each TID has
an one-to-one relationship with each duplet (TLLI, NSAPI). This means each
TID uniquely corresponds to an APN. The GGSN’s IP address is also held
in the table so that the SGSN can know which GGSN it will tunnel to. The
table below the SGSN1 in Figure 2.10 holds all these mapping information.
At the GGSN end, opposite to the SGSN, the IMSI of the Mobile Station,
and any telecommunication-specific identifier, except for the IP address, is
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unknown. Its table only holds the map of the MS’s IP address and TID as
well as the IP address of TID’s peer, that is the SGSN’s IP address.
This subsection has described various identifers in brief. The following
subsections will describe the data transfer in two directions to explain how
the address conversion is performed using these identifers.
2.3.3 Data Transfer from MS
When an application, for example a browser in MS1, prepares to send data,
for example a HTTP request, to the external Packet Data Network, for ex-
ample the Internet, it will go through the following steps:
• The browser delivers the request to the IP network layer as normal.
• The IP network layer encapsulates it into an IP packet with MS1’s IP
address as the source address and delivers it to the SNDCP via the
NSAPI2.
• The SNDCP prefixes a header to this IP packet, which contains NSAPI2.
The SNDCP then delivers the data to the link layer.
• SGSN1 receives the data from the link layer, which is identified by
TLLI1 in this scenario. It strips off the header, extracts the IP packet,
and sends it to GGSN1 via a tunnel identified by TID4.
• GGSN1 receives the IP packet, and sends it to the Internet identified
by APN2.
2.3.4 Data Transfer to MS
When the HTTP response in the above example is routed to GGSN1 accord-
ing to MS1’s IP address, this response will be delivered to MS1 through the
following steps:
• GGSN1 looks up the tables to determine the particular SGSN address
and TID for the Mobile Station that is the intended recipient of the
packet. In this case, it finds SGSN1 and TID4.
• GGSN1 tunnels this original packet to the SGSN1 with TID4.
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• SGSN1 maps TID4 to the corresponding TLLI1 and NSAPI2 according
to its table. At this point, SGSN1 knows where MS1 is and to which
network application it must route the packets.
• SGSN1 takes the original packet, adds a header with TLLI1 and NSAPI2,
and forwards it to the Mobile Station.
• The SNDCP layer at MS1 strips off the header and delivers the original
packet to the IP network layer via NSAPI2.
• The IP network layer extracts the response and delivers it to the
browser, which is waiting for this response.
2.3.5 Summary
Taking a scenario as an example, this section described how the address
conversion between the IMSI and IP address is performed using a series of
identifiers held by each node. An assumption in this scenario is that these
identifiers have been established already. Therefore, the question arises how
these identifiers are established. In GPRS, this is performed by a series of
procedures, which will be discussed in the following section.
2.4 GPRS Procedures
Simply speaking, the association between the mobile station’s IP address
and its IMSI is established by setting up a Packet Data Protocol (PDP)
context data structure. However, before this procedure can be performed,
Mobile Stations have to register with the GPRS network. In the GPRS
terminology, it is called the attach procedure (European Telecommunications
Standards Institute, 2000a). The opposite procedure is the detach procedure,
in which the PDP context, established in the attach procedure, is deleted.
The detached mobile station is not IP addressable until a new attach and
PDP context set-up procedure has taken place.
2.4.1 Attach Procedure
Attach procedure is performed when Mobile Stations inform the PLMN
of their presence for the purpose of using the GPRS services (European
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Figure 2.11: GPRS Attach Procedure (Salkintzis, 2004, p. 3-8)
Telecommunications Standards Institute, 2000a). This can be performed
immediately after Mobile Stations have been switched on or later as users
decide to use the GPRS services. This procedure is initiated by sending an
attach request to a SGSN. In response, the SGSN authenticates the Mobile
Station, retrieves its subscription data, and checks whether it is authorized
to have access to the GPRS network from its current routing area. If none
of the checks fails, the SGSN accepts the attach request of the mobile and
it returns an accept message. At this point, this SGSN becomes the serving
SGSN of that special Mobile Station.
The detailed attach procedure is illustrated in Figure 2.11 in the form of
a message sequence diagram. There are a total of five steps to perform this
procedure, which are described in detail hereafter.
Step 1
In this step, the Mobile Station sends an attach request message to the SGSN,
which stores the routing data where the mobile station is located. The attach
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request message typically includes the following information (Bates, 2002, p.
135):
• Packet Temporary Mobile Station Identity (P-TMSI): as described in
Section 2.1.4, this is the Packet-Switched domain counterpart of TMSI.
It serves as a temporary identifier for the user identity confidentiality.
It is allocated by a visited Routing Area’s Visitor Location Register
via a SGSN, possibly another SGSN and, possibly, in another Routing
Area. Since it is stored in the nonvolatile memory (USIM) of the Mobile
Station, it is used as a temporary Mobile Station identity as long as it
is valid.
• Routing Area Identity (RAI): the identity of the Routing Area where
the above P-TMSI, if present, was allocated.
• Network Service Access Point Identifier (NSAPI): NSAPI is specific to a
particular network application at the Mobile Station. The Subnetwork-
Dependent Convergence Protocol (SNDCP) layer uses this NSAPI to
communicate with network applications (Bates, 2002, p. 136).
• Information related to the Mobile Station capabilities: supported fre-
quency bands, multi-slot capabilities, and ciphering capabilities.
Step 2
Upon receiving the attach request, the new SGSN tries to acquire the per-
manent Mobile Station identity — that is, its IMSI. It is possible that the
P-TMSI included in the attach request message has previously been allocated
by the new SGSN. Then the new SGSN also knows the IMSI of the Mobile
Station. Thus the new SGSN does not need to acquire this Mobile Station’s
IMSI again. Otherwise, the new SGSN can acquire the IMSI according to
the following sequence:
• First attempt to contact the old SGSN and request the IMSI value that
corresponds to the P-TMSI included in the attach request message.
This is performed in Message 2a in Figure 2.11. The address of the old
SGSN can be derived by the new SGSN using the RAI included in the
attach request.
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• If the previous step fails, then the new SGSN acquires the IMSI from the
Mobile Station itself, as illustrated in step 2b in Figure 2.11. The ob-
vious drawbacks of this step are that it introduces additional signalling
over the radio interface and that it compromises the user identity con-
fidentiality, which is the intention of introducing P-IMSI (Salkintzis,
2004, p. 3-8).
Step 3
With the Mobile Station’s IMSI acquired in Step 2, the new SGSN verifies
whether the user is authenticated and authorized for that particular service
by checking with the Home Location Register (HLR) entry for the Mobile
Station.
Typically after the authentication and key agreement procedure, cipher-
ing is enabled on the radio interface, and therefore further messages trans-
mitted on this interface are enciphered (Salkintzis, 2004, p. 3-9).
Step 4
This step is initiated by an update location message, which is sent by the
new SGSN to update the HLR database with the new location of the MS.
This message typically includes the following information:
• the new SGSN’s own IP address,
• its own SS7 address,
• and the IMSI value of the MS.
Subsequently, the HLR informs the old SGSN that it can now release
any information stored for this Mobile Station. This is done with the cancel
location message, as illustrated in Message 4b in Figure 2.11.
After releasing the resource of the old SGSN, the HLR sends the GPRS
subscription data of the Mobile Station to the new SGSN, as illustrated in
Message 4c. At this point, the new SGSN may perform several examinations.
For example, it may check whether the Mobile Station is allowed to roam
in its current Routing Area. If none of the checks fails, then the new SGSN
builds up a GPRS Mobility Management (GMM) context for this Mobile
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Station and returns a positive acknowledgment to the HLR. Otherwise, if an
inspection routine fails, the new SGSN sends a negative response to the HLR
and subsequently an attach reject message is sent to the Mobile Station. The
specific reason for rejecting the attach request is included herewith.
Step 5
In this step, the new SGSN sends an attach accept message to the Mobile
Station to indicate that the Mobile Station has been successfully registered
for GPRS services. Typically, with the attach accept message, the new SGSN
assigns a new P-TMSI value to the Mobile Station. A Temporary Logical
Link Identity (TLLI) is also allocated to the Mobile Station as a temporary
ID used by the Logical Link Control (LLC) layer. At the final step, the Mobile
Station responds with an attach complete message, which acknowledges the
correct reception of the new P-TMSI value. As mentioned above, at this
stage the messages transmitted via radio interface are typically enciphered,
and therefore, the new P-TMSI value can not be eavesdropped on (Salkintzis,
2004, p. 3-9).
A database is maintained at the SGSN that maps the Mobile Identity,
IMSI, with the TLLI assigned to it and the NSAPI specific to a network
application. This is like the front part of the table below SGSN1 shown
Figure 2.10.
2.4.2 Detach Procedure
The results of the GPRS detach function is that the SGSN may delete the
MM and the PDP contexts; the PDP contexts are actually deleted in the
GGSN. The mobile station detaches by sending a detach request message
to the SGSN. There are three detach types: GPRS-Only, IMSI-Only, and
Combined. A detailed description of the detach procedure can be found in
(Bates, 2002, p. 127).
2.4.3 Activate PDP Context
Upon completion of a successful GPRS attach procedure, a Mobile Station
has been assigned a TLLI that the GPRS network knows. However, external
Packet Data Networks (PDNs), for example IP networks, do not yet know
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Figure 2.12: Message Sequence Diagram in Establishing a PDP Context
(Salkintzis, 2004, p. 3-11)
this Mobile Station. Therefore, further actions are needed for accessing an
external PDNs. That is where the Packet Data Protocol (PDP) Context
Activate procedure comes in.
The message flow sequence for activating a new PDP context is illustrated
in Figure 2.12. When a Mobile Station wants to establish a new PDP context,
it sends an Activate PDP context Request message to its serving SGSN. This
message specifies all characteristics of the requested PDP context, such as
(Bates, 2002, p. 142):
• specific PDP type, for example, IPv4, IPv6, X.25, or PPP, which spec-
ifies the type of the payload transferred on the PDP context,
• specific APN, which represents an external PDN,
• specific GPRS bearer, which specifies the required QoS properties.
The SGSN checks the requested APN and identifies the IP address of the
GGSN that provides access to that APN by using the Domain Name System
(DNS). This GGSN may be located either in the serving GPRS network or
in the home GPRS network.
After that, the SGSN sends a GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (GTP) sig-
nalling a message to that GGSN to request the activation of the requested
PDP context. Typically, the GGSN checks whether the Mobile Station is
authorized to access the requested APN, and if so, it allocates a new IPv4
address to this PDP context.
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Note that the GGSN may request a new IPv4 address either from an
internal Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server or from an
external DHCP server located in the requested network. In the first case,
the Mobile Station is allocated an IPv4 address from the address space of the
serving or home GPRS network, and the Mobile Station becomes a new IPv4
node within this network. In the latter case, however, the Mobile Station is
allocated an IPv4 address from the address space of the external network,
and effectively it becomes a new IPv4 node inside this PDN. It is typically
used when the external network is an intranet, which may use private IP
addresses.
The GGSN accepts the request to create the new PDP context and returns
a positive GTP response to the SGSN with TID information. It also updates
its database, like the table below GGSN1 in Figure 2.10 on page 47, where
it maps the TID and the corresponding SGSN IP address.
Subsequently, the SGSN returns an accept message to the Mobile Station,
which includes the IPv4 address allocated to the new PDP context. The
SGSN also updates its database with the TID and the corresponding GGSN
IP address, like the back part of the table in Figure 2.10 on page 47.
At this point, a new PDP context has been established. Note that the
establishment of a PDP context does not involve the reservation of dedicated
communication resources in the GPRS network. This applies to both the ra-
dio interface and the wired part of the GPRS network. The establishment
of a PDP context involves only the storage of new information in the GPRS
nodes (Salkintzis, 2004, p. 3-12). A series of associations between different
identifiers is maintained in the Mobile Station, SGSN, and GGSN (Bates,
2002, p. 139) respectively, as shown in Figure 2.10 on page 47. This infor-
mation is subsequently used to route the packets correlated with that PDP
context, as described in Section 2.3.
2.4.4 Deactivate PDP Context
This procedure removes the MS’s PDP context from the GGSN. To initiate
this procedure the MS sends a Deactive PDP context Request message to
the SGSN. The SGSN, in turn, sends a Delete PDP context Request mes-
sage to the GGSN, which removes the PDP context and returns a Delete
PDP Context Response message to the SGSN. A detailed description of this
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Figure 2.13: GPRS Handover
procedure can be found in (Bates, 2002, p. 148)’s book.
2.5 GPRS Handover
The previous section described the GPRS procedures in GSM context. With
the conceptual understanding of these procedures in mind, which is the same
as in UMTS, this section describes GPRS handovers in the context of UMTS.
The introduction of GPRS makes no difference in the UTRAN part of
UMTS (Kaaranen et al., 2001, pp. 288 – 289). Referring to Figure 2.5,
the Internal Handover of GPRS is the same as in the Circuit-Switched (CS)
domain. As to the External Handover, the involved Mobile Switching Conter
(MSC) is replaced by its counterpart in the Packet-Switched (PS) domain,
SGSN. Intra-SGSN handover is similar to the Intra-SGSN handover in the
sense that their procedures are the same, and only the participating entities
are different: one is MSC; one is SGSN. The significant difference is presented
in the case of the Inter-SGSN handover. This will be discussed in detail
below.
Regarding the above mentioned difference between the Circuit-Switched
domain handover and GPRS handover, Figure 2.13 shows a modified hand-
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Figure 2.14: Inter-SGSN Handover (Eberspacher et al., 2001, p. 251)
over diagram corresponding to the GPRS.
When the Mobile Station moves from Cell5 to Cell6 in Figure 2.13, which
are controlled by SGSN1 and SGSN2, respectively, an Inter-SGSN handover
occurs. The whole procedure is illustrated in Figure 2.14 in the form of a
message sequence diagram.
The Mobile Station sends a Routing Area Update (RAU) Request mes-
sage. At this point in time, the new Routing Area is controlled by SGSN2.
SGSN2 sends a SGSN Context Request message to SGSN1, asking for the
required information of the Mobile Station. The address of SGSN1 is ef-
fectively derived from the Routing Area Identity parameter included in the
RAU Request message.
Upon the receipt of this SGSN Context Request Message, SGSN1 real-
izes that the Mobile Station has moved to another Routing Area and stops
sending downlink packets to the Mobile Station.
Note that between the instant when the handover took place and the
receipt of this message, an interruption period exists. During that period,
SGSN1 could have been transmitting downlink packets to the Mobile Station.
These packets would be unacknowledged and would need to remain buffered
at SGSN1. At this point, the GGSN still believes that the Mobile Station is
reachable through SGSN1 and could be transmitting new downlink packets
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to SGSN1. The latter would need to buffer these packets as well (Salkintzis,
2004, p. 3-16).
In response to the above mentioned SGSN Context Request Message,
SGSN1 replies with an SGSN Context Response message carrying the re-
quested information to SGSN2. The latter sends a SGSN Context Acknowl-
edgement message, which confirms that it has received the requested infor-
mation and is ready to receive any buffered packets for the Mobile Station
that are still unacknowledged. At this point, SGSN1 forwards all the buffered
packets for the Mobile Station to the SGSN2 within a new tunnel. At the
same time, SGSN2 sends an Update PDP Context Request to the GGSN to
inform it that any further downlink packets for the Mobile Station should
be tunnelled to SGSN2. In response, the GGSN replies with an Update
PDP Context Response. Now the communication path of the PDP context
changes to reflect the location change of the Mobile Station. Furthermore,
the location update procedures are also conducted in the HLR to reflect the
current location of the Mobile Station.
Note that in the case of inter-SGSN handover, all the Logical Link Control
(LLC) connections with SGSN1 in the Mobile Station are released and new
LLC connections are established with SGSN2. After the short interruption
required for modifying the PDP context and reestablishing the new LLC
connections, the communication continues.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigated various aspects of GPRS in the context of UMTS.
Special focus was on the handovers in GPRS. These handovers have been
categorized into several levels, according to a hierarchical structure:
• Softer Handover,
• Internal Handover,
• Intra-SGSN Handover,
• Inter-SGSN Handover.
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Benefit from the same frequency characteristic of WCDMA technology,
the Soft Handover, is applied through the whole hierarchical structure of the
handover. This enables seamless handover in a GPRS network.
In addition to the handovers in a homogeneous GPRS network, a more
sophisticated handover is called the Inter-system handover. In the context of
UMTS, the Inter-system handover is between UTRAN and GERAN (Kaara-
nen et al., 2001, p. 369). It is a result of 2G legacy in the sense that many
3G operators provide their wide-area coverage with the GSM network and
use 3G in relatively small traffic hot spots (Korhonen, 2001, p. 332). How-
ever, this concept can be expanded to include all wireless access network
technologies. This introduces the concept of wireless overlay networks. If
the diversity of the various wireless networks are exploited in a effective way,
seamless handover between GPRS and WLAN are made possible. The next
chapter will examine this concept in terms of its handover procedures and
network models.
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Chapter 3
Wireless Overlay Networks —
A Practical Approach towards
4G
Chapter 2 investigated the various aspects of the GPRS. As a kind of Wireless
Wide Area Network (WWAN), the GPRS network renders wide coverage.
However, only low-bandwidth services are offered over this wide coverage
region. On the other hand, another broadly deployed wireless network, 802.11
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), provides a high bandwidth service
but over a narrow coverage region. Although it would be desirable to provide
a high-bandwidth service over a wide coverage region to mobile users all the
time, no single wireless network technology simultaneously provides a low-
latency, high-bandwidth, wide-area data service to a large number of mobile
users (Stemm & Katz, 1998).
As pointed out by Stemm and Katz (1998), the solution to the above-
mentioned goal is:
“Use a combination of wireless networks to provide the best
possible coverage over a range of geographic areas.”
In a more general sense, this combination, spanning in-room, in-building,
campus, metropolitan, and regional cell sizes, fits into a hierarchy of network
interfaces which is called a wireless overlay network structure. To make
this wireless overlay network structure look like a single network, seamless
handover between heterogenous networks is required.
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Figure 3.1: Wireless Overlay Network Structure (Stemm & Katz, 1998)
This chapter provides a brief examination of the wireless overlay network
in terms of its handovers, and network models. Finally, since 802.11 and
GPRS offer characteristics that complement each other perfectly, the inte-
gration of the GPRS network and 802.11 WLAN is discussed in terms of its
implementation architectures.
3.1 Handover in Wireless Overlay Network
Figure 3.1 illustrates a scenario of a wireless overlay network. Lower layers
consist of wireless cells with higher bandwidth that cover a relatively small
area. Higher layers in the hierarchy provide a lower bandwidth over a larger
geographic area.
When a mobile node moves in such a wireless overlay network structure,
it needs to switch to different wireless subnetworks to keep communication
continuous. This switching procedure is called handover. Relative to this
wireless overlay network structure, there are two kinds of handovers that
need to be distinguished: horizontal and vertical handover, as illustrated in
Figure 3.2.
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(a) Horizontal Handover (b) Vertical Handover
Figure 3.2: Horizontal vs Vertical Handover (Stemm & Katz, 1998)
3.1.1 Horizontal Handover
A horizontal handover is defined as a handover between base stations that are
using the same type of wireless network interface, as shown in Figure 3.2(a).
It is also called intra-technology handover (Vidales et al., 2005). This is
the traditional definition of handover for homogeneous cellular systems such
as cellular telephony systems, wide-area data systems, and wireless local
area networks. Section 2.5 (see page 56) intensively discussed this kind of
handover in the GPRS network. In the case of 802.11 WLAN, many other
articles focus on the process involved in this kind of handover (Mishra, Shin,
& Arbaugh, 2003).
3.1.2 Vertical Handover
A new type of handover, which is significantly different from the above-
mentioned handover, is defined as the vertical handover. This is a handover
between base stations that are using different wireless network technologies
(also called an inter-technology handover). The term vertical derived from
the overlay network structure that has networks with increasing cell sizes at
higher levels in the hierarchy, as shown in Figure 3.2(b). This hierarchical
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structure corresponds to the levels shown in Figure 1.3 on page 10. In gen-
eral, the Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN) covers an in-room size
cell; the WLAN covers a in-building or campus size cell; the WWAN covers
the metropolitan-area cell; and the satellite wireless communication system
covers the largest region-area cell.
Depending on the direction in which the handover occurs, the vertical
handovers can further be divided into two categories: an upward vertical
handover is a handover to a wireless overlay with a larger cell size (and lower
bandwidth per unit area), and a downward vertical handover is a handover
to a wireless overlay with a smaller cell size (and higher bandwidth per unit
area). A vertical handover may be to an immediately higher or lower overlay,
or the mobile host may “skip” an overlay. For example, a mobile may hand
over from an in-room network directly to a wide-area network, or vice versa.
3.1.3 Comparison between Horizontal and Vertical Hand-
over
There are some important differences between the horizontal handover and
the vertical handover that might affect the strategy for implementing vertical
handovers:
• In horizontal handover systems, a mobile host performs a handover
from cell A to cell B while moving out of the coverage area of cell
A into the coverage area of cell B. This is not necessarily the case
in vertical handover. For example, when a user performs an upward
vertical handover from an in-room cell A to an in-building cell B, the
user is moving out of the coverage of cell A. However, when a user
performs a downward vertical handover from cell B to cell A, the user
is not moving out of the coverage of cell B. This implies that downward
vertical handovers are less time-critical, because a mobile can always
stay connected to a upper overlay while handing over to a lower overlay.
• Many network interfaces have an inherent diversity that arises because
they operate at different frequencies. For example, a room-size overlay
may use infrared frequencies, a building-size overlay network may use
one set of radio frequencies, and a wide-area data system may use an-
other set of radio frequencies. Another way in which diversity exists is
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in the spread spectrum techniques of different devices. Some devices
use Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS), while others use Fre-
quency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS). Taking advantage of this
diversity between network interfaces, some enhancements can be done
in order to reduce the discovery time.
• In a network of homogeneous base stations, the choice of “best” base
station is usually obvious: the mobile chooses the base station with the
highest signal strength after incorporating some threshold and hystere-
sis. In a multiple-overlay network, the choice of the “best” network
cannot usually be determined by channel-specific factors such as signal
strength because different overlay levels may have widely varying char-
acteristics. For example, an in-building RF network with a low signal
strength may yield better performance than a wide-area data network
with a high signal strength. There are also considerations of monetary
cost (some networks charge per minute, others per byte) that do not
arise in a homogeneous handover system.
Depending on the above-mentioned specific characteristics of the hori-
zontal and vertical handovers, utilizing them in a strategic way leads to a
scenario of seamless handover. This scenario is discussed next.
3.1.4 Seamless Handover
Figure 3.3 depicts a scenario with various handovers, each numbered uniquely.
Number 1 is a horizontal handover; numbers 2 and 4 are upward vertical han-
dovers; numbers 3, 5, and 6 are downward vertical handovers. The decision
state for each handover is identified by the different patterns in the figure.
As mentioned above, it is not necessarily the case that a vertical handover
is due to move out of the coverage of a wireless network. An intersection state
exists where the mobile node has physical links to both the upper and lower
networks, or the same level networks in the case of horizontal handover,
for example, handover 1 in Figure 3.3. This results in a make-before-break
handover mechanism becoming possible (Dutta et al., 2004), which presents
a seamless handover.
The idea behind the make-before-break mechanism is that the mobile
node connects to the upper larger coverage network in advance when it de-
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Figure 3.3: Seamless Handover in Wireless Overlay Network
tects that it is losing connection to the lower smaller coverage network. For
a short period the mobile node simultaneously connects to both networks.
When the mobile node completely loses the connection to the lower network,
it does not suffer from data loss because it has had a connection to the upper
network ready. In this way, the seamless handover is achieved when the mo-
bile node spans the gap between the lower networks, like the space between
numbers 2 and 3, as well as between numbers 4 and 5 in Figure 3.3.
This section described the concept of seamless handover in wireless over-
lay networks. The next section will discuss several different architectural
models that can be implemented toward a wireless overlay network.
3.2 Models of Wireless Overlay Network
Several basic models are implemented towards a wireless overlay network,
using multiple wireless networks. This is illustrated in Figure 3.4 using two
wireless networks as an example, network A and network B. These models
adopt the concept of a hybrid network. A hybrid core network and several
wireless access networks, each with its own service optimization, are used
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   
	
 
  
ﬀ  ﬂﬁﬀ 
(b) Hybrid Network
   
	
 
 



ﬀ 
(c) Heterogeneous Network
Figure 3.4: Architecture Models for Wireless Overlay Network (Wu &
Havinga, 2001)
(Walsh, Xu, & Paila, 2000). The hybrid core network processes the inter-
action between different wireless access networks while the selected wireless
access network delivers the service to end users.
The distinguishing factor between these models is the layer on which the
wireless networks communicate (Wu & Havinga, 2001). Many derivatives of
these models can be found (Walsh et al., 2000).
The rest of this section will describe the three basic models depicted in
Figure 3.4.
3.2.1 Tunnelled Networks
Figure 3.4(a) illustrates this network model. In this model, a user has inde-
pendent service agreements with operators of several access systems. Upper
layers access the different technologies independently. According to a certain
policy, the best network is selected and the hybrid core tunnels the traffic
across the Internet and the chosen radio access network to the mobile node.
Thus, no modifications are required to the existing network stacks.
The hybrid functionality is provided with the hybrid core, which resides
in the home network of the mobile node. For example, the home agent based
on Mobile IP can be used to support the hybrid functionality. The two main
disadvantages of this are that the hybrid core will often duplicate functions of
the access networks, such as authentication, and all data transactions involve
multiple round trips across the Internet, increasing network load and service
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latency.
3.2.2 Hybrid Networks
Figure 3.4(b) illustrates this model. In this model, the individual wireless ac-
cess networks implement the three bottom layers: physical, link, and network
layers. There is a hybrid core that interfaces between the Internet and the
different wireless access networks. In this case, the agreements between the
wireless access network operators and the hybrid core operator must be more
permanent. An advantage of the hybrid network is that it is able to offer
advanced transport services for the network layer. For example, the hybrid
core may implement smooth hand-over support for inter access network mo-
bility. The main drawback of this model is that the networking activities are
duplicated. Despite this, the service latency is reduced relative to the tun-
nelled network model because there is not as much duplicated functionalities
as in tunnelled networks.
3.2.3 Heterogeneous Networks
In this model there is a common core layer that deals with all network func-
tionality and operates as a single network to the upper layers. Thus, different
wireless access networks implement only the physical and link layers, which
are specifically relevant to each technology. Communication between wireless
access networks belonging to the common core is based on lower layers. This
reduces the overhead, and improves performance. A major obstacle of this
model is that the different access networks must converge, which requires a
huge standardization effort and operator commitment. Figure 3.4(c) illus-
trates this model.
When implementing a wireless overlay network, the integration of 802.11
WLAN and 3G cellular networks, especially the UMTS network, warrants
special attention due to their wide deployment. Efforts made in this regard
are described in the next section.
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Figure 3.5: Tight Coupling and Loose Coupling
3.3 Integration of WLAN and 3G Cellular
Network
A feasibility study on the integration of the 3G system and 802.11 has been
done by the 3GPP TSG working group. They identified a total of six sce-
narios (European Telecommunications Standards Institute, 2003), which can
be divided into four levels of integration (Vidales et al., 2005). The levels
are open coupling, loose coupling, tight coupling, and fully integrated. Of
the four levels, most research was done on tight coupling and loose coupling,
as shown in Figure 3.5. These levels will be respectively discussed in detail
below.
3.3.1 Tight Coupling Interworking
The tight coupling approach aims to make the 802.11 network appear to
the 3G core network as another 3G access network (Buddhikot et al., 2003).
Thus the 802.11 gateway appears to play the role of an SGSN, for example,
in the case of UMTS. It means this gateway would implement the interface
Gb and emulate functions which are natively available in the UTRAN, as
shown in Figure 3.5. This hides the details of the 802.11 network to the 3G
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core network. Similar to the above-mentioned heterogeneous network model,
this makes these two different networks appear to be a single network for the
outside. They would share the same authentication, signalling, transport and
billing infrastructures, independent from the protocols used at the physical
layer on the radio interface. In this sense, the approach can be seen as an
example of the heterogeneous network model.
However, the mobile nodes in this approach are required to implement
the corresponding 3G protocol stack on top of their standard 802.11 network
cards, and switch from one physical layer to the next as needed. All the
traffic generated by the mobile nodes in the 802.11 network is injected into
the 3G core network.
Furthermore, this approach renders several disadvantages both on the
network and terminal side(Buddhikot et al., 2003). On the network side, the
3G core network directly exposes its interfaces to the 802.11 network, and
the same operator must own both the 802.11 and the 3G parts of the net-
work. In fact, in this case, independently operated 802.11 networks could not
be integrated with 3G networks. Current 3G networks are being deployed
using carefully engineered network-planning tools, and the capacity and con-
figuration of each network element are calculated using mechanisms which
are specific to the technology utilized over the air interface. By introducing
the 802.11 traffic directly into the 3G core, the setup of the entire network,
as well as the configuration and the design of network elements, have to be
modified to support the increased load.
On the terminal side, this approach presents the following issues:
• As mentioned above, the 802.11 network cards would need to implement
the 3G protocol stack.
• It would constrain the use of 3G-specific authentication mechanisms,
based on Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) or Removable
User Identity Module (R-UIM) cards, for authentication on WLANs,
forcing 802.11 providers to interconnect to the 3G carriers’ SS7 network
to perform authentication procedures.
• This would also imply the use of 802.11 network interface cards with
built-in USIM or R-UIM slots or external cards plugged separately into
the subscriber devices.
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For the reasons described above, special care should be taken when choos-
ing this architecture to implement the integration of the 802.11 WLAN and
3G cellular network. The complexity and the high cost of the reconfiguration
of the 3G core networks and of the 802.11 gateways could force operators that
chose the tightly-coupled approach to become uncompetitive (Buddhikot et
al., 2003).
3.3.2 Loose Coupling Interworking
This approach can be seen as an example of the tunnelled network models
mentioned previously. This architecture also introduces a gateway into the
802.11 network, as shown in Figure 3.5. However, unlike the tight coupling
architecture, this gateway connects to the Internet and does not have any di-
rect link to 3G network elements such as PDSNs, GGSNs or 3G core network
switches. The user population that accesses services of the 802.11 gateway
may include users that have locally signed on, as well as mobile users visit-
ing from other networks. This approach is called loose coupling interworking
because it completely separates the data paths in the 802.11 and the 3G
networks. The high speed 802.11 data traffic is never injected into the 3G
core network, but the end user still achieves seamless access.
In this approach, different mechanisms and protocols can handle authen-
tication, billing and mobility management in the 3G and 802.11 portions of
the network. However, for seamless operation to be possible, they have to
inter-operate. In the case of inter-operation with CDMA2000, this requires
that the 802.11 gateway supports Mobile IP functionalities to handle mobility
across networks.
Since the UMTS standards do not yet include Mobile IP, more adaptation
is required to integrate with UMTS networks. Chapter 7 will discuss the
issues relevant to offering a Mobile IP service in GPRS. Mobile IP services
would need to be tailored to the GGSNs to enable seamless mobility between
802.11 and UMTS. Common subscriber databases would need to interface
with Home Location Registers (HLR) for authentication and billing on the
UMTS side of the network. These problems will be addressed in Chapter 7.
Advantages of the loose coupling integration approach are as follows:
• It allows the independent deployment and traffic engineering of 802.11
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and 3G networks. 3G carriers can benefit from other providers’ 802.11
deployments without extensive capital investments. At the same time,
they can continue to deploy 3G networks using well-established engi-
neering techniques and tools.
• While roaming agreements with many partners can result in widespread
coverage, including key hot-spot areas, subscribers benefit from having
just one service provider for all network access. They no longer need to
establish separate accounts with providers in different regions, or with
providers who cover different access technologies.
• Finally, unlike the tight coupling approach, this architecture allows an
organization to provide its own public 802.11 hot-spot, inter-operate
through roaming agreements with public 802.11 and 3G service providers,
or manage a privately installed enterprise WLAN.
From the aforementioned it becomes clear that the loose coupling ap-
proach offers several architectural advantages over the tight coupling ap-
proach, with almost no drawbacks. Therefore, this study promotes the loose
coupling approach as the preferred architecture for the integration of WLAN
with UMTS networks, in particular, with GPRS networks.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter introduced the concept of the wireless overlay network, and in-
vestigated the basic models for implementing this concept. The advantages
and disadvantages of each model were also discussed. As a practical im-
plementation, the integration of the 802.11 WLAN and the GPRS network
received more attention. It has been argued that a loose coupling architecture
was more suitable for this integration.
Now, the appropriate architecture has been chosen. The question arises
which mechanisms will fulfill the role of glue in such a loose coupling archi-
tecture to enable the various networks to work together and enable seamless
handover between them. The answer is dominantly prone to be the IP, which
has proved its huge success in the wired network. The next chapter will ex-
amine the various aspects of the IP, demonstrate why it is justified that the
IP fulfills this role, and what problems exist towards fulfilling such a role.
Chapter 4
IP — An Interworking Role in
Overlay Networks
In Chapter 2, GPRS has been introduced, a technology which provides data
service in mobile networks. In Chapter 3, the concept of a wireless overlay
network has been introduced, which is considered as an appropriate archi-
tecture for seamless handover in heterogenous networks. To achieve seam-
less handover, a mechanism that integrates all heterogeneous network access
technologies is needed. As pointed out by Guardini et al. (2000):
“A key role of IP in future mobile data systems will probably be
the provision of efficient and cost effective interworking between
overlay networks.”
The vitality of the IP technologies has been demonstrated by the ex-
ponential growth of the Internet. This chapter attempts to answer which
characteristics justify IP to fulfil an interworking role in future mobile sys-
tems. It also investigates the existing problems towards fulfilling this role.
For the purposes mentioned above, the rest of this chapter is organized
as follows: firstly, an architectural model of IP networks section will be in-
troduced. Thereafter the design principles of IP will be discussed. This is
followed by the introduction of several IP’s functionalities highly relevant to
this study, including the addressing and routing of IP, and mapping IP ad-
dresses to physical addresses. The existing IP drawbacks will be investigated
next. Finally, the IP network security will be discussed.
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Figure 4.1: The Internet Architecture Model (Comer, 1991, p. 57)
4.1 Architectural Model
The advent of the Internet is primarily for the purpose of interconnecting
many disparate physical networks and making them function as a coordi-
nated unit (Comer, 1991, p. 1). As such, an interconnection scheme, or
internetwork (also called internet), is introduced to hide the low-level details
and make the collections of networks appear to be a single large network.
Actually, an internet is a logical network, as opposed to the low-level phys-
ical network, built on a collection of physical networks (Peterson & Davie,
2000, p. 248). It has its own data packet format and addressing scheme. A
new node, also called a router, or called a gateway, is introduced to intercon-
nect two or more different networks, which shapes the architectural model,
as illustrated in Figure 4.1.
A boundary can be distinguished between the hosts and the entities that
only provide network functionalities. This division separates the hosts from
the network subsystem. This leads to the question of which functionalities
should be put where. The next section seeks to answer this question from an
IP design principle perspective.
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Figure 4.2: The Hourglass Architecture of the Internet Protocol Stack (Deer-
ing, 1998)
4.2 IP Design Principles
Perhaps the most important distinction between the Internet and traditional
telecommunication networks is how the systems are designed. This distinc-
tion is captured in the following statement:
“The traditional telecomms approach is to design everything as
part of a single process, leading to what is conceptually a single
standard (in reality, a tightly coupled set of standards). Building
a new system will thus involve the design of everything from top
to bottom from scratch (and thus it is often called the ‘Stovepipe
Approach’). By contrast, the IP approach is to design a ‘small’
protocol that does one particular task, and to combine it with
other protocols (which may already exist) in order to build a
system.” (Wisely et al., 2002, p. 5 – 6)
As opposed to ‘the Stovepipe Approach’ of the traditional telecommuni-
cation network, we define the approach used to design the Internet as ‘the
IP approach’ in the context of this study. The above mentioned distinction
of the IP approach can be captured by an IP design principle, namely ‘al-
ways keep layer transparency’, or by the phrase, “IP over everything and
everything over IP” (Wisely et al., 2002, p. 6). An hourglass depicts this
concept(Deering, 1998), as illustrated in Figure 4.2.
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Another distinction between the Internet and traditional telecommunica-
tion networks is where the functionality is placed (Wisely et al., 2002, p. 6).
Traditional telecommunication networks put much functionality within the
network while, in contrast, the Internet places functionality as close to the
edge of the network as possible, to keep the network as simple as possible.
This is captured by another IP design principle: ‘always think end to end’.
Two key principles, layering and the end-to-end principle, have been men-
tioned above. However, the next subsection begins with what is probably the
more fundamental principle: connectivity.
4.2.1 Connectivity
Providing connectivity is the key goal of the Internet (Wisely et al., 2002,
p. 77). The Internet’s original intention was that the network would pro-
vide connectivity, even if large parts of the network were destroyed by enemy
actions. This connectivity is built on the low-level physical network’s con-
nectivity that is structured in such a way that each of these networks carries
IP data packets. Routers connect these networks together and route the IP
packets to their destination address. Here, the routers employ a connection-
less packet route. IP packets, independent of the physical network type, have
the same common format and common addressing scheme. Thus, it is easy
to take a packet from one type of network and send it over another network.
In such a connectionless network, there is no need to establish a path for
the data through the network before data transmission (Wisely et al., 2002, p.
80). There is no state information stored within the network about particular
communications. Instead, each packet of data carries the destination address
and can be routed to that destination independently of the other packets
that might make up the transmission. Thus if any node is destroyed, packets
would still be able to find alternative routes through the network. No state
information about the data transmission could be lost, as all the required
information is carried with each data packet.
Since the Internet concentrates on connectivity, it supports not just a
single service like telephony but a whole host of applications all using the
same connectivity. This principle promotes that the network layer should
focus on transport only, and leave other functionalities on the edge of the
network, as previously mentioned. It also promotes a thin IP network, as
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illustrated in Figure 4.2.
Next, consider the other two key principles: first the end-to-end principle,
then the principle of layering.
4.2.2 End-to-End Principle
This principle is first stated by Saltzer, Reed, and Clark (1984):
“The function in question can completely and correctly be im-
plemented only with the knowledge and help of the application
standing at the endpoints of the communication system. There-
fore, providing that questioned function as a feature of the com-
munication system itself is not possible. (Sometimes an incom-
plete version of the function provided by the communication sys-
tem may be useful as a performance enhancement.)”
This statement proclaims that only end systems can correctly perform
functions that are required from end-to-end, such as security and reliability.
Therefore, these functions should be left to the end systems (Wisely et al.,
2002, p. 81). End systems are the hosts that actually communicate, such
as a PC or mobile phone. This end-to-end approach removes much of the
complexity from the network, and prevents unnecessary processing, as the
network does not need to provide functions that the terminal will need to
perform for itself.
This end-to-end principle is often reduced to the concept of the ‘stupid’
network, as opposed to the telecommunications concept of an ‘intelligent net-
work’ (Wisely et al., 2002, p. 83). The end-to-end principle means that the
basic network deals only with IP packets and is independent of the transport
layer protocol. This confirms the above mentioned connectivity principle
from another side, that is, the network layer should focus on transport only.
4.2.3 Layering and Modularity
The layering principle can be summarized as follows:
“Layered protocols are designed so that layer n at the destination
receives the same object sent by layer n at the source.” (Comer,
1991, p. 149)
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Figure 4.3: TCP/IP Internet Layering Model (Comer, 1991, p. 146)
This allows each layer to focus on its own functionalities at a time, without
worrying about how lower layers work. The protocols are easy to implement
and understand. This is a structured way of dividing functionalities to reduce
or hide complexity. Each layer offers specific services to upper layers, while
hiding the implementation detail from the upper layers. Ideally, there should
be a clean interface between each layer. This simplifies programming and
makes it easier to change implementation of any individual layer.
When this concept is applied in the vertical direction, it is called mod-
ularity. Any protocol performs one well-defined function at a specific layer.
These modular protocols can be reused. Ideally protocols should be reused
wherever possible, and functionality should not be duplicated. Avoiding du-
plication also makes it easier for users and programmers to understand the
system (Wisely et al., 2002, p. 83) .
According to the above mentioned layering concept, a layering model of
the Internet is shown in Figure 4.3. This model is often referred to as the
TCP/IP Internet Layering Model. It will be referred to frequently later when
describing a solution in IP networks.
Besides the above mentioned network layering model specific to IP net-
works, there is also another general model promoted by the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), namely the Open Systems Intercon-
nection (OSI) reference model (Stallings, 2004, p. 27 ). This model will be
referred to frequently when describing non-IP networks.
Many books provide information on these two models. This study does
not intend to repeat that information here. A good description of the OSI
model can be found in (Stallings, 2004, pp. 27 – 38), and of the TCP/IP
model in (Comer, 1991, pp. 146 – 147). However, for the purpose of compar-
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Figure 4.4: A Comparison of the OSI and TCP/IP Models (Stallings, 2004,
p. 40)
ison, Figure 4.4 roughly presents correspondences in functionality between
two models.
4.2.4 Summary
The previous subsections described the three principles of IP, respectively.
They are highly interrelated. Achieving connectivity is the goal while the
end-to-end principle is a consequence of progressing towards this goal. The
network thus focuses on providing connectivity only, all other application-
specific functionalities are thus left to the end systems to process. The prin-
ciple of layering and modularity is the mechanism to align with the previous
two principles. When applying the TCP/IP model, in Figure 4.3, to the
Internet architecture in Figure 4.1, we can get a better understanding of this
concept. This is shown in Figure 4.5.
The network boundary is clearly identified in the figure. Inside the net-
work boundary, there are routers and subnetworks, which cooperate with
each other to offer connectivity. Outside the network boundary, there are
hosts which process the application specific functionalities, based on the con-
nectivity offered by the networks.
In this architecture, the great advantage of the layering principle is that it
renders transparency between different layers. This allows changes to proto-
col components without having to do a complete update of all protocols. This
is particularly important when dealing with the heterogeneity of networking
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Figure 4.5: TCP/IP Concept (Stallings, 2004, p. 41)
technologies. There is a big range network types with different capabilities,
and different application types with various capabilities and requirements.
By providing the linchpin — the internet layer — it is possible to hide the
complexities of the networking infrastructure from users and concentrate on
purely providing connectivity (Wisely et al., 2002, p. 86 ). This has led to
the catchphrase ‘IP over Everything and Every- thing over IP’.
Therefore, these three principles will be fundamentally followed in this
study. However, they are not absolute. Perhaps the best description of the
philosophy about the principles is as follows:
“Principles that seemed inviolable a few years ago are deprecated
today. Principles that seem sacred today will be deprecated to-
morrow. The principle of constant change is perhaps the only
principle of the Internet that should survive indefinitely.” (Car-
penter, 1996)
Thus, “engineering feedback from real implementations is more important
than any architectural principles” (Carpenter, 1996). This is seen as ‘the
principle of the principles’ in discussing IP networks.
The previous sections looked at IP from a conceptual perspective. The
next section describes IP addressing and routing, while Section 4.4 will ex-
plain how IP addresses are mapped to physical addresses.
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(b) IP Address Format
Figure 4.6: Formats of Internet Protocol (IP) Datagram and Address
4.3 IP Addressing and Routing
As mentioned in Section 4.1, an internet can be seen as a logical network,
built on a collection of physical networks. It has its own packet format and
addressing scheme, as illustrated in Figure 4.6.
This study does not intend to describe each field, included in the figure
above, in detail here. A good description of the IP datagram format can
be found in (Comer, 1991, pp. 91 – 106), and of the IP address format in
(Comer, 1991, pp. 62 – 70 ). To understand the problem that arises with IP
addresses when considering mobility, some concepts about IP addresses are
nevertheless worth discussing.
IP addresses are hierarchical, which means that they are made up of
several parts that correspond to some sort of hierarchy in the internetwork
(Peterson & Davie, 2000, p. 262), as shown in Figure 4.6(b). Specifically, IP
addresses consist of two parts, a network part and a host part. The network
part of an IP address identifies the network to which the host is attached; all
hosts attached to the same network have the same network part in their IP
addresses. The host part then identifies each host uniquely in that particular
network.
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The hierarchial structure of IP addresses facilitates the routing of an IP
datagram. The routing algorithm determines the next hop address based
on the network part of the destination IP address of the IP datagram. If
the destination host and sender lie on the same physical network, the sender
directly delivers the IP datagram to the destination’s physical address via
the network interface. To see if the destination lies on the same physical
network, the sender extracts the network part of the destination IP address
and compares it to the network part of its own IP address. A match means
they are in the same physical network. This situation is called direct routing
in IP terminology. As to how the senders know the physical address of the
destination, it is a matter of address resolution, which will be addressed in
the next section (Comer, 1991, p. 111).
The opposite of direct routing is indirect routing in which the destination
is not on a directly attached physical network with the sender. This force
the sender to pass the datagram to a gateway, or router, for delivery. In
this case, the next hop is a router. The sender directly delivers the original
datagram to that router’s physical address. It is important to understand
that the datagram source and destination addresses remain unaltered. Upon
the receipt of that datagram, the router thus can repeat the above mentioned
comparison and calculate out the next hop address based on its routing table.
This process is repeated until the datagram reaches the router which is on the
same physical network as the destination. At this point, the router performs
direct routing and directly delivers the datagram to the destination (Comer,
1991, p. 116).
Typically, a routing table contains pairs (N, G), where N is the IP address
of a destination network, and G is the IP address of the next router along the
path to the network N (Comer, 1991, p. 113 ). It is important to know that
the routing table contains only network addresses, not the individual host
IP addresses. This makes routing efficient and keeps routing tables small.
However, it also renders a constraint on the IP network:
“If a host moves from one network to another, its IP address must
change” (Comer, 1991, p. 65).
Although host-specific routing can solve this problem, it causes the rout-
ing table to expand rapidly. This is especially in the case of the Internet,
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Figure 4.7: Concept of the ARP
where there are millions of hosts. This presents very low scalability. This
problem will further be addressed in Section 4.5.4.
4.4 Mapping IP Address to Physical Addresses
As mentioned above, before a sender can directly deliver the IP datagram
to the next hop, it needs to know the next hop’s physical address. This is
a matter of mapping high-level addresses to physical addresses, also known
as the address resolution problem (Comer, 1991, p. 74). There are several
solutions to this problem. The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is the
easiest and most efficient solution.
Figure 4.7 demonstrates the idea behind the ARP, which is explained as
follows: when host A wants to resolve IP address IB to a physical address,
it broadcasts a special data frame that asks the host with IP address IB to
respond with its physical address, PB. All hosts in the same physical network,
including B, receive the request, but only host B recognizes its IP address
and sends a reply that contains its physical address. When A receives the
reply, it uses the physical address to send the IP datagram directly to B. In
this way, the IP addresses are dynamically resolved without the requirement
of a centralized database (Comer, 1991, p. 75).
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4.4.1 Proxy ARP
Proxy ARP lets a proxy agent answer ARP requests on behalf of a host on
another network. This makes the sender believe that the proxy agent is the
destination host, while in fact the destination host is on another network. The
router often plays the role of proxy agent for the destination host, relaying
packets to it from other hosts.
4.4.2 Gratuitous ARP
Another feature of ARP is called gratuitous ARP. It occurs when a host
sends an ARP request looking for its own IP address. This is usually done
when the interface is configured at bootstrap time.
While IP allows for advantages in terms of connectivity, end-to-end and
modular, it also has some drawbacks. These are discussed in the next section.
4.5 IP Drawbacks
As mentioned early, the birth of the Internet was due to the need for global
connectivity. Moreover, the Internet community embraced a realistic philos-
ophy in the sense that “it is better to adopt an almost complete solution
now, rather than to wait until a perfect solution can be found” (Carpen-
ter, 1996). Consequently, the Internet was born with just a set of protocols,
not a complete architecture or a network design (Wisely et al., 2002, p. 7).
Providing global connectivity to the users is its major goal. To become a
complete architecture, other key elements are needed. These elements are
examined below. This includes billing and management, quality of service,
address Exhaustion, IP mobility, session management, and security issues.
4.5.1 Billing and Management
With the exponential growth of the user traffic entering the network, it is
obvious that a mechanism should exist to limit the user traffic and manage
user activities. A reasonable approach is by means of charging. The users
pay for what they occupy. Thus a billing engine and management platform
are needed. Here the following three problems need attention:
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• Authentication: a validation of a user’s identity, in other words, confirm
you are whom you claim to be (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p. 312).
• Authorization: the granting of specific types of service (including “no
service”) to a user, based on their authentication, what services they
are requesting, and the current system state. Authorization may be
based on restrictions, for example time-of-day restrictions, or physi-
cal location restrictions, or restrictions against multiple logins by the
same user. Authorization determines the nature of the service which
is granted to a user. Examples of types of service include, but are not
limited to: IP address filtering, address assignment, route assignment,
QoS/differential services, bandwidth control/traffic management, com-
pulsory tunnelling to a specific endpoint, and encryption.
• Accounting: the tracking of the consumption of network resources
by users. This information may be used for management, planning,
billing, or other purposes. Real-time accounting refers to accounting
information that is delivered concurrently with the consumption of the
resources. Batch accounting refers to accounting information that is
saved until it is delivered at a later time. Typical information that is
gathered in accounting is the identity of the user, the nature of the
service delivered, when the service began, and when it ended.
These three problems are often termed as the Authentication Authoriza-
tion Accounting (AAA) architecture (Laat, Gross, Gommans, Vollbrecht, &
Spence, 2000). A lot of IETF effort has been placed on this area. A AAA
authorization framework is proposed in RFC 2904 (Vollbrecht et al., 2000b).
Some application examples of this framework are provided in RFC 2905 (Voll-
brecht et al., 2000a). Moreover, the requirements that AAA protocols must
meet are specified in RFC 2906 (Farrell et al., 2000).
4.5.2 Quality of Service
The Internet provides a “best effort” transport service. There is, however, no
guarantee that the packets definitely reach their destinations without delay
and in the correct order. Nevertheless, due to diversity of the application
services, there are different constrains in terms of quality of service that the
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IP layer provides. Some require absolute correctness with no concern for time
limits, for example, file download service, while some require arrival within
the limited time even if some packets are lost or wrong, for example, voice
services. All these elements are defined as Quality of Service (QoS), which
determines the degree of satisfaction of the user of a service (Wisely et al.,
2002, p. 201). In fact, IP is fundamentally unsuited for delivering packets
within a time limit. Adding this functionality into the IP is a very active
topic in the research community.
Several QoS mechanisms have been developed within the IETF, which
are listed below,
• Integrated Services (IntServ) in RFC 1633 (Braden, Clark, & Shenker,
1994),
• Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) in RFC 3031 (Rosen, Callon,
& Viswanathan, 2001),
• Differentiated Services (DiffServ) in RFC 2475 (Blake et al., 1998),
• Integrated Services over Specific Link Layers (ISSLL) in RFC 2816
(Ghanwani, Pace, Srinivasan, Smith, & Seaman, 2000), and
• Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) in RFC 2205 (Braden, Zhang,
Berson, Herzog, & Jamin, 1997), RFC 2208 (Mankin et al., 1997).
4.5.3 Address Exhaustion
Global addressing is one of the Internet’s goals. Unfortunately, there are
not enough IP addresses to allocate to every host, since the address field is
limited to 32 bits. To address this problem, a new version, IPv6 (Deering &
Hinden, 1998), is introduced to expand the address space to 128 bits.
4.5.4 IP Mobility
Traditionally, IP-based networks have been designed with the assumption
that they are fixed. Although the concept works well in a fixed environment,
when it comes to mobility, a major problem arises from the fact that an
IP address has two contradictory semantics associated with it. On the one
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hand, the IP address serves as an identifier of the mobile terminal for the
upper protocols — this should be the same regardless of the sub-network it
attaches to. On the other hand, the IP address also serves as a locator of the
mobile terminal for routing the datagram to its destination — this requires
change so as to reflect its current position of sub-network that it has moved
to, as mentioned in Section 4.3.
A lot of effort has been made to solve this problem. This will be discussed
in detail in Chapter 5.
4.5.5 Session Management
Because IP connectivity is just a socket on a computer, it is quite often the
case that applications on different terminals are incompatible in some way.
For example, when trying to set up something like a real time voice call,
it requires quite a lot of negotiation on coding rates and formats, etc. In
addition, the user’s IP address will change at each login, which means that
it is almost impossible to locate individuals instantly for setting up a voice
session. What is needed is a way of identifying fixed users, binding them more
rapidly to one changing IP address, and then negotiating sessions (Wisely et
al., 2002, p. 8).
For the purpose of identifying users, a standardized method, Network
Access Identifier (NAI), is proposed in RFC 2486 (Aboba & Beadles, 1999).
For the purpose of negotiation, an early protocol suite, H.323, is developed
by ITU (Wisely et al., 2002, p. 128). Another much more recent pro-
posal by IETF is the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) (Handley, Schulzrinne,
Schooler, & Rosenberg, 1999; Handley & Jacobson, 1998).
4.5.6 Security Issues
There are many serious security flaws inherent in the TCP/IP protocols
suite. Some of these flaws exist because hosts rely on IP source address
for authentication. Others exist because network control mechanisms, and
in particular routing protocols, have minimal or non-existent authentication
(Bellovin, 1989).
For defending these security issues, security mechanisms exist at each
layer of the TCP/IP model shown in Figure 4.3. This is not a case of re-
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peating functionalities. The word ‘security’ actually contains many different
functions, and different types of security are employed to solve different se-
curity issues, as shown in Table 4.1. Generally, true security requires what
is known as ‘security in depth’, that is, if one wants security, one should not
rely on just on one mechanism to achieve it (Wisely et al., 2002, p. 107).
Table 4.1: Security Mechanisms at Different Layers of the TCP/IP Model
(Wisely et al., 2002, p. 108)
Layer Example Security Mechanisms Comments
Application
SET
Digital Signature
Enables private, authenti-
cated transactions. Relies
on certificate infrastructure.
Transport SSL
Enables data encryption.
Relies on certificate infras-
tructure.
Network
IPSec & AAA protocols
Firewalls
Protects the network, Pro-
tects data across the net-
work.
Link
Physical
Coding schemes, Physical
Isolation
Especially useful for wire-
less links which are easily
tapped
The next section will comprehensively investigate security in IP networks
while Chapter 6 will focus on a specific IP Security Architecture, IPSec (Kent
& Atkinson, 1998c).
4.5.7 Summary
This section has investigated the drawbacks of the IP approach in a com-
prehensive manner. Also some proposed methods have been introduced in
brief. It is worth noting that some approaches to solving these drawbacks
involves ‘weakening’ the basic IP design principles mentioned in Section 4.2.
For example, adding QoS to some routers fattens the waist of the hourglass
depicted in Figure 4.2 on page 75, that is, the IP layer, which weakens the
end-to-end principle. IPSec has the same consequence. As stated by Deering
(1998), this will lead to a much fatter waist, as illustrated in Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8: Fattened Waist (Deering, 1998)
Thus care should be taken when seeking approaches to solve these prob-
lems. With these basic principles in mind, this study focuses on two of the
above mentioned problems: mobility and security, while the other problems
are not addressed. Furthermore, the problems that arise when solutions to
these two problems are combined will also be addressed. Chapter 5 will fo-
cus on mobility while Chapter 6 will focus on security. Then next section
investigates security in IP networks in a comprehensive way.
4.6 IP Network Security
The previous section has investigated the weaknesses of the IP from a system
perspective. This section will focus on the IP network security issues only. In
a sense, IP network security issues arise from the inherent weakness in the de-
sign, configuration, implementation, or management of a network or system
(Canavan, 2001, p. 25). In the context of information security, this weakness
is called as a vulnerability. Any deliberate act that exploits vulnerabilities is
called an attack (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p. 64), which presents a threat
against the operation, functioning, integrity, or availability of a network or
system. To defend any threat, the controls, also called safeguard, or coun-
termeasure, should be in place. This includes security mechanisms, policies,
procedures, or technologies which can successfully counter attacks, reduce
risk, and resolve vulnerabilities (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p. 27).
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4.6.1 Information Security
When looking at the essence of network security, we discover that it is the
information, and our ability to access that information that we want to pro-
tect, and not the computers and networks (Canavan, 2001, p. 9). Thus a
more appropriate term to use is information security. Information Security is
defined as the protection of information, and the systems and hardware that
use, store, and transmit that information according to the concept devel-
oped by the National Security Telecommunications and Information System
Security Committee (NSTISSC) (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p. 9).
From an information security perspective, therefore, the purpose of the se-
curity controls mentioned above is to protect the value of the information over
the IP network from being compromised in terms of availability, accuracy,
authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, utility, and possession (Whitman &
Mattord, 2003, p. 10). However, in the context of the network security, only
availability, authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity characteristics make
sense (Canavan, 2001, p. 9). Thus, a threat is anything that could lead
to the violation of the above mentioned characteristics of the information
(Schafer, 2003, p. 6 ), while an attack is seen as the actual implementation
of a threat.
IP networks are often divided into two parts: the outside world, known
as the untrusted network, for example, the Internet, and the inside world,
known as the trusted network, for example, the intranet of an organization
(Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p. 276). Most controls defend against attacks
from the outside. However, it is worth noting that often threats come from
inside an organization: “We have found the enemy and it is us” (Canavan,
2001, p. 10). This section, however, still focuses on defense against outside
attacks.
This study attempts to propose a framework in a mobile environment,
where it is often the case that inside users move to the outside. The question
arises how, in this situation, can users be provided with continuous access
to inside information over an untrusted network? In other words, how is
the availability of the information ensured? Furthermore, availability should
be ensured without the violation of any of the other characteristics, namely,
authenticity, confidentiality and integrity.
After all technology countermeasures have been deployed, we have not
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necessarily provided a secure network system. It is important to remember
that information security is not simply a matter of technology. It is concerned
with software, hardware, data, people, and procedures. There are many
management side elements involved, such as policy, awareness, training and
education (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p. 10). Generally, controls against
threats are provided in three levels: managerial, operational, and technical
(Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p. 221 ). However, this study focuses on the
technical aspect only. A more comprehensive introduction to all aspects of
information security can be found in the book, “Principles of Information
Security” (Whitman & Mattord, 2003).
Coming back to the attacks mentioned previously, intensive research ef-
forts have been made in this area. Bellovin (1989) widely investigated the se-
curity problems in the TCP/IP protocol suite. Chakrabarti and Manimaran
(2002) focused on the network infrastructure, and presented a taxonomy of
existing attacks. This section does not attempt to repeat this work in a
comprehensive manner, but will introduce some attacks relevant to Mobile
IP and IPSec. Thereafter some countermeasures against these attacks will
be introduced. The effect of these countermeasures might be reduced due
to the introduction of Mobile IP and IPSec, or might even be incompatible
with them.
4.6.2 Attacks
As mentioned above, an attack leads towards a threat to the characteristics
of the information. In reality, a specific attack often leads to a combination
of threats towards several characteristics of the information (Schafer, 2003,
p. 8). An actual hacker will often combine several attacks to construct a
threat towards the characteristics of the information. There are two general
categories of attacks (Schafer, 2003, p. 9):
• Passive attack: there is no obvious activity that can be monitored
or detected in this type of attack. Attackers stealthily eavesdrop on
protocol data units. It is often used to monitor and record the traffic
on the network, usually in order to gather information that can be used
later in active attacks (Canavan, 2001, p. 26). Examples of this attack
type include packet sniffing and traffic analysis.
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• Active attack: attackers delay, replay, delete, modify, or insert data
into the protocol data units. As the name implies, this kind of attack
employ more overt actions on the network. Examples of this type of
attacks are denial of service attack (DoS) or active probing of systems
and networks.
A hacker often uses passive attacks to obtain information to launch an
active attack. Thus, the discovery of passive attacks can be regarded as
a premonition of an active attack. This feature is often exploited by the
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p. 286).
In this section, a passive attack, namely sniffer, and two active attacks,
spoofing and DoS, will be introduced, as well as general countermeasures
against them.
Sniffer
A sniffer is a program or device that can monitor data travelling over a net-
work (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p. 69). Sniffers can be used for legitimate
network management functions as well as for stealing information from a
network. When it is exploited by illegitimate users to gain internal informa-
tion, the confidentiality of the information is compromised. Sniffers can be
extremely dangerous to a network’s security, as they are virtually impossible
to detect and can be inserted almost anywhere.
A measure against this attack type is employing cryptology to encrypt
traffic over the network. Many approaches exist, such as Transport Layer
Security (TLS) (Dierks & Allen, 1999), Secure Socket Layer (SSL) (Freier et
al., 1996), Virtual Private Network (VPN), etc.
Spoofing
Spoofing is a technique used to falsify one’s identity or masquerade as some
other individual or entity to gain unauthorized access to a system or network
(Canavan, 2001, p. 30). A broad category of spoofing has been identified,
including IP address spoofing, session highjacking, DNS spoofing, sequence
number spoofing, and replay attacks.
Among them, IP address spoofing receives particular attention in this
study. To engage in IP address spoofing, a hacker must first use a variety
4.6. IP NETWORK SECURITY 93
of techniques to find an IP address of a trusted host and then modify the
packet headers so that it appears that the packets are coming from that
host. Spoofing attacks often compromise the authenticity and integrity of
information transmitted over the networks. Some spoofing attacks are denial
of service oriented (Binkley & Richardson, 1998), which leads to the loss of
availability of the attacked systems.
One example of IP address spoofing is “smurf” attacks. In such an attack,
the attacker sends one or many ping packets to an IP directed-broadcast
address with an IP source address that may also be at the destination
site. For example, if a site had a site specific class C address along the
lines of 192.168.1.0, the attacking IP destination might be 192.168.1.255 or
192.168.1.0 (0 broadcast addresses may be used as well) with an IP source of
192.168.1.1. The result is that two systems may be attacked. The IP source
itself is bombarded with ping reflections from all the systems at the directed
broadcast address. Further the smurf vehicle could also be used for single
packet “ping of death” attacks (Binkley & Richardson, 1998). The defense
against this kind of attacks will be addressed in Section 4.6.3.
Denial of Service
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are designed to shut down a system or net-
work, or render it inoperable (Canavan, 2001, p. 38 ). The goal of DoS is not
to gain access to information but to make a system or network unavailable
for legitimate users, which compromises the availability of the information.
There are many different types of DoS attacks. Some are listed below:
• Ping of death,
• Synchronize sequence number (SYN) flooding,
• Spam,
• Smurf.
This dissertation will discuss two types of countermeasures against these
threats. The next section describes firewalls, while Section 4.6.4 introduces
virtual private networks (VPNs) as a countermeasure.
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4.6.3 Firewall
To protect internal systems from the attacks mentioned above, firewalls are
often deployed on the border of networks to prevent a specific type of in-
formation from moving between the untrusted network and trusted network,
and vice versa (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p. 276).
Firewalls have made significant advances since their earliest implementa-
tions. The first generation of firewall devices were routers that perform only
simple packet filtering operations. More recent generations of firewalls offer
increasingly complex capabilities. At present, firewalls have evolved into the
fifth generation, with many types available. These types of firewalls can be
implemented in a wide variety of architectures. This section will firstly in-
troduce various types of firewalls. Thereafter, deployment architectures will
be introduced.
Types of Firewalls
Firewalls can be categorized in different ways, for example, by the layer of the
OSI model at which they operate, by the technology that they implement,
or by the general approach they employ (Canavan, 2001, p. 214). This
subsection will introduce them according to the time that they were born,
that it, generation by generation.
Packet filtering firewall is the earliest firewall. It simply filters packets
based on their headers as they travel to and from the organization’s networks.
Application-level firewall is also called proxy server, since it runs
special software designed to serve as a proxy for a service request. The
application-level firewall is often a dedicated computer separate from the fil-
tering router and very commonly used in cooperation with a filtering routers.
Stateful inspection firewall, like the packet filtering firewalls, also
performs packet filtering, but it takes it a step further. It keeps track of each
connection established between internal and external networks using a state
table. These state tables track the state and context of each packet in the
session, by recording which station sent what packet and when. A stateful
firewall can restrict incoming packets by denying access to packets that are
responses to internal requests. If the stateful firewall receives an incoming
packet that cannot be matched in its state table, then it defaults to its Access
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Control List (ACL) to determine whether to allow the packet to pass.
Dynamic packet filtering firewall takes a further step than stateful
inspection firewalls. It allows only a particular packet with a particular
source, destination, and port address to enter through the firewall. It does
this by understanding how the protocol functions, and by opening and closing
“doors” in the firewall, based on the information contained in the packet
header. With this functionality, dynamic packet filters are intermediate,
between traditional static packet filters and application proxies.
Kernel proxy is a specialized form that works under the Windows NT
Executive, which is the kernel of Windows NT. It evaluates packets at mul-
tiple layers of the protocol stack, by checking security in the kernel as data
is passed up and down the stack.
Firewall Architectures
Each of these firewalls can be configured in a number of network connec-
tion architectures. These approaches are sometimes mutually exclusive and
sometimes can be combined. Each is examined in more detail below.
Packet filtering routers are the border routers between the organiza-
tion’s internal networks and the external service provider, which are equipped
with packet filtering firewall function (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p. 279).
They filter packets that the organization does not allow into the network.
They often use the source IP address to make the distinction between al-
lowed and unallowed packets. This is a simple but effective means to lower
the organization’s risk to external attack. Drawbacks to this type of system
are a lack of auditing and strong authentication. IP header information is
furthermore unreliable as it can be set by the source, or any intermediary
to any arbitrary value (Binkley & Richardson, 1998). Thus it can not solely
defend the attacks mentioned previously. In addition, the complexity of the
access control lists, used to filter the packets, can grow and degrade network
performance. Figure 4.9 shows this configuration.
To defend against the IP address spoofing attacks described in Section 4.6.2,
packet filtering routers often enforce a security policy that packets arriving
at an outside interface must have an outside source address, or must not have
an inside source address. Likewise, packets leaving from inside must have an
inside source address, or must not have an outside source address. This way,
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Figure 4.9: Packet Filtering Routers (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p. 277)
one may prevent spoofing attacks from originating from the inside of a net-
work (Binkley & Richardson, 1998). This is called network ingress filtering
(Ferguson & Senie, 1998). Mobile IP is specifically affected by ingress traffic
filtering, which will be intensively discussed in Section 5.2 on page 113.
Screened host firewall systems combine the packet filtering router
with a separate, dedicated firewall, such as an application proxy server. This
approach allows the router to prescreen packets to minimize network traffic
and load on the internal proxy. The application proxy examines an appli-
cation layer protocol, such as HTTP, and performs the proxy services. This
separate host is often referred to as a bastion host, as it represents a single,
rich target for external attacks, and should be very thoroughly secured. An
advantage is that the proxy requires the external attack to compromise two
separate systems, before the attack can access internal data. In this way the
bastion host provides more protection for the data than the router alone.
Figure 4.10 shows this configuration.
Dual-homed host firewalls contain two Network Interface Cards (NICs),
rather than the one contained in the bastion host configuration, as illustrated
in Figure 4.11. One NIC is connected to the external network, and one is
connected to the internal network, providing an additional layer of protec-
tion. With two NICs all traffic must physically go through the firewall to
move between the internal and external networks.
Screened subnet firewalls consist of two or more internal bastion hosts,
behind a packet filtering router, with each host protecting the trusted net-
work, as illustrated in Figure 4.12. There are many variants of the screened
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Figure 4.10: Screened Host Firewall (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p. 280)
subnet architecture. The first general model consists of two filtering routers,
with one or more dual-homed bastion hosts between them. The screened
subnet is an entire network segment that performs two functions: it protects
the DMZ systems and information from outside threats; and it protects the
internal networks by limiting how external connections can gain access to
internal systems. Although extremely secure, the screened subnet can be
expensive to implement and complex to configure and manage. To apply the
architecture, the value of the information it protects must justify the cost.
The architecture of a screened subnet firewall provides a DMZ. The DMZ
can be a dedicated port on the firewall device linking a single bastion host,
or it can be connected to a screened subnet. Until recently, servers providing
services through an untrusted network were commonly placed in the DMZ.
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Figure 4.12: Screened Subnet (DMZ) (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, P. 282)
Examples include Web, file transfer protocol (FTP), and certain database
servers. More recent strategies using proxy servers have provided much more
secure solutions.
4.6.4 Virtual Private Network
Firewalls protect the internal network from the outside attacks. However,
when users move to the outside, they will not be under protection of their
firewalls. A mechanism is required to ensure the availability of the internal
information for them in such a way that authenticity, confidentiality and
integrity are not compromised. Firewalls solely can not satisfy this demand.
That is where the Virtual Private Network (VPN) can play a role.
A VPN is a means of transporting traffic in a secure manner over an
unsecured network (Canavan, 2001, p. 205). A VPN often gains this ability
by using some combination of encryption, authentication, and tunnelling.
The following is the four most commonly used protocols to construct VPN:
• Point-to-Point Tunnelling Protocol (PPTP),
• Layer 2 Tunnelling Protocol (L2TP),
• Internet Protocol Security (IPSec), and
4.7. CONCLUSION 99
• SOCKS.
Among them, IPSec, due to its effectiveness and elegance, receives the
most focus in this study, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
4.7 Conclusion
IP is considered as a mechanism to interwork heterogenous networks. This
chapter demonstrated it from a design principle perspective and then inves-
tigated its drawbacks. Two of these drawbacks are the focus of this study,
namely mobility and security. IP mobility will be discussed in Chapter 5.
With the solving of IP mobility problem, it is possible to enable seamless
handover in the selected GPRS and WLAN interworking architecture as dis-
cussed in Chapter 3. The remaining problem toward this study’s goal is
security.
Security is a very wide-scope problem. This chapter briefly examined
IP network security in terms of attacks and countermeasures against these
attacks, for example, firewalls. Of popular firewall deployment architectures,
screened subnet firewall architecture was chosen as the base of the proposed
framework. In addition, to protect traffic between the internal domain and
the Mobile Node, visiting external domains in such an architecture, a VPN
is considered to be a popular mechanism. IPSec, as one of the most popular
VPN mechanisms, will be introduced in detail in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 5
Mobile IP
Chapter 4 has concluded that IP would play an interworking role in the
future mobile network. In that chapter, it has been pointed out that a major
problem towards this role is that IP was originally designed to internetwork
fixed networks, with the assumption that the hosts are fixed. The hosts in IP
networks are identified and located based on IP addresses. On the one hand,
as an identifer, the IP address should never be changed, otherwise the upper
session will break. On the other hand, as a locator, the IP address should
change to reflect the host’s new point of attachment when it moves. Many
solutions attempt to address this problem. Mobile IP (MIP), proposed by
the IETF, is the best-known.
This chapter will give a broad overview to enhance understanding of Mo-
bile IP in Section 5.1. Furthermore, this chapter will expand to discuss
Mobile IP in terms of reverse tunnelling and route optimization. Finally, a
hierarchical approach to IP mobility will be discussed.
5.1 Overview of Mobile IP
To solve the above-mentioned IP addressing problem, the fundamental idea
behind Mobile IP is that a Mobile Node (MN) should have two IP addresses
(Perkins, 1996b). They are:
• Home Address, which is permanently assigned to a Mobile Node, and
acts as its identifier.
• Care-of Address (CoA), which is temporarily assigned to a Mobile
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Node, and acts as its locator reflecting its actual location.
Thus, in basic Mobile IP operation, a Correspondent Node (CN), which
is going to communicate with a Mobile Node, addresses the Mobile Node via
its Home Address (HoA), while the Mobile IP handles the Mobile Node’s
movement and enables the routing of packets to its actual location so that
the mobility of the Mobile Node is hidden from the Correspondent Node.
This operation requires the introduction of two extra entities into the IP
network infrastructure, namely:
• Home Agent (HA), which maintains location information for Mobile
Nodes. It resides in the Mobile Node’s home network and stands for the
Mobile Node, when that Mobile Node is away from home to intercept
packets addressed to the Mobile Node’s Home Address and tunnels
them to its CoA.
• Foreign Agent (FA), which resides in the Mobile Node’s visited network,
namely the foreign network. It provides routing services to the Mobile
Nodes that have registered with it. The Foreign Agent detunnels and
delivers the packets, which were tunnelled by the Mobile Node’s Home
Agent, to the Mobile Node. For the packets sent by a Mobile Node to a
Correspondent Node, the Foreign Agent may serve as a default router
for registered Mobile Nodes.
There are two Mobile IP versions corresponding to the two versions of IP:
Mobile IPv4 (MIPv4) (Perkins, 2002) and Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) (Johnson,
Perkins, & Arkko, 2004). MIPv6 is based on the same principles as MIPv4
but is more powerful (Dimopoulou & Venieris, 2004, p. 5-15). It is well in-
tegrated into the new IPv6 protocol and exploits its facilities for overcoming
several drawbacks encountered in MIPv4. However, as mentioned in Chap-
ter 1, this study builds the framework on IPv4 networks. Thus this chapter
concerns Mobile IPv4 only. In the context of this study, the notations, Mo-
bile IP and MIP, refers to the general Mobile IP functionalities common to
both MIPv4 and MIPv6.
A typical network configuration with Mobile IP support is illustrated
in Figure 5.1. It is assumed that the Mobile Node in this configuration
is equipped with 802.11 WLAN access ability. This configuration will be
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Figure 5.1: A Typical Mobile IP Network Configuration (Dimopoulou &
Venieris, 2004, p. 5-3)
taken as an example to demonstrate Mobile IP procedures through the whole
chapter.
When the Mobile Node moves to a foreign network, the CoA can be ac-
quired by the Foreign Agent in that foreign network, or by alternative mech-
anisms, such as the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) (Droms,
1997). They are respectively denoted as:
• Foreign Agent Care-of Address (FA-CoA), which comprises of one of
the Foreign Agent’s addresses. In this way, all visiting Mobile Nodes
to a foreign network can share a few addresses, which saves the scarce
IP address resource. This approach is represented in light gray in Fig-
ure 5.1.
• Co-located Care-of Address (Co-CoA), which comes from the IP ad-
dress pool of the foreign network. Each Mobile Node has a dedicated
IP address. This approach does not require the presentence of the For-
eign Agent in the foreign network. It is represented in dark gray in
Figure 5.1.
As shown in Figure 5.1, there is a remarkable triangle along the commu-
nication path CN → HA→MN → CN . In Mobile IP’s terminologies, it is
referred to as Triangle Routing, which contributes to one primary disadvan-
tage of Mobile IP. This is that unnecessary load is placed on the network due
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to indirect routing (Dimopoulou & Venieris, 2004, p. 5-10). This problem
will be intensively discussed in Section 5.3. This overview section focuses on
the basic Mobile IP procedures only.
In the basic Mobile IP operation, three phrases can be distinguished:
agent discovery, registration, and routing (Dimopoulou & Venieris, 2004, p.
5-3). The rest of this section will discuss them in sequence.
5.1.1 Agent Discovery
Agent Discovery is a procedure where the mobility agents, Home Agent and
Foreign Agent, advertise their availability on each link so that a newly at-
tached Mobile Node can determine the current point of attachment, and
identify the services provided by the agents (Perkins, 1996b). More specific,
the mobility agents periodically broadcast an Agent Advertisement message
on the link, or this message is sent in response to an Agent Solicitation mes-
sage sent by a Mobile Node for advancing the Agent Discovery procedure.
Through the information provided by the advertisements, a Mobile Node is
able to detect if it is in the same network or has moved to a new network.
This is referred to as Move Detection. If the Mobile Node determines that it
has migrated to a new network, it can acquire a new Care-of Address (CoA).
The new CoA can be obtained from the CoA address list following the Agent
Advertisement message, called Foreign Agent CoA (FA-CoA), or through
other mechanisms, for example, DHCP, called Co-located CoA (Co-CoA)
in this case. Besides facilitating the move detection and CoA acquisition,
the Agent Advertisement also indicates the services offered by the mobility
agents via some bit setting.
The Agent Advertisement is an ICMP Router Advertisement message
(Deering, 1991), that is followed by a Mobility Agent Advertisement Exten-
sion, and optionally, by other extensions. Its format is shown in Figure 5.2.
Based on the format offered here, the rest of this subsection will explain
how it facilitates the move detection, and CoA acquisition. Other services
provided will also be indicated.
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Figure 5.2: Mobility Agent Advertisement Format (Dimopoulou & Venieris,
2004, p. 5-5)
Move Detection
Two primary algorithms are used by Mobile Nodes to detect whether they
have migrated from one subnetwork to another. The first is based on the Life-
time field within the main body of the ICMP Router Advertisement portion
of the Agent Advertisement, as shown in Figure 5.2. A Mobile Node records
the Lifetime received in any Agent Advertisement. If an Agent Advertise-
ment is absent from the same agent for longer than the specified Lifetime, it
can be deduced that the Mobile Node has moved to a new network. If, at
the same time, an Advertisement is received from another agent, it registers
with this new agent. Otherwise, it immediately sends an Agent Solicitation
message that leads to the timely discovery of the agent (Perkins, 1996b).
The second method for move detection uses network prefixes. This is
based on the Prefix-Lengths Extension. The prefix length is applied to the
router addresses, which are found in the router advertisement part of the
message, and can serve as the identification of the subnetwork. If the agent
prefix differs from the prefix of the Mobile Node’s CoA (FA-CoA or Co-CoA),
the Mobile Node assumes that it has moved, and then registers with the new
agent. Otherwise, it assumes that it is still located in the same network.
Care-of Address Acquisition
When a Mobile Node recognizes that it has moved to a new foreign network,
through the above-mentioned Move Detection algorithms, it acquires a Care-
of Address (CoA) in the foreign network. This address can be obtained
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from the CoA address list appending the Agent Advertisement message, as
illustrated in Figure 5.2. In this case, it is FA-CoA. It can also be obtained
from other mechanisms, for example, DHCP. In this case, it is called Co-CoA.
Other Services
Besides facilitating Move Detection and CoA acquisition, the Agent Adver-
tisement, through its flag bits depicted in Figure 5.2, indicates other services
supported by the mobility agents:
• F and H indicate the agent’s role on the network, Foreign Agent, Home
Agent or both.
• M and G indicate the type of encapsulations supported by the Foreign
Agent. M corresponds to the Minimal encapsulation (Perkins, 1996c)
and G to the Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) (Farinacci, Li,
Hanks, Meyer, & Traina, 2000). Note that these two encapsulation
types are optional while IP in IP encapsulation (Perkins, 1996a) is
mandatory for all mobility agents.
• T indicates the Foreign Agent supports the reverse tunnelling. This
will be discussed in Section 5.2.
• R indicates that registration with a Foreign Agent is required, even if
in the Co-CoA mode. This is needed for the purpose of authentication.
5.1.2 Registration
After a Mobile Node (MN) detects that it has moved to a new network
and has acquired a new Care-of Address (CoA), it must inform its Home
Agent (HA) of this CoA, so that the latter can tunnel the packets destined
for its Home Address to the Mobile Node. This can be achieved through
the registration procedure. In this procedure, authentication is conducted
to establish mobility security association. This might take place between a
Mobile Node and Foreign Agent, between a Mobile Node and Home Agent, as
well as between a Foreign Agent and Home Agent (Dimopoulou & Venieris,
2004, p. 5-6).
In addition, a registration procedure is also launched when the Mobile
Node needs to renew its soon-to-expire registration with its HA. Therefore,
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regardless of whether the Mobile Node migrates to a new network or not, it
is engaged in sending renewal registrations to its Home Agent for resetting
the lifetime of its registration (Perkins, 1996b).
The registration procedure is performed via two messages exchanged be-
tween the Mobile Node and its Home Agent: a Registration Request (from
Mobile Node to Home Agent) and a Registration Reply (from Home Agent
to Mobile Node). Depending on the CoA mode, the Foreign Agent might
be located between Home Agent and Mobile Node. The Foreign Agent will
process the information of interest and relay messages to their actual destina-
tions. However, the Foreign Agent might be not involved in this procedure
if the Mobile Node is using a Co-located CoA (Co-CoA), unless the For-
eign Agent has set the R bit of its Agent Advertisement, as mentioned in
Section 5.1.1.
In the rest of this section, it is assumed that the registration is performed
through the Foreign Agent, unless otherwise stated. The complete descrip-
tion of direct registration with the Home Agent can be found in RFC 2002
(Perkins, 1996b).
For a clear understanding of how the registration procedure establishes
an association between a Mobile Node’s Home Address and its CoA, two
conceptual data structures are introduced here, as shown in Figure 5.3. One
is a visitor list, which resides in the Foreign Agent, and accommodates the
associations between the Mobile Node’s Home Address and its physical ad-
dress. The other is a mobility binding list, which resides in the Home Agent,
and accommodates the association between the Mobile Node’s Home Address
and its CoA.
The Registration Request message format is illustrated in Figure 5.4. A
complete description of each field can be found in RFC 2002 (Perkins, 1996b).
The following discussion will directly reference these terms without providing
a detailed explanation.
Roughly speaking, the registration procedure can be divided into the
establishment of the association in the above-mentioned data structure, au-
thentication between communicating entities, and the determination of ex-
pire time, which will be discussed hereafter, respectively.
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Figure 5.3: Registration Procedure in Mobile IP
Association Establishment
Upon receipt of a Registration Request from a Mobile Node, that is, message
1a in Figure 5.3, one of the main tasks of the Foreign Agent is to establish
an association between the Mobile Node’s physical address and its the Home
Address. Because this request packet is sent with the Mobile Node’s Home
Address as the IP source address, the Home Address can be extracted from
the IP header. Otherwise the Home Address can be directly determined from
the registration request message’s Home Address field shown in Figure 5.4.
The physical address is determined from the link layer data frame. An as-
sociation between the Mobile Node’s physical address and its Home Address
is thus established in the visitor list of the Foreign Agent. In this case, an
entry is inserted into the visitor list, mapping the Mobile Node’s Home Ad-
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Figure 5.4: Registration Request Message Format (Perkins, 1996b)
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dress, 172.17.1.19, to its physical address, “89 E3 A2 73 2B A8”. However,
the actual update of the Foreign Agent’s visitor list takes place when it re-
ceives a Registration Reply from the Home Agent indicating the success of
the procedure, that is, message 2a.
The Foreign Agent relays the Registration Request message to the Home
Agent using the address from the Home Agent field in Figure 5.4, as demon-
strated by message 1b in Figure 5.3. The Home Agent updates its mobility
binding list for the Mobile Node. It adds a new entry, and either removes the
existing ones if the S bit is not set, or maintains them in conjunction with
the new one if the S bit is set. If the Mobile Node was previously located
in its home network, a mobility binding is created because the Home Agent
did not maintain any location information for the Mobile Node until that
moment. In this case, the new entry maps the Mobile Node’s Home Address
to its CoA, 207.102.6.15.
The deregistration procedure follows a similar message format and flow
when the Mobile Node returns to its home network. The exception is that
the lifetime is set to zero in the registration request message. This will result
in the deletion of all mobility binding entries, for the Mobile Node in the
home agent, if the Care-of Address field is set to its Home Address, or the
deletion of only the CoA indicated by the Care-of Address field, if this field
is set to that particular CoA.
Apart from the registration and deregistration procedures performed when
the Mobile Node leaves or returns to its home network, it is also necessary
that appropriate Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) procedures should be
performed to enable other hosts in the home network to contact the Mobile
Node.
When the Mobile Node moves away from its home network, hosts in
the home network will not have valid ARP cache entries for that Mobile
Node from that moment on. Once the Home Agent receives and accepts the
Registration Request message, it starts gratuitous ARP, which was discussed
in Section 4.4.2 on page 84. Hosts on the Home Network will be notified that
packets destined to the Mobile Node’s Home Address should be delivered
to its own physical address, that is, the Home Agent. In this way, the
Home Agent will be able to intercept such packets and tunnel them to the
Mobile Node. Accordingly, the Home Agent also starts proxy ARP, which
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was discussed in Section 4.4.1 on page 84, for replying to ARP requests for
the Mobile Node (Dimopoulou & Venieris, 2004, p. 5-8 ).
Similarly, when the Mobile Node returns to its home network, it should
perform gratuitous ARP for updating the ARP caches of hosts on the Home
Network. This associates the Mobile Node’s own physical address with its
home IP address to enable the receipt of packets destined to its Home Ad-
dress. The Mobile Node then sends the Deregistration Request to its Home
Agent. Upon receipt and successful processing of the message, the Home
Agent stops using proxy ARP for that Mobile Node and once again performs
gratuitous ARP (Dimopoulou & Venieris, 2004, p. 5-8 ).
Authentication
Authentication is performed via various authentication extensions, includ-
ing Mobile-Home authentication extension, Mobile-Foreign authentication
extension and Foreign-Home extension (Perkins, 1996b). These extensions
append to the fixed portion of the registration request message. Among
them, one extension should always be present in both request message and
reply message, that is, Mobile-Home authentication extension. This exten-
sion requires that a mobility security association exists between the Mobile
Node and the Home Agent and is used for authenticating registration data
exchanged between these entities.
Certainly, when these authentication extensions are present at the same
time, a specified order should be obeyed. For example, a Mobile Node, after
securing the Registration Request message with a Mobile-Home Authenti-
cation Extension, may add other extensions to be processed by the Foreign
Agent and can secure these extensions with a Mobile-Foreign Authentication
Extension. The Foreign Agent, when receiving the message, should process
and remove any extension after the Mobile-Home Authentication Extension,
before relaying it to the Home Agent. Furthermore, it can add any informa-
tion to be processed by the Home Agent, which is secured with a Foreign-
Home Authentication Extension. The same logic also applies to the Reply
messages sent in the reverse direction. It is important, however, that the
Foreign Agent should not modify any of the fields up to the Mobile-Home
Authentication Extension because it is likely that the Home Agent will not
be able to authenticate this part of the message (Dimopoulou & Venieris,
5.1. OVERVIEW OF MOBILE IP 111
2004, p. 5-7).
Expire Time Determination
The Lifetime field in Figure 5.4 indicates the number of seconds remaining
before the registration is considered expired. This value is initially set by the
Mobile Node when sending a registration request, taking into account the
value of the registration lifetime field set by the Foreign Agent in its Agent
Advertisement as illustrated in Figure 5.2. However, the registration lifetime
is decided not only by the Mobile Node, but needs the approval of the Home
Agent as well. If the Home Agent specifies a smaller lifetime value in the
Registration Reply, the Foreign Agent will, upon the receipt of this regis-
tration replay, reset its timer to align to the lifetime indicated by the Home
Agent, and then relay this reply to the Mobile Node. Rather than resetting
its timer, the Mobile Node simply will decrease the registration’s remaining
lifetime by the difference of the two lifetime values. By so doing, it will en-
sure that the registration lifetime expires at the Mobile Node before it does
at the Home Agent and Foreign Agent. Consequently, a renewal registration
will be transmitted early enough for updating the mobility bindings of the
Foreign Agent and Home Agent (Dimopoulou & Venieris, 2004, p. 5-8).
5.1.3 Routing
After the Mobile Node (MN) has registered with its Home Agent (HA), it
is able to receive routing services from the Home Agent with, when needed,
the cooperation of the Foreign Agent (FA) for packets addressed to its Home
Address (HoA). The Home Agent, in particular, intercepts packets destined
to the Mobile Node’s Home Address and tunnels them to the registered Care-
of Address (CoA). The end of the tunnel might be a Foreign Agent or the
Mobile Node itself, depending on the CoA mode employed. If the Home
Agent supports the simultaneous binding feature, and the Mobile Node has
registered more than one CoA, the Home Agent tunnels a copy to each one of
them. The default mechanism used for tunnelling is IP in IP encapsulation
(Perkins, 1996a), which is mandatorily supported by all Mobile IP entities,
Home Agents, Foreign Agents, and Mobile Nodes. It is also possible that an
alternative type of encapsulation, such as Minimal encapsulation (Perkins,
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1996c) or GRE encapsulation (Farinacci et al., 2000), can be requested by the
Mobile Node and agreed upon during the registration procedure. Figure 5.5
takes IP in IP encapsulation as example to demonstrate the message sequence
and encapsulation format. As mentioned previously, there is a remarkable
triangle routing along the communication path between the Correspondent
Node (CN) and the Mobile Node. Depending on the CoA mode employed,
either Foreign Agent CoA (FA-CoA) or Co-located CoA (Co-CoA), there are
two possible communication loops:
• A1→ A2→ A3→ B3 if FA-CoA is used, and
• A1→ A2′′ → B3 if Co-CoA is used.
In the case that a Foreign Agent is present, the encapsulated packet,
A2, reaches the Foreign Agent first, which checks its visitor list for an entry
matching the inner packet’s destination address, that is, the Mobile Node’s
Home Address (HoA). If such an entry is found, the Foreign Agent delivers
the inner packet, A3, to the Mobile Node by addressing the Mobile Node’s
physical address. This physical address becomes known to the Foreign Agent
during either the agent discovery from either an Agent Solicitation, or during
the registration procedure from the Registration Request message transmit-
ted by the Mobile Node. This entry is created during the registration proce-
dure, as described in Section 5.1.2. If the Foreign Agent has no entry for the
Mobile Node’s Home Address in its visitors list, then it simply discards this
packet.
In the reverse direction, standard IP routing is used for packets transmit-
ted by the Mobile Node. As shown in Figure 5.5(a), B1 is directly sent by
the Mobile Node to the Correspondent Node (CN), with the CN’s address as
destination address, and its own Home Address (HoA) as source address.
Note that the Mobile Node must be configured with a default router to
serve the next hop for outgoing packets. If it has registered a FA-CoA, it
simply uses its Foreign Agent as the first-hop router for outgoing packets.
The Foreign Agent’s physical address is known from the agent’s advertise-
ments. Alternatively, the Mobile Node can choose its default router from the
Router Addresses advertised in the ICMP Router Advertisement portion of
the Agent Advertisement. These two methods are also used by Mobile Nodes
that use a Co-CoA (Dimopoulou & Venieris, 2004, p. 5-9).
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(a) Routing Sequence Diagram
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(b) Encapsulation in Mobile IP
Figure 5.5: Routing in Mobile IP
Mobile IP routing services are used when the Mobile Node is away from
home. However, if the Mobile Node returns to its home network, it oper-
ates exactly as any other stationary host. Packets addressed to the Mobile
Node’s Home Address reach the Mobile Node through standard IP routing.
The Home Agent maintains no mobility binding and thus is not involved in
the routing of datagrams.
This section provided an overview of Mobile IP. The next section will
further discuss reverse tunnelling in Mobile IP while Section 5.3 will pay
attention to route optimization in Mobile IP’s triangle routing.
5.2 Reverse Tunnelling
As mentioned in Section 4.6.3 on page 95, ingress filtering takes place in
most networks’ border routers to interrupt packets with a source IP address
that appears topologically incorrect. In this way, malicious users are not
able to impersonate other legitimate users when attached to ingress-filtering
domains (Ferguson & Senie, 1998). However, ingress filtering prevents the
standard operation of Mobile IP. Mobile Nodes residing in a foreign network
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Figure 5.6: Reverse Tunnelling
are likely to send packets that have their Home Addresses as the source IP
address.
Reverse tunnelling seeks to address this problem by introducing the use of
a reverse tunnel, having the Care-of Address (CoA) of the Mobile Node (MN)
as a starting point, and the Home Agent (HA) as an endpoint (Montenegro,
1998). In this way the topologically incorrect Home Address of the Mobile
Node is hidden from the foreign network’s ingress filtering firewall. Mobile
Nodes are aware that Foreign Agents (FA) support reverse tunnelling by
detecting if the T flag is set in their Agent Advertisements. Consequently,
they request this service during their registration through the selected Foreign
Agent by setting the corresponding flag in the Registration Request message.
Likewise, Home Agents must accept the reverse tunnel support and should
be ready to decapsulate packets originating from the Mobile Node’s CoA.
In Foreign Agent CoA mode, there are two styles of reverse tunnelling,
as illustrated in Figure 5.6, namely:
• Direct Delivery Style,
• Encapsulating Delivery Style.
In Direct Delivery Style, the Mobile Node specifies the Foreign Agent as
its default router for outgoing IP packets. From the Mobile Node’s point
of view, packets to be reverse tunnelled are processed in the same way as
any other packet. The destination address of such packets is the Correspon-
dent Node’s IP address and the source address is the Mobile Node’s Home
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Address. The Foreign Agent, in turn, is responsible for examining these
packets by checking their source IP address, and for tunnelling them to the
Mobile Node’s Home Agent. Compared with Encapsulating Delivery Style,
the benefit of this style is that no extra processing is required at the Mobile
Node and that packets consume less bandwidth on the wireless link between
the Mobile Node and the Foreign Agent because they are not encapsulated.
However, it lacks flexibility because all packets will be directed to the Home
Agent and there is no way for the Mobile Node to avoid reverse tunnelling
at runtime (Dimopoulou & Venieris, 2004, p. 5-13).
In the Encapsulating Delivery Style, the Mobile Node does not send pack-
ets directly to the Correspondent Nodes, but rather encapsulates them to the
Foreign Agent. The Foreign Agent is responsible for checking that the pack-
ets have been sent by a Mobile Node that has requested this service. Then
the packets are decapsulated and finally re-encapsulated to the Mobile Node’s
Home Agent. The Home Agent, in both schemes, will decapsulate the pack-
ets and forward them based on the destination address of the original packet,
that is, the Correspondent Node’s address.
The benefit of this style is that it allows the Mobile Node to indicate at
runtime whether reverse tunnelling should be used by the Foreign Agent. In
this way, if the Mobile Node, which has requested the Encapsulating Delivery
Style service, sends packets to its Correspondent Node without encapsulating
them first to the Foreign Agent, the latter does not perform reverse tunnelling
to these packets. As a consequence, it will forward them based on standard
IP routing mechanisms.
A Mobile Node requests this service by adding an Encapsulating Delivery
Style Extension (Montenegro, 1998) to the Registration Request message.
This extension is added after the Mobile-Home Authentication Extension
and is removed by the Foreign Agent after being processed, because it affects
only the Foreign Agent’s operation. In all cases, encapsulation is performed
according to the forward tunnel configuration. This means that the same
encapsulation type and the same tunnel endpoints are used for both forward
and reverse tunnels.
If the Mobile Node uses Co-located CoA (Co-CoA) mode, the Mobile
Node itself tunnels the original packets to its Home Agent, with its CoA as
the source address and its Home Agent as destination address.
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5.3 Optimization
The base Mobile IP protocol renders transparency to the operation of Cor-
respondent Nodes (CN) by making them believe that Mobile Nodes (MN)
always reside in their home networks. Although this feature is desirable be-
cause it supports mobility without the requirement of any changes to the
Correspondent Node’s protocol stack, it suffers from several performance
problems.
Firstly, Mobile IP’s triangle routing problem leads to sub-optimal routing
of packets. Secondly, packets in transmit during a handover are often lost be-
cause they are tunnelled based on out-of-date location information. Thirdly,
base stations with small cells result in frequent handovers, and require a
registration with a distant Home Agent (HA) for each such local handover.
This leads to higher overhead and further aggravates packet loss (Perkins &
Wang, 1999).
Mobile IP route optimization alleviates triangle routing by informing the
Correspondent Node of the Mobile Node’s Care-of Address (CoA), while
smooth handover reduces packet loss during handovers by informing the pre-
vious Foreign Agent (FA) of the Mobile Node’s Care-of Address (Perkins &
Johnson, 1999).
For the third problem, a hierarchical Foreign Agent management scheme
is proposed to alleviate the frequent local handover (Gustafsson, Jonsson, &
Perkins, 2005).
The rest of this section will address these three problems especially in
cooperation with a corresponding proposal by IETF.
5.3.1 Route Optimization
The idea behind route optimization is that similar to Home Agent, Corre-
spondent Nodes also need to maintain mobility binding for the Mobile Nodes
they communicate with, so as to directly send packets (tunnelled packets)
to the Mobile Node’s actual point of attachment (Dimopoulou & Venieris,
2004, p. 5-10). However, the fact that mobility information for the Mobile
Node is now available to all possible communicating Correspondent Nodes,
makes the timely update of this information more difficult when the Mobile
Node changes its point of attachment. In the standard protocol, only the
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Home Agent had to be notified. Now, in addition to the Home Agent, all
Correspondent Nodes need to update their mobility binding caches as well.
Until this happens, packets forwarded to the old Foreign Agent are lost. For
this reason, optimization extensions are also provided to allow the forwarding
of packets, which were already on their way to the old Foreign Agent, to the
Mobile Node’s new CoA.
Four new messages are defined for route optimization (Perkins & Johnson,
1999):
• A Binding Warning message is used to transmit advice that one or
more correspondent nodes or foreign agents are likely to have either
no binding cache entry or an out-of-date binding cache entry for some
mobile node.
• A Binding Request message is used by a Correspondent Node to request
a Mobile Node’s current mobility binding from the Mobile Node’s home
agent.
• A Binding Update message is used for notification of a Mobile Node’s
current mobility binding.
• A Binding Acknowledge message is used to acknowledge receipt of a
Binding Update message.
When the Home Agent (HA) receives data packets from a Correspondent
Node (CN) destined to a Mobile Node (MN) away from home, it deduces
that the Correspondent Node is not aware of the Mobile Node’s actual lo-
cation because packets are addressed to the Mobile Node’s Home Address.
Then it sends a Binding Update (BU) message to notify the Correspondent
Node of the Mobile Node’s Care-of Address (CoA). Upon the receipt of this
Binding Update message, the Correspondent Node is able to know that the
Mobile Node has moved to a new point of attachment. In subsequent com-
munication, it directly tunnels a packet to the Correspondent Node without
the Home Agent (HA) involved, as illustrated in Figure 5.7. In the rest
of session, the Corresponding Node periodically sends the Home Agent the
Binding Request message to update its binding cache for that Mobile Node.
In response to this request message, the Home Agent send a Binding Update
message to the Correspondent Node as well.
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Figure 5.7: Route Optimization
In this basic operation, a problem might arise when the Mobile Node
moves to a new Foreign Agent, but the Correspondent Node has not yet been
informed of the Mobile Node’s change of CoA and keeps sending packets to
the old one. These packets will be lost if no other mechanisms is in place.
This is where the Binding Warning message comes in, which enables smooth
handover.
5.3.2 Smooth Handover
Smooth handover has been defined for two cases. Firstly, it is defined for data
being sent, based on out-of-date binding caches maintained at Correspondent
Nodes (CN). Secondly, it is defined for data packets in transmit while the
Mobile Node (MN) changes its point of attachment, but before it registers
with its Home Agent (HA). In both cases, either the Correspondent Nodes
or the Home Agent maintain “wrong” information for the Mobile Node with
respect to its Care-of Address (CoA). Consequently, the previous Foreign
Agent (FA) needs to be informed of the Mobile Node’s new location in order
to redirect packets addressed to the Mobile Node. This is performed by mak-
ing the Mobile Node instruct its new Foreign Agent, via a Previous Foreign
Agent Notification Extension (PFANE) (Perkins & Johnson, 1999), to send
a Binding Update message to its previous Foreign Agent, as illustrated in
Figure 5.8.
Upon receipt of this message, the previous Foreign Agent deletes the
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Figure 5.8: Smooth Handover
visitors list entry for the Mobile Node and adds a binding cache entry for
it for forwarding packets to its new location. Then, it replies to the Mobile
Node with a Binding Acknowledge message, because the Mobile Node needs
to be sure that the update has been carried out. In the absence of this
message, the new Foreign Agent retransmits the Binding Update message to
the previous Foreign Agent. In the event that the Mobile Node returns to
its home network, smooth handover functionality is not supported, and the
Binding Update message causes only the previous Foreign Agent to delete
its visitor list entry (Perkins & Johnson, 1999).
From now on, if the previous Foreign Agent receives encapsulated packets
for that Mobile Node, which it is not currently serving but for which it
maintains a binding cache, it deduces that the Correspondent Node needs to
update its binding cache for the Mobile Node and sends a Binding Warning
message to the Mobile Node’s Home Agent, which carries the Correspondent
Node to be updated. The Home Agent then sends a Binding Update message
to the indicated Correspondent Node to inform it of the Mobile Node’s new
CoA. A Binding Warning message can also be sent by the Mobile Node to its
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Home Agent at the time it registers a new CoA. This way the Home Agent
is informed in a timely manner of the Correspondent Node to be updated
during the registration procedure (Perkins & Johnson, 1999) .
5.3.3 Hierarchical Foreign Agent Scheme
Direct routing from Correspondent Nodes to Mobile Nodes and smooth hand-
over reduce unnecessary traffic and packet loss during handover. However,
they can not reduce the frequent local handover. That is where the MIPv4
Regional Registration (Gustafsson et al., 2005) comes in, which promotes a
hierarchical Foreign Agent (FA) scheme.
The idea is to hide the movement of Mobile Nodes within the visited
domain from the Home Agent under one globally routable entity, denoted as
the Gateway Foreign Agent (GFA) (Dimopoulou & Venieris, 2004, p. 5-38).
This means that time required for signalling messages to the home network,
in conjunction with the time needed for the host to update the path to its
current location, is reduced. This is because a change in the Mobile Node’s
path, within a visited domain, is not propagated to the Home Agent but is
handled locally.
The regional registration proposal defines a tree-like hierarchy of Foreign
Agents, where the FA, located at the root of the tree, is referred to as the
GFA, as illustrated in Figure 5.9.
5.4 A Hierarchical Approach to IP mobility
Mobile IP has been widely accepted as the most appropriate protocol for IP
mobility management in future wireless mobile networks. However, it suffers
from several well-known weaknesses, such as the increasing signaling load
placed on the network and the latency in restoring the communication path
to the host’s new point of attachment (Dimopoulou & Venieris, 2004, p. 5-
22). This latency, in turn, leads to the loss of packets while the end-to-end
path is being restored. Consequently, although providing a robust and simple
solution, Mobile IP does not guarantee seamless mobility, and thus Mobile
Nodes participating in active sessions experience disruption in their service
when changing their point of attachment. These drawbacks have led to the
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Figure 5.9: MIPv4 Regional Registration Architecture (Dimopoulou & Ve-
nieris, 2004, p. 5-39)
investigation of other solutions that complement Mobile IP. Section 5.3.3
described one of these solutions. This section takes that concept a step
further, and promotes a hierarchical approach to mobility management. In
this hierarchical structure, IP mobility is further divided into the following
three levels (Das et al., 2000):
• Micro-mobility is the movement of a Mobile Node within or across
different base stations within a subnetwork and occurs very rapidly.
Currently, management of micro-mobility is accomplished using link-
layer support (layer 2 protocol).
• Macro-mobility (or intradomain mobility) is the movement of a Mobile
Node across different subnetworks within a single domain or region, and
occurs relatively less frequently. This is currently handled by Internet
mobility protocols (layer 3), such as Mobile IP.
• Global mobility (or interdomain mobility) is the movement of a Mobile
Node among different administrative domains or geographical regions.
At present, this is also handled by layer 3 techniques such as Mobile
IP.
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Figure 5.10: Hierarchical IP Mobility
With such a hierarchical approach, the macro-mobility protocols often
operate in the core network while micro-mobility protocols cover the region
of an access network and hide the Mobile Node’s movement within the same
local region from the upper macro-mobility protocols. The global mobil-
ity protocols deal with the movement between the different administrative
domains and operate at a global level. With three level mobility protocols
cooperating with each other, a global mobility architecture is enabled. This
architecture allows for low latency and as little signalling load as possible, as
illustrated in Figure 5.10.
Mobile IP is widely accepted as the macro-mobility and global mobility
protocol (Das et al., 2000). Otherwise, several proposals have been made
for handling the micro-mobility. Most of them consist of extensions to Mo-
bile IP or interact with Mobile IP signaling for providing global mobility
to users. A classification of these protocols has been made by researchers
based on the forwarding mechanisms used for the routing of packets to the
Mobile Nodes. Protocols may be categorized as those that use hierarchical
tunnelling techniques as their forwarding mechanism and those that use host-
based forwarding entries along the path to the Mobile Nodes (Dimopoulou &
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Venieris, 2004, p. 5-24). The former includes MIPv4 Regional Registration
and Hierarchical MIPv6 while the latter includes Cellular IP and HAWAII.
Their primary difference lies in where location information is maintained
within the network. In the first category, agents, often placed in a hierar-
chical manner, hold this information and use the standard IP routing of the
“mobile-unaware” fixed infrastructure for the forwarding of packets. In con-
trast, host-based forwarding schemes establish location information for the
hosts in all nodes pertaining to the downstream forwarding path.
The detailed description of these protocols are not the concern of this
study. A comprehensive comparison of various micro-mobility protocols, in
terms of architecture, scalability, reliability, and philosophy, can be found in
the book “IP for 3G” (Wisely et al., 2002, p. 176 )
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter described the basic operation of Mobile IP, and investigated
the virous extensions to it as well, such as reverse tunnelling, route opti-
mization, smooth handover, and regional registration. With solving the IP
mobility problem using Mobile IP, based on the aforementioned GPRS and
WLAN interworking architecture in Chapter 3, a seamless handover mecha-
nism between GPRS and WLAN has come into shape. To ultimately make
this work requires offering Mobile IP services in GPRS networks, which will
be discussed in Chapter 7.
After constructing the seamless handover mechanism, this chapter further
introduced a hierarchical architecture for IP mobility. This makes IP mobility
more effective, which meets this study’s other objective, namely effective IP
mobility.
Before presenting the proposed framework, the next chapter will introduce
another part of the framework: IPSec.
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Chapter 6
IPSec
Chapter 4 has comprehensively investigated the existing problems for IP to-
wards a complete network design. Among them, the IP mobility and security
issues are the focus of this study. Chapter 5 has thoroughly discussed the
IP mobility, while a brief introduction of IP network security has been done
in Section 4.6 on page 89. At that time, it was argued that the availability
of the information in the intranet should be ensured without the violation
of any other characteristic, that is, authenticity, confidentiality and integrity
when the users of the intranet move to the outside. More specifically, this
involves the authentication of the user, authentication and confidentiality of
the data, and the integrity of the data. We have stated that IPSec (Kent
& Atkinson, 1998c) is such a mechanism that provides the solution in an
effective and elegant way.
This chapter will describe IPSec to demonstrate how it offers the above
mentioned security services. The first section will provide an overview of
IPSec Architecture. The second section will provide a brief examination of
the existing IPSec scenarios. The next two sections will describe two of three
primary IPSec components, Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulation
Security Payload (ESP) protocols, respectively. The fifth section will briefly
introduce the third primary component, namely key management. The sixth
section will evaluate IPSec architecture design in accordance with IP design
principles, mentioned in Section 4.2 on page 75, and attempt to answer why
it is an effective and elegant solution.
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Figure 6.1: IPSec Architecture (Thayer et al., 1998)
6.1 Overview of IPSec
IPSec primarily consists of three components, the Authentication Header
(AH) protocol (Kent & Atkinson, 1998b), the Encapsulating Security Pay-
load (ESP) protocol (Kent & Atkinson, 1998a), and key management (Maughan,
Schertler, Schneider, & Turner, 1998; Harkins & Carrel, 1998). The security
services of IPSec are achieved by means of certain cryptographic mechanisms
employed by AH and ESP. These cryptographic mechanisms, in turn, require
a separate set of mechanisms for putting cryptographic keys in place, which
forms the third part of IPSec, Key Management. In addition, there are many
other supporting components, such as encryption algorithms, authentication
algorithms, and domain of interpretation (DOI) (Piper, 1998). An overview
of IPSec architecture is shown in Figure 6.1.
6.1.1 Security Services
IPSec is designed to provide inter-operable, high quality, cryptographically-
based security for IPv4 and IPv6 (Kent & Atkinson, 1998c). The set of se-
curity services offered includes access control, connectionless integrity, data
origin authentication, protection against replays (a form of partial sequence
integrity), confidentiality, and limited traffic flow confidentiality. These ser-
vice are offered through the use of the AH protocol and ESP protocol as well
as the key management procedures and protocols. The services that each
protocol provides are summarized in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1: Security Service Matrix
AH ESP
Connectionless integrity
√ √
Data origin authentication
√ √
Protection against replays
√ √
Confidentiality
√
Traffic flow confidentiality
√
6.1.2 Security Association
A Security Association (SA) is a simplex ‘connection’ that provides security
services to the traffic carried by it (Kent & Atkinson, 1998c). The term
‘connection’ is used with quotation marks because the IP realizes a connec-
tionless and thus stateless service for all communication entities. However,
the respective peer entities need certain state information to implement secu-
rity services. This includes security mechanisms, algorithms and keys used.
This state is maintained through Security Associations established, deployed
and dissolved between peer entities (Schafer, 2003, p. 200). The concept of a
Security Association is fundamental to IPSec. Both AH and ESP make use
of Security Associations and one of the major functions of key management
is the establishment and maintenance of Security Associations. The rest of
this subsection will describe the various aspects of the Security Association.
Security Association Entities
As mentioned above, a Security Association is a secure ‘connection’ between
communication entities. Here, the communication entity can be a host or
gateway. In the case of a gateway, this gateway serves as a security proxy on
behalf of the hosts in the network behind this gateway. In the context of this
study, it is referred to as Security Gateway or, more specific, IPSec Gateway.
The following are the three possible combinations of entity connections:
• Host ↔ Host,
• Host ↔ Gateway, and
• Gateway ↔ Gateway.
These combinations correspond to three topology structures of IPSec:
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(c) Host-to-Network
Figure 6.2: IPSec Topologies (Kent & Atkinson, 1998c)
• Host-to-Host,
• Host-to-Network, and
• Network-to-Network.
A comparison of these three topologies is shown in Figure 6.2. In host-to-
host mode, security is truly end-to-end while in modes wherever the gateway
is involved, that is, the host-to-network and network-to-network modes, the
communication from the host to its gateway is protected by IPSec. This
problem will be further addressed later when discussing the combination of
Security Associations.
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Security Association Identifer
It is worth noting that a Security Association is used only in one commu-
nication direction. To secure a typical bi-direction communication between
two peer entities, two Security Associations are thus required. Each Security
Association, in each direction, should be uniquely identified. The following
definition meets this requirement:
“A Security Association is uniquely identified by a triple con-
sisting of a Security Parameter Index (SPI), an IP destination
address, and a security Protocol (AH or ESP) identifier.” (Kent
& Atkinson, 1998c)
Since the IP destination address is different in each communication di-
rection, it solely distinguishes the Security Associations in each direction.
The SPI is a 32-bit pseudo-random number included in the header of
each of the AH and ESP protocols. To function correctly, SPIs must be
synchronized between two endpoints of a Security Association.
Security Association Modes
A Security Association is basically operated in one of the following two
modes:
• Transport Mode: this mode can only be used between two hosts.
• Tunnel Mode: this mode can be used between hosts or gateways. How-
ever, whenever either end of a Security Association is a security gate-
way, the Security Association must be tunnel mode.
To well understand the Security Association modes well, especially tunnel
mode, two terms need to be introduced first:
• Communication Endpoints, which denote the source and destination
system of the IP packet exchange (Schafer, 2003, p. 206).
• Cryptographic Endpoints, which denote the systems that generate and
process the AH or ESP protocol headers of IP packet exchanges within
the framework of a Security Association.
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(b) Packet Format in Tunnel Mode
Figure 6.3: Security Association Mode
With these two terms explained, the transport and tunnel modes become
easier to understand when described as follows:
• Transport mode is used when the cryptographic endpoints are the same
as the communication endpoints.
• Tunnel mode is used when at least one cryptographic end point is not
a communication endpoint.
As we know, the endpoint is identified by the IP address in IP networks.
Since the cryptographic endpoint and communication endpoint are the same
in the transport mode, only an IP header is required to represent two roles
of the same endpoint, as illustrated in Figure 6.3(a).
In contrast, these two endpoints are different in the tunnel mode. Conse-
quently, two IP headers are required to represent them respectively. An outer
IP header represents the cryptographic endpoints while an inner IP header
represents the communication endpoints, as illustrated in Figure 6.3(b).
Hosts can play a role of sole communication endpoint or both commu-
nication endpoint and cryptographic endpoint, but not sole cryptographic
endpoint. Gateways, in most cases, play a role of sole cryptographic end-
point, but not absolutely. For example, for network management a gateway
system can be managed by a management station via the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP). At this time, it is acting as a host.
Thinking about IPSec topologies, mentioned earlier, and Security Associ-
ation modes, it is observed that constraint relationships exist between them.
In host-to-network and network-to-network modes only tunnel mode can be
applied, because the gateway is involved in these two modes. In host-to-host
mode, both transport and tunnel modes can be applied. Actually, the trans-
port mode can be seen as a simplified form of tunnel mode in host-to-host
mode. Since the communication ends and cryptographic endpoints are the
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same in this situation, an extra IP header is not needed so that the tunnel
mode is evolved into the transport mode.
Table 6.2 summarizes the relationships between IPSec topologies and Se-
curity Association modes.
Table 6.2: Use of Transport and Tunnel Mode
Tunnel Mode Transport Mode
Host-to-Host
√ √
Host-to-Network
√
Network-to-Network
√
Security Association Combination
The IP traffic transmitted over a single Security Association is offered pro-
tection by exactly one security protocol, either AH or ESP, but not both.
Sometimes a security policy may call for a combination of security services
for a particular traffic flow that can not be achieved using a single Secu-
rity Association. In such a situation it is necessary to use multiple Security
Associations to implement the required security policy. The term “Security
Association bundle” is applied to a sequence of Security Associations through
which traffic must be processed to meet a security policy (Kent & Atkinson,
1998c). It is worth noting that the Security Associations that construct a
bundle may terminate at different cryptographic endpoints. For example,
one Security Association may extend between a mobile host and a security
gateway and a second, nested Security Association may extend to a host
behind the gateway. Security associations may be combined into bundles in
two ways: Transport Adjacency and Iterated Tunnelling.
• Transport Adjacency refers to applying more than one security protocol
to the common IP datagram, without using tunnelling. This approach
of combining AH and ESP allows for only one level of combination,
and further nesting yields no extra benefit since the processing is per-
formed at one IPsec entity at the destination. As mentioned above,
transport mode is applicable in host-to-host topology only. Likewise,
this approach is only applicable in host-to-host topology.
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• Iterated Tunnelling refers to the application of multiple layers of secu-
rity protocols effected through IP tunnelling. This approach allows for
multiple levels of nesting, since each tunnel can originate or terminate
at a different cryptographic endpoint along the path. There are three
basic cases of iterated tunnelling:
1. Both endpoints for the Security Associations are the same.
2. One endpoint of the Security Associations is the same.
3. Neither endpoint is the same.
These two approaches can also be combined, for example, a Security
Association bundle could be constructed from one tunnel mode Security As-
sociation and one or two transport mode Security Associations, applied in
sequence. Note that nested tunnels can also occur where neither the source
nor the destination endpoints of any of the tunnels are the same. In such a
case, there will be no host or security gateway with a bundle corresponding
to the nested tunnels.
Security Association Databases
There are two conceptual databases for the administration and specification
of Security Associations: the Security Policy Database (SPD) and the Se-
curity Association Database (SAD). The former specifies the policies that
determine which security services should be applied to which IP packets and
how this application should be executed. The latter database contains pa-
rameters that are associated with each Security Association. This also defines
the concept of a Selector, a set of IP and upper layer protocol field values
that are used by the SPD to map traffic to a policy, that is, a Security As-
sociation (Kent & Atkinson, 1998c).
Three basic IPSec topologies have been identified in Section 6.1.2, namely
host-to-host, network-to-network and host-to-network, and two basic combin-
ing methods of Security Associations have been introduced in Section 6.1.2.
When these combining methods are applied to the topologies, it leads to
many IPSec scenarios. Some of these scenarios will be discussed in the next
section.
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Figure 6.4: Transport Adjacency
6.2 IPSec Scenarios
Among the consideration of IPSec topologies and security associations, three
basic scenarios must be mandatory in the compliant IPSec hosts or security
gateways (Kent & Atkinson, 1998c). The rest of this section will introduce
these three scenarios, according to the categories of topologies, respectively.
6.2.1 Host-to-Host
In this case, both communication endpoints and cryptographic endpoints are
hosts. Thus both transport adjacency and iterated tunnelling methods can
be used. This scenario provides true end-to-end security.
When applying transport adjacency in host-to-host topology, which ac-
tually, is the only topology to which transport adjacency can be applied, a
possible packet format is shown in Figure 6.4.
It is worth noting that there is no situation where Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) appears prior to the Authentication Header (AH). This is
because the protection range of the AH is bigger than that of the ESP. The
AH is applied to both the upper layer protocols and parts of the IP header,
but the ESP is not. Thus, in order to protect as big a range as possible, it
seems appropriate that the AH should appear as the first header after IP.
It is possible to apply iterated tunnelling to the host-to-host topology,
but there is no requirement to support general nesting in tunnel mode (Kent
& Atkinson, 1998c). Thus, this study does not intend to discuss it here.
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(b) Packet Format
Figure 6.5: End-to-End Security in Network-to-Network Topology
6.2.2 Network-to-Network
In this configuration, the traffic between two networks is protected by IPSec.
Its basic form presents a scenario with simple virtual private network support,
as shown in Figure 6.2(b). Only tunnel mode can be applied here. The packet
format is shown in Figure 6.3(b).
One of the problems associated with the above configuration is the fact
that traffic is protected between the security gateways, and traffic between
the hosts and security gateways are left unprotected (Held, 2004, p. 148). If
true end-to-end security between the hosts are required, applying iterating
tunnelling to this topology can meet this requirement, which presents another
scenario, as illustrated in Figure 6.5.
6.2.3 Host-to-Network
This covers the situation where a remote host uses the Internet to reach
an organization’s IPSec gateway and then gains access to some server or
other machine. If applying iterated tunnelling to this configuration, the two
Security Associations originate from the same endpoint, namely the host,
but terminate at different endpoints. One being the peer host, and another
one the security gateway, as shown in Figure 6.6.
This is the so-called ‘road warrior scenario’ (Schafer, 2003, p. 207). It is
worth noting that this scenario is suitable to a mobile environment. Assume
that the host in Figure 6.6(a) is a wireless mobile station. When the user
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(b) Packet Format
Figure 6.6: Road Warrior Scenario
moves to the outside, it connects to the Internet via the external wireless
network. Then it crosses the Internet to the home network’s security gateway.
After establishing the Security Association with the security gateway, the
traffic between the security gateway and this mobile station is protected by
IPSec. Furthermore, if another Security Association between this mobile
station and another host in the home network is established, the traffic along
the whole path is protected, and end-to-end security is offered.
Due to its high relevance to the mobile environment, the most focus will
be placed on this scenario in this study.
6.3 IPSec Standards
According to the layering and modularity principle, discussed in Section 4.2.3,
all the components or functionalities mentioned above are implemented in
such a way that any protocol implements a functionality only so that it is
easy to reuse, and to be combined without the problem of functionality du-
plications. IPSec is designed to be algorithm-independent, which intends to
provide a framework to populate various algorithms for required security ser-
vices. This modularity permits the selection of different sets of algorithms
without affecting the other parts of the implementation. As a result, many
subsequent RFC documents are issued to specify these protocols and al-
gorithms, and RFC 2411 serves as a guideline for specifications describing
encryption and authentication algorithms used in this system. A structural
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Figure 6.7: Overview of IPSec Documents (Schafer, 2003, p. 199)
diagram of these documents is shown in Figure 6.7.
The rest of this chapter will describe specifics regarding the three major
components of the IPSec architecture. Section 6.4 will discuss the AH proto-
col, followed by a discussion of the ESP protocol in Section 6.5. Section 6.6
then discusses key management.
6.4 AH Protocol
The Authentication Header (AH) protocol specified, in RFC 2402 by IETF,
provides connectionless integrity and data origin authentication, and optional
anti-replay services (Kent & Atkinson, 1998b). In general, it is divided into
two parts: a definition of the base protocol and the use of cryptographic
algorithms with AH.
This section provides an overview of the AH protocol. Its protocol format
is described first. Then a description is provided of how the security services,
mentioned above, are achieved.
6.4.1 AH Protocol Format
The AH header consists of six fields: namely next header, payload length, re-
served, security parameter index (SPI), sequence number, and authentication
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Figure 6.8: Format of AH Protocol (Kent & Atkinson, 1998b)
data. After these fields, comes payload, as shown in Figure 6.8. The first
two fields perform normal protocol functionalities, such as demultiplexing
and boundary positions. The remaining fields perform the security-relative
functionalities. They are introduced in brief below.
Next Header: this 8-bit field identifies the type of payload after the AH
header. The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) defines
the assigned numbers that can be used (Reynolds & Postel, 1994).
For example, the value 6 for TCP packet, 17 for UDP packet, as the
Protocol field of IP header does. This assists the receiver to demultiplex
the payload to an appropriate higher level protocol processor.
Payload Length: this 8-bit field contains the length of the whole AH header
expressed in 32-bit words, minus two. Note that here the payload does
not mean payload data in Figure 6.8, but the two integrity-securing
fields: sequence number and authentication data. The length of the
whole AH header and payload, as the payload of the IP datagram,
can be calculated from the HLEN field and total length field of the IP
header. From this length, and the payload length, the authentication
data’s length can be calculated. Since the payload length is measured
in 32-bit words, padding is required where the authentication algorithm
is not a multiple of a 32-bit word. So the effective length of the authen-
tication data becomes a problem. It can be determined by the selected
algorithm.
Reserved: this 16-bit field is reserved for future use. It is currently set to
zero.
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Security parameter index: this is a 32-bit field. As mentioned earlier,
this field uniquely identifies the Security Association to be used for
processing the packet in conjunction with the IP destination address
and the being used security protocol.
Sequence number: this 32-bit field is used for anti-replay service. This ser-
vice, also referred to as replay protection, is optional although the field
is always included by the sender. It is up to the receiver to determine
whether or not to process the data in this field.
Authentication Data: this field is variable. It is used to hold the output
of a cryptographic algorithm for providing integrity and authentication
service. This will be described in detail later.
6.4.2 Connectionless Integrity and Data Origin Au-
thentication
Integrity is a security service that ensures that modifications to data are
detectable. It is called connectionless integrity here in that the AH detects
modification of only an individual IP datagram, without regard to the order-
ing of the datagram in a stream of traffic (Kent & Atkinson, 1998c). Thus
it does not ensure the integrity of the whole IP stream. Other mechanisms
should exist to ensure that. Data origin authentication is defined as:
“providing to one party that receives a message assurance of the
identity of the party which originated the message.” (Menezes,
Van Oorschot, & Vanstone, 1997, p. 25)
These two security services are usually bundled together.
Authentication Algorithm Procedures
The AH uses the same mechanism to achieve both of the above two security
services. It is performed primarily through the calculation and validation
of an Integrity Check Value (ICV), also called the Message Authentication
Code (MAC) in the case of the data origin authentication.
The sender employs a certain keyed cryptographic algorithm to calculate
a digest of the whole packet, that is, an ICV. The ICV is calculated in such a
6.4. AH PROTOCOL 139
way that nobody can deduce the original message from the ICV and nobody
can calculate the ICV of a message without knowing the key. The sender
places the calculated ICV in the Authentication Data field and sends out
the whole packet. Upon receipt of this packet, the receiver uses the same
algorithm and key to calculate the ICV of the received packet. Then the
receiver compares the calculated ICV with the ICV in the packet received’s
authentication data field. If it is equal, the receiver can deduce that the
packet originally comes from the sender without modification in the middle.
This deduction is based on the fact that the key is secret between the sender
and the receiver and the selected algorithms ensure that nobody can fake
and modify a packet to pass the above validation without the key. In this
way, the connectionless integrity and data origin authentication are ensured.
Both the selected algorithms and the key are the parameters of an Security
Association, they are negotiated during the Security Association initializa-
tion process. This is the task of the key management part, which will be
introduced later. What is highlighted here is that the AH offers the high
flexibility in this way. It is not limited to a certain algorithm and does not
limit length of the ICV. As a result, there is a broad range of algorithms
available. Once again, this benefits from the IP’s modularity principle.
For point-to-point communication, suitable algorithms include keyed Mes-
sage Authentication Codes (MACs) based on symmetric encryption algo-
rithms, such as DES (Menezes et al., 1997, p. 250) or on one-way hash
functions, such as MD5 (Rivest, 1992) or SHA-1 (Eastlake & Jones, 2001).
Furthermore, these algorithms have been enhanced with the special consid-
eration of the IPSec, such as HMAC-MD5-96 (Madson & Glenn, 1998a) and
HMAC-SHA-1-96 (Madson & Glenn, 1998b). For multi-cast communication,
one-way hash algorithms, combined with asymmetric signature algorithms
are appropriate, though performance and space considerations currently pre-
clude use of such algorithms.
ICV Calculation
There are some aspects worth noting with respect to the calculation of the
Integrity Check Value (ICV).
The first aspect is about mutable fileds. IP header fields can be classified
into three categories: immutable, mutable but predictable, and mutable. For
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Figure 6.9: IP Packet Format with AH (Kent & Atkinson, 1998b)
the first two categories, their values are inserted into the field for the purpose
of ICV calculation. For the last category, such as the TTL field, it will be
modified during the transit. Its value will be set to zero for the purpose of
the ICV computation. The value of authentication data field is also set to
zero.
The second aspect is about padding. Some encryption algorithms are
based on block size. Sometimes it is not a multiple of 32 bits. So padding is
required to ensure the length of the whole AH is a multiple of 32 bits. The
content of the padding is arbitrarily selected by the sender. These padding
bytes are included in the authentication data calculation, counted as part of
the payload length, and transmitted at the end of the authentication data
field to enable the receiver to perform the ICV calculation.
From the fields the ICV covers, we can see the extent of the protection
offered by the AH. It protects the whole IP packet, including the original
IP header, and even the new IP header if in the tunnel mode, as shown in
Figure 6.9.
It is worth noting that this mechanism solely can not absolutely ensure the
data origin authentication. If only the above mechanism adopted, it cannot
provide defence against a replay attack, where a third part can intercept
the above processed message from the sender, store it and resend it later.
When this resent message arrives at the receiver, it can pass all validation.
Integrity is not comprised, but data origin authentication is violated. This
can be prevented by another mechanism, called replay protection, which will
be introduced below.
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6.4.3 Replay Protection
The replay protection service is achieved using a sequence number. It is
initially set to zero when a Security Association is established. Thereafter,
before each datagram is transmitted, the value of this field is incremented
by one. A new Security Association must be established, because sequence
numbers associated with a Security Association are not allowed to repeat
when the sequence number value of 232 − 1 is reached. As this sequence
number is included in the computation of the ICV, any modification of it by
an attacker will be detected.
The receiver of a packet always verifies if the sequence number contained
in the packet is within a range of acceptable numbers. This range is called
a ‘sliding window’. The reason why an entire window is used, is that in the
Internet the order of IP packets can change during transmission of IP packets
via different routes, even during normal operation. Therefore, packets sent
later may possibly arrive at the receiver sooner than packets that were sent
earlier.
RFC 2401 specifies a minimum window size of 32 with the value 64 rec-
ommended as the default. Upon receipt of an IP packet, the receiving system
performs the following actions depending on the sequence number:
• If the sequence number is to the left of the receiving window, the re-
ceiver discards the packet.
• If the sequence number is inside the receiving window, the receiver
verifies the ICV and accepts the packet if the verification is successful.
• If the sequence number is to the right of the receiving window, the
receiver verifies the ICV and, if the verification is successful, accepts
the packet and advances the window to the right.
6.5 ESP Protocol
As described above, the AH protocol does not provide a confidentiality ser-
vice. This is achieved by the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol.
Optionally, it can also offer an authentication service and a replay protection
142 CHAPTER 6. IPSEC
   	 
 	     ﬀ
 ﬁﬂﬃ "!
#
	%$	% &	' (*)+	  ,  !- ﬀ
.
+- (
/ 0 1 2
ﬃ+3	4+.56.	'$
.
Figure 6.10: Format of ESP Protocol (Kent & Atkinson, 1998a)
service. Similar to the AH protocol, it uses the same mechanism to imple-
ment the authentication and replay protection service. This section focuses
on how confidentiality is achieved in the ESP.
The rest of this section will describe the individual field first. Thereafter a
description of how the confidentiality of information is achieved, is provided.
6.5.1 ESP Protocol Format
The ESP protocol header consists of seven fields: security parameter index
(SPI), sequence number, payload, pad, pad length, next header, and authen-
tication data, as shown in Figure 6.10.
Security Parameter Index: this field is 32-bits in length. Similar to the
SPI in an AH header, this field is used to identify different Security
Associations with the same destination address and security protocol.
Sequence Number: this 32-bit field functions in the same manner as its
counterpart in the AH header.
Initialization Vector: if the cryptographic algorithm being used requires
an initialization vector (IV), the IV is transported in plain-text in each
IP packet so that each packet can be processed independently of other
packets.
Payload: this variable length field contains the actual data being trans-
ported. This field, as well as any padding and the Pad Length and
Next Header fields to be described shortly, are encrypted, with the
algorithm used for encryption selected when the Security Association
was established. The actual type of data carried in the payload, such
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as a TCP segment, is identified by the Next Header field contained in
the trailer.
Pad: this field ensures that the payload being encrypted is padded to a
length that is equivalent to an integer multiple of the block size of the
algorithm used and that the two following fields end up in the higher-
order 16 bits of a 32-bit word.
Pad Length: this field indicates the number of octets added.
Next Header: this field functions in the same way as it does in the AH.
Authentication Data: the optional authentication data field contains a
ICV, if available.
6.5.2 Confidentiality
The ESP achieves confidentiality by means of the symmetric encryption algo-
rithms. This is specified by the Security Association, and negotiated during
the initialization process. Many other parameters also need to be decided
at that time, such as, cipher block length if block encryption algorithms is
used, and the key.
The mode of the ESP decides the extent of confidentiality offered. For
the transport mode, just the original upper layer protocol is encrypted, and
only data confidentiality is offered. For the tunnel mode, the entire original
IP packet is encrypted. As a result, the original source and destination IP
address is not visible to the third party. This offers partial traffic confiden-
tiality, in addition to the data confidentiality.
6.5.3 Other Security Services
The replay protection is offered similar to the Authentication Header (AH)
protocol. Also, the same algorithms used by the AH are applied in the ESP
connectionless integrity and data origin authentication services. What is
different though, is the extent of coverage. The ESP does not count the
original IP header to the calculation of the ICV, while the AH does. Thus,
the ESP does not protect the integrity of the original IP header, as shown
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Figure 6.11: IP Packet Format with ESP (Kent & Atkinson, 1998a)
in Figure 6.11. This is why the AH and ESP are combined to offer stronger
security services.
When both confidentiality and integrity are selected in the ESP, a notable
point is the order in which the encryption algorithm and authentication al-
gorithm are performed. Kent and Atkinson (1998a) argued that encryption
should be performed first before authentication. It is because encryption
does not encompass the Authentication Data field while, by contrast, the
calculation of ICV involves the payload. In addition, this order of processing
also facilitates rapid detection and rejection of replayed or bogus packets by
the receiver, prior to decrypting the packet, hence potentially reducing the
impact of denial of service attacks. Note that since the Authentication Data
is not protected by encryption, a keyed authentication algorithm must be
employed to compute the ICV.
6.6 Key Management
The above sections described how security services are achieved using the
Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) pro-
tocols. Before data exchange between two systems can be protected by these
IPSec protocols, the Security Association between them must firstly be set
up. There are two options for the establishment of the Security Association:
manual or dynamic establishment. As the manual method is not only time-
consuming but also error prone, it should only be used in very manageable
configurations.
IPSec defines a standard method for the dynamic establishment of Secu-
rity Associations. The Internet Security Association and Key Management
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Protocol (ISAKMP) defines generic protocol formats and procedures for ne-
gotiation (Maughan et al., 1998). The actual applications of this protocol for
the negociation of parameters for IPSec Security Associations is presented in
detail in the IPSec Domain of Interpretation (IPSec DOI) (Piper, 1998).
Based on the message formats and procedures provided by the ISAKMP,
the Oakley protocol defines the actual key exchange procedure (Orman,
1998). In conjunction with ISAKMP, it is often referred to as ISAKMP/Oakley,
as it represents a key exchange protocol that supports the ISAKMP frame-
work.
Another protocol, the Internet Key Exchange (IKE), can be seen as a
hybrid protocol that combines portions of ISAKMP and Oakley to provide
a key management capability (Harkins & Carrel, 1998).
This study does not intend to explain them in detail, but a good de-
scription can be found in the corresponding RFC documents, as indicated
above.
6.7 Evaluation with IP Design Principles
The previous sections have introduced various aspects of IPSec. In doing so,
it has been mentioned many times that the layering and modularity principles
have been obeyed in the design of the IPSec. However, it seems to violate the
principle of the end-to-end principle, as the IPSec operates on the network
layer. According to Wisely et al. (2002, p. 82), the security services are a
matter of the end-to-end principle, and placing it in network layer fattens the
network layer and makes the network more complicated. Only the endpoints
that communicate with each other know if they need to hide the information
from other users. Thus, a matter of course is that the security functionalities
should not be placed in the network layer. Despite this, this section still
attempts to argue that IPSec does comply with the end-to-end principle of
IP. Furthermore, a more thorough discussion of end-to-end and node-to-node
encryption is conducted.
The argument of the end-to-end principle is conducted in terms of all three
IPSec topologies: host-to-host, network-to-network, and host-to-network. In
the case of host-to-host, it is obvious that any solution can be seen as end-
to-end wherever the security functionalities are placed, as the hosts are just
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the endpoints of the communication. This does not add any complexity into
the networks. The IP packets that have been processed by IPSec are routed
in the networks as the normal IP packet does. Any intermediate routers do
not need to have any acknowledge of IPSec, and are left unchanged. Only
the communicating hosts need to have IPSec support. It is really what the
end-to-end principle requires.
In the case of network-to-network, IPSec processes are performed in the
security gateways. It is seen as end-to-end in the sense that it is the security
gateways that are seen as the endpoints, but not the individual hosts in the
networks behind those gateways. Only the security gateways need to have
IPSec support. Similar to the host-to-host case, no acknowledge of IPSec is
required in the intermediate routers, or even in the communicating hosts. In
this sense, it is seen as end-to-end.
The same deduction is applicable in the case of host-to-network where
the endpoints are a host and a security gateway, respectively. Thus, in any
case, IPSec is indeed an end-to-end solution.
Another solution for security is node-to-node encryption (Canavan, 2001,
p. 202), as shown in Figure 6.12. Node-to-node encryption often operates in
the link layer. That is why it is also referred to as link-to-link encryption.
The source host puts encrypted data into the data link layer frame, and
sends it to the next node, that is, a host or router in the network. This
node decrypts the received data frame, and then, if in the case of the router,
encrypts it into another data frame, which is sent to the next node. Otherwise
the encrypted data frame is delivered to the upper layer. Each node along
the path between source host and destination host then repeats the same
decryption and encryption procedure again and again until it reaches the
destination host.
An advantage of node-to-node encryption is that it is strong encryption.
As mentioned above, it operates at the link layer, and encrypts all the upper
protocols data, which exposes as little information to the outside as possible.
However, it has some inevitable disadvantages which include the following:
• It requires that the router devices along the whole path must be com-
patible, which means they must know how to encrypt and decrypt the
data frame. As a result of the above requirement, a key management
process is also required between any involved node. Moreover, with
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Figure 6.12: Node-to-Node and End-to-End Encryption (Canavan, 2001, p.
45)
the increment of the involved routers along the path, it will become
incredibly complex, especially in a large network like the Internet.
• In each router the data is decrypted and exposed to the outside. This is
a security gap, which could be exploited by hackers to obtain valuable
information. The solution to this issue is to establish a trust rela-
tionship between the host and all the routers along the whole path.
However, it seems an impossible mission in the Internet due to its high
autonomy.
• It is inefficient that the same encryption and decryption processes are
repeated in intermediate routers again and again.
When the above disadvantages are taken into account, IPSec provides a
much better solution, which renders effective and elegant. The only drawback
of IPSec, compared with the node-to-node encryption, is that IPSec is not as
strongly encrypted as the node-to-node, because it exposes more information
to the outside. Fortunately, this can be rectified by employing tunnel mode.
In this way, the whole IP packet is protected under IPSec, as mentioned
earlier. In this sense, IPSec, by comparison, is better than the other end-
to-end solutions operating in the upper layer, such as SSL and TLS, as they
expose even more information to the outside.
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6.8 Conclusion
This chapter examined various aspects of IPSec. The Authentication Header
(AH) protocol protects the authenticity and data integrity of traffic while the
Encapsulating Secure Payload (ESP) protocol protects the confidentiality
of traffic, and optionally, the authenticity and data integrity as well. Of
various IPSec scenarios, the so-called “road warrior scenario”, using host-
to-network topology, is considered most suitable to the mobile environment.
This scenario will be intensively discussed in the rest of this thesis in terms
of the proposed framework. The incorporation of Mobile IP and IPSec will
be discussed in Chapter 8.
At this stage, we have the necessary background knowledge to understand
the proposed framework. Hereafter, we will go to the next part of this thesis,
namely the Framework, and present the proposed framework.
Part II
The Framework
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Chapter 7
Integration of GPRS and
Mobile IP
Part I introduced necessary background knowledge and motivated some di-
rection for the proposed framework. A loose coupling GPRS and WLAN
interworking architecture was suggested in Chapter 3. IP was selected to
fulfill the interworking role in this architecture. After describing IP in Chap-
ter 4, we further described Mobile IP in Chapter 5. Moreover, a hierarchical
architecture for IP mobility was suggested for effective IP mobility. IPSec,
in corporation with a screened subnet firewall architecture, was selected to
protect traffic’s authenticity, integrity and confidentiality when Mobile Nodes
move away from the internal domain.
With the necessary background knowledge in mind, hereafter, the pro-
posed framework is presented. This will be performed through three steps:
1. Offering Mobile IP service in GPRS, which is discussed in this chapter.
2. Integration of Mobile IP and IPSec, which will be discussed in Chap-
ter 8.
3. Combining the above discussions to propose a complete framework,
which will be presented in Chapter 9.
The rest of this chapter will introduce an approach to introducing Mobile
IP service into GPRS networks as proposed by the the 3rd Generation Part-
nership Project (3GPP). Then, based on “Step 2” of their approach, we will
present a model for offering Mobile IP service into GPRS networks. After
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that, we will describe this model in terms of its initial stage, routing and
handover in correspondent sections.
7.1 Introduction of Mobile IP into GPRS
3GPP has proposed a “stepwise” approach to introducing Mobile IP into
the GPRS core network (European Telecommunications Standards Institute,
2001). The essential idea is to enhance the Gateway GPRS Support Node
(GGSN) with Foreign Agent (FA) functionality, which introduces a new in-
frastructure entity, GGSN/FA, into the GPRS network. The development of
a GPRS network towards a full Mobile IP-based network can be performed
in three steps, all backwards compatible with networks and mobile terminals
that are not handling Mobile IP.
Step 1: This represents a minimum configuration for an operator, who wishes
to offer the Mobile IP service. The current GPRS structure is kept and
handles the mobility within the Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN),
while Mobile IP offered by GGSN/FA allows the user to roam between
other systems, such as WLAN, without losing an ongoing session.
Step 2: A more efficient routing could be obtained after inter-SGSN han-
dovers by changing the GGSN/FA, to which the Mobile Node is at-
tached, to a more optimal one. By keeping the tunnels from the new
SGSN to both the old and new GGSN/FA, for a short period of time,
potential problems with packet loss are minimized.
Step 3: This step combines the Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) and
Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN) into one node, the Internet
GPRS Support Node (IGSN), and to let Mobile IP handle inter-IGSN
handover, that is, mobility within the PLMN core network and between
networks. It renders a full Mobile IP based mobile network.
An operator may implement “Step 2” or “Step 3” without first imple-
menting the previous one. The rest of this section will introduce these three
steps in brief, respectively.
In Figure 7.1 – 7.3, the Border Gateway (BG) denotes the functional-
ity to avoid unwanted traffic between GPRS Public Land Mobile Networks
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(PLMNs). The Border Gateway falls outside the scope of GPRS specifica-
tions.
7.1.1 Step 1 — Offering Mobile IP Service
This step assumes a minimal impact on the GPRS standard and on the
networks when introducing Mobile IP into GPRS. In this step, the Mobile
Node must be able to find a Foreign Agent, preferably the nearest one. The
underlying assumption is that the Foreign Agent is located at the GGSN and
that not all GGSNs may have Foreign Agents. One Foreign Agent in a Public
Land Mobile Network is sufficient for offering Mobile IP service, however for
capacity and efficiency reasons, more than one may be desired. This means
that the Mobile Node must request a Packet Data Protocol (PDP) context to
be set up with a GGSN that offers Foreign Agent functionality. The solution
is to define an Access Point Name (APN), for example “MOBILEIPv4FA”.
This APN is used to connect to the correct GGSN with a Foreign Agent.
While setting up the PDP context, the Mobile Node must be informed of
the network parameters of the Foreign Agent (FA), for example, the care-of
address. Depending on the capabilities of a visited network, two roaming
schemes can be identified: GPRS roaming and Mobile IP roaming. With
GPRS roaming, it means roaming via the Gp interface, which is necessary
when the visited network does not offer any Foreign Agent. In those cases
where the visited network offers a Foreign Agent, Mobile IP roaming is uti-
lized. It is assumed that the Mobile Node stays with the same GGSN/FA as
long as the PDP context is activated. A typical network architecture after
this step is shown in Figure 7.1.
7.1.2 Step 2 — Intermediate GPRS-MIP System
In “Step 2”, the routing is improved by performing a Mobile IP based stream-
lining after an inter-SGSN handover. A “very mobile” Mobile Node might
perform several inter-SGSN handovers during a long session which may cause
inefficient routing. The inefficient routing takes place when the GGSN/FA
that is closest to the new SGSN is different from the closest one to the old
SGSN. The routing could be improved by changing the GGSN/FA for the
mobile during an UMTS/GPRS session. During such a change two tunnels
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Figure 7.1: First Step
are maintained, for a short period of time, between the new SGSN and the
old and the new GGSN/FA. This will minimize problems with packet loss.
The possibility of optimizing the route is especially desirable in those cases
where there are several GGSN/FAs in the Public Land Mobile Network, and
the GGSN/FA and the SGSNs are co-located, as illustrated in Figure 7.2.
The Mobile Node will get a new care-of address with the same procedure
as is defined in step 1 for giving the Mobile Node a care-of address. As in
the previous step, the GPRS interfaces (Gn and Gp) need to be deployed
for roaming customers, since there might be networks which not yet support
Mobile IP. Roaming between Public Land Mobile Networks (PLMN) can be
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Figure 7.2: Second Step
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Figure 7.3: Third Step
handled either with Mobile IP or with GPRS.
7.1.3 Step 3 — Using Mobile IP for Intra System Mo-
bility
The third step is to let Mobile IP handle intra Core Network mobility, inter-
PLMN mobility as well as inter-system mobility in the packet domain. The
functionality of the SGSN and the GGSN are combined into one node, the
Internet GPRS Support Node (IGSN), and functionality is added to utilize
Mobile IP for handling inter-IGSN mobility. The IGSN/FA will be the node
that marks the end of the UMTS specific part of the PLMN. Figure 7.3
depicts a logical view of the core network architecture. To allow compatibility
with UMTS/GPRS networks, an option to let the IGSN also act as a SGSN
or GGSN will be necessary during a transformation period.
The basic functionalities of the IGSN includes:
• Support of UMTS/GPRS mobility management across the UTRAN/BSS,
that is, what the SGSN does today.
• Support of MAP (Mobile Application Part), which is used to communi-
cate with UMTS/GPRS specific nodes, such as Home Location Register
(HLR), Equipment Identity Registry (EIR), SMS-C and the function-
ality needed to handle the information to and from these nodes, such
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as SIM based authentication and handling of keys for encryption over
the radio interface.
• Interaction with the Home Location Register (HLR) and via the For-
eign Agent with the Authentication Authorization Accounting (AAA)
infrastructure.
• Charging data collection and formatting according to UMTS/GSM
specifications. IETF specifications may be used for Foreign Agent ac-
counting.
• Support of Mobile IP with the necessary functionality to be compliant
with Mobile IP deployment in non-UMTS networks around the world.
• Support of inter-IGSN handovers, either by Mobile IP or GTP. In the
control plane, the PDP context for a Mobile Node might need to be
transferred from the old to the new IGSN by GTP.
7.2 Overview of the Model
Based on the above description of the three steps, this study chooses the
second step as a model of integrating Mobile IP into GPRS, because it has the
most minimal impact on the current network infrastructure, and optimized
mechanisms for handovers. It, furthermore, has been widely put into practice
(Sharma et al., 2004; Buddhikot et al., 2003).
Two points need to be taken into account when designing this model:
• Due to scarcity of radio resources and IPv4 addresses, they should be
used with care;
• The impact on the current GPRS signalling messages as well as on the
Mobile Node and SGSN functionality should be minimized to ensure
that this model can be implemented for Release 99 (R99) version of
UMTS, as the R99 is a widely deployed version.
The first point leads to the choice of using the FA-CoA mode, because it
saves the scarce IP address resources, as explained in Chapter 5. The second
point leads to the choice of using the APN to find the desired GGSN instead
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Figure 7.4: Model of Integrating GPRS and Mobile IP
of introducing a new PDP type and the choice of transporting all Mobile IP
messages in the UMTS/GPRS user plane.
Based on “Step 2”, a model of integrating Mobile IP into the GPRS is
shown in Figure 7.4. The following subsections will describe this model in
terms of its handover process, protocol architecture, and procedures.
7.2.1 Hierarchical Handover
This model handles handover at four levels: Base Station (BS) handover,
Radio Network Controller (RNC) handover, SGSN handover, and Foreign
Agent handover, as illustrated in Figure 7.5. All handovers, excluding the
Foreign Agent handover, are UMTS-specific procedures, and the Mobile IP
is transparent for these procedures. Chapter 2 described these procedures,
and this chapter will not repeat them again. The Foreign Agent handover is
Mobile IP specific. This handover is often triggered by a SGSN when this
SGSN finds a closer GGSN/FA to it.
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Figure 7.5: Hierarchical Handover
7.2.2 Protocol Architecture
Multiple protocols and entities are involved along the communication path
from the corresponding node (CN) to the Mobile Node (MN), as illustrated
in Figure 7.6. It is easy to observe that the GGSN/FA is where the Mobile IP
and GPRS interact with each other. Two sides of this point are the Mobile
IP specific domain and the GPRS specific domain, respectively. The end-
to-end principle, promoted by the Internet community, is still obeyed by the
upper layer protocols, that is, the transport layer and the application layer.
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Figure 7.7: Procedures
7.2.3 Procedures
For a Mobile Node attaching to a GPRS network, the following basic proce-
dures are performed to obtain Mobile IP service over that GPRS network,
as illustrated in Figure 7.7.
• GPRS attachment
• PDP context activation
• Mobile IP Agent advertisement
• Mobile IP Registration
• IP packets routing
The former four procedures can be seen as the initial stage. After that,
the Mobile Node is attached to the GPRS network, and known by its Home
Agent. At this point, the Correspondent Node can send packets to the Mobile
Node’s home address. These packets are routed to the Mobile Node via a
Mobile IP tunnel and a GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (GTP) tunnel.
The rest of the sections will introduce the initial stage first, and then
introduce the routing stage in this model.
7.3 Initial Stage
The initial stage is divided into two parts: GPRS specific procedures (at-
tachment and PDP context activation), and Mobile IP specific procedures
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(agent advertisement and registration). An interaction point between the
GPRS and Mobile IP is when the Mobile Node finishes PDP context ac-
tivation procedure and the GGSN/FA is going to advertise its presence to
the Mobile Node. At this point the association between the GPRS specific
address and Mobile IP specific is established. The PDP context activation
assigns an IP address to the Mobile Node, and the Mobile Node also acquires
an IP address in the agent advertisement procedure. The first question when
combining the GPRS and Mobile IP is which address is determined as the
IP address of the Mobile Node.
Relative to the two procedures present at the interaction point, the other
two procedures concerned are more straightforward. The GPRS attachment
functions exactly as described in Section 2.4.1 on page 49, and will, therefore,
not receive further attention in this section. As to the Mobile IP registration
procedure, the messages relevant to this procedure are delivered via the GTP
tunnel established in the PDP context activation procedure.
To enhance understanding of the discussion to follow, a sequence diagram
of the whole initial stage is provided in Figure 7.8. Based on this figure, the
rest of this section will describe the initial stage in detail, and seek to answer
the question mentioned above.
The PDP Context Activation procedure functions normally, as described
in Section 2.4.3 on page 53. One exception is that the Mobile Node should
omit the IP address, which the GGSN sends to it in response to the Activate
PDP Context Request. Thus, at this point in time the Mobile Node still does
not have an IP address. Instead, it is allocated a local link layer address,
that is, TID. Via the GTP tunnel, identified by that TID, the Foreign Agent
advertises its presence to the Mobile Node. As the Mobile Node not yet
has an IP address, a limited broadcast address (255.255.255.255) needs to be
used as the destination address in the Agent Advertisement message.
As the normal Agent Advertisement message does, this message carries
the necessary parameters regarding the agent, such as Foreign Agent ad-
dresses. When the Mobile Node receives the advertisement, it can pick up
one of the Foreign Agent address lists as its care-of address.
After that, the Mobile Node registers the new Care-of Address with its
Home Agent. The format of the registration was given in Figure 5.4. This
message is delivered to the GGSN/FA via the GTP tunnel established above.
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Figure 7.8: Initial Stage
The Foreign Agent relays this message to the Mobile Node’s home agent. To
map the reply from the home network with the correct Mobile Node, the
GGSN/FA needs to store the home address of the Mobile Node and the local
link address of the Mobile Node, that is, TID. When the GGSN/FA receives
the registration reply, it must, besides the normal process, also insert the
Mobile Node’s home address into its GGSN PDP Context as that Mobile
Node’s PDP address.
At this point, the initial stage is finished. The care-of address of the
Mobile Node, that is, the address of the GGSN/FA, is known by the Mobile
Node’s home agent. No extra PDP address is allocated to the Mobile Node.
Its home address is set as its PDP address in the GGSN/FA when relaying
the Mobile IP registration reply message to the Mobile Node. In this way,
the association between the Mobile Node’s home address and its TID is
established. When the Foreign Agent receives the encapsulated packets by
the home agent, the Foreign Agent extracts the original packet, and delivers it
to the GGSN part. The GGSN part tunnels this packet to the corresponding
SGSN via the GTP tunnel according to the association established above.
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This will be described in more detail in the next section.
7.4 Routing
After the initial stage, the associations between a series of identifiers in dif-
ferent participating entities are established. Relying on these associations,
the routing of the packets are conducted. Figure 7.9 illustrates all the pos-
sible routes. As the FA-CoA mode is mandatory in this model, only one
parameter impacts on the routing of the packets, that is, the reverse tunnels.
Depending on whether the reverse tunnel is employed or not, there are the
following communication loops:
• Reverse tunnel: A1 → A2 → A3 → A4 → B1 → B2 → B3 → B4
• No reverse tunnel: A1 → A2 → A3 → A4 → B1 → B2 → B3′′
7.4.1 CN → MN
In this direction, the corresponding node sends a packet A1 to the Mobile
Node’s home address. This packet is intercepted by the home agent. The
home agent encapsulates A1 into A2 with the Mobile Node’s CoA as the
destination address. As the FA-CoA mode is employed in this model, the
packet A2 is received by the GGSN/FA that the Mobile Node attaches to.
The Foreign Agent functionality part of the GGSN/FA extracts the orig-
inal packet A1. Then it delivers the A1 to the GGSN functionality part for
further processing. The GGSN part looks up its database for this packet’s
destination address, that is, the Mobile Node’s home address. As mentioned
previously, in Mobile IP registration, the PDP context address of the Mo-
bile Node was updated using its home address, and an association between
the home address and TID, which identify the tunnel to the corresponding
SGSN, was established. According to this association, the GGSN puts the
packet A1 into the GTP tunnel identified by that TID. The SGSN receives
the packet A1 from the GTP tunnel. According to the association between
TID and TLLI, which was established in the GPRS attachment procedure,
packet A1 is delivered to the Mobile Node.
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(a) Routing Sequence Diagram
  
	

 

 





ﬀﬁ
ﬂﬃ  !"ﬃ# ﬁ!$
ﬁﬁ %
&
' ()
ﬁﬁ 


	+*
  


	+*
  
&,&ﬁ*
,,&*

-ﬁ


	+*
  

.ﬁ


	+*
,/
 ﬁ
/10
ﬂ
(b) Packet Encapsulation in CN → MN direction
  
	



  
	


  
	




  
	


  
	


ﬀﬁﬀﬁﬂ
ﬂﬀﬁﬂ
ﬀﬃ
   !
ﬃ#" $
(c) Packet Encapsulation in MN → CN direction
Figure 7.9: Routing between CN and MN
7.4.2 MN → CN
When the Mobile Node sends packet B1 to the corresponding node, it delivers
B1 to the SGSN first. Then B1 is tunnelled to the GGSN/FA by the SGSN.
The GGSN part of GGSN/FA extracts the original packet, and delivers it to
the Foreign Agent part. If the reverse tunnel is employed, the Foreign Agent
encapsulates B1 into the packet B3. The home agent receives B3, extracts
B1, and relays it to the corresponding node. Otherwise, if no reverse tunnel
is employed, the Foreign Agent part directly delivers packet B1 to the public
IP network. Finally, B1 is routed to the corresponding node by the normal
IP routing mechanism.
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Figure 7.10: Handover Sequence Diagram
7.5 Handover
This section focuses on the situation where a GGSN/FA handover is required
when the Mobile Node attaches to a new SGSN. The GGSN/FA handover is
controlled by the SGSN. The GGSN/FA handover would naturally be done
after the SGSN handover, but it could also be used for load balancing between
two GGSN/FAs.
Figure 7.10 illustrates the message flow when the GGSN/FA handover
takes place. After a SGSN handover, the SGSN has the option to change the
GGSN/FA. The decision is based on the knowledge that SGSNs have of the
GGSNs. If the decision is negative, the PDP Context is kept as normal and
the old GGSN is kept. On the other hand, if a GGSN/FA handover must be
performed, the following procedure is followed:
1. The new SGSN sends a Create PDP Context Request to the new GGSN
with the information that the PDP Context is a Mobile IP PDP Con-
text. The information of the type of the context is put in the APN
field as described in Section 7.3.
2. The new GGSN answers with a Create PDP Context Response and
creates the connection between the Foreign Agent and the new PDP
Context.
3. The new SGSN sends a Delete PDP Context Request to the old GGSN.
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4. The old GGSN deletes the PDP Context and responds to the request
with a Delete PDP Context Response.
5. The Foreign Agent sends the Mobile Node an Agent Advertisement.
6. Agent registration is performed as described in Section 7.8.
After successful creation of the new PDP Context, a timer can be set.
The timer counts down the time until the old PDP Context is deleted. This
allows the packets that arrive at the old GGSN/FA to be forwarded to the
Mobile Node. The timer can also be set to zero to indicate the absence of
a timer. Hence, the PDP Context to the old GGSN is deleted immediately
after the new PDP Context is created.
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter described a stepwise approach to offering Mobile IP services in a
GPRS network as proposed by the 3GPP. Based on “Step 2” in this proposal,
we proposed a model for offering Mobile IP service into GPRS networks.
This model requires minimal changes to the GPRS infrastructure. Only a
combined entity, GGSN/FA, is introduced to serve as a gateway between
GPRS and Mobile IP. Micro-mobility is handled by the GPRS part, while
the Mobile IP part is responsible for macro-mobility. This way, GGSN/FA
hides the movement of Mobile Nodes in the GPRS network to the Home
Agent. This effectively reduces signalling payload and latency.
The next chapter will discuss the integration of Mobile IP and IPSec.
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Chapter 8
Integration of IPSec and
Mobile IP
Chapter 7 has described the integration of Mobile IP and GPRS. Now Mo-
bile Nodes present a unified Mobile IP interface to Correspondent Nodes,
regardless of whether they are located in GPRS networks or 802.11 WLANs.
As mentioned in Chapter 6, IPSec is used to protect the communication be-
tween Mobile Nodes and their internal domain when they move away. This
chapter seeks to address the integration of Mobile IP and IPSec to provide
mobility and security at the same time.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The first section will de-
scribe the network environment where Mobile IP and IPSec will be deployed.
Thereafter the two encapsulation modes for combining the Mobile IP tunnel
and IPSec tunnel are discussed. The third section will investigate the ex-
isting deployment scenarios where the two encapsulation modes are applied
to combine Mobile IP and IPSec tunnels. The fourth section will propose
a dual home agent architecture for combining Mobile IP and IPSec, which
provides both internal and external mobility.
8.1 Background
Typical corporate networks consist of three different domains: the Internet
(untrusted external domain), the intranet (trusted internal domain) where
private addresses (Rekhter, Moskowitz, Karrenberg, Groot, & Lear, 1996)
are typically used, and the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which connects the
167
168 CHAPTER 8. INTEGRATION OF IPSEC AND MOBILE IP
two domains (Vaarala & Klovning, 2005), as was illustrated in Figure 4.12
on page 98. Often the firewall and VPN gateway are deployed in the DMZ
to guard the access to the internal domain. Access is only allowed if both
the firewall and VPN security policies are respected.
In this study when we refer to a VPN we refer to an IPSec-based remote
access VPN. Among the three topologies of IPSec, described in Chapter 6,
the Host-to-Network topology, shown in Figure 6.6 on page 135, is considered
the most suitable for the individual remote user to access the internal domain
(Schafer, 2003, p. 207). This deployment works well when an IPSec peer is
stationary. However, when an IPSec peer moves, which is called a Mobile
Node (MN) in Mobile IP terminology, a problem arises.
The problem is owed to a limitation in the current IPSec version, whereby
a new Internet Key Exchange (IKE) negotiation (Harkins & Carrel, 1998)
must be done whenever a Mobile Node moves, which means its Care-of Ad-
dress (CoA) changes. The main reason is that a Security Association is
unidirectional and identified by a triplet consisting of (Vaarala & Klovning,
2005):
• The destination address, which is the outer address when tunnel mode
is used,
• The security protocol (ESP or AH), and
• The Security Parameter Index (SPI).
Although an implementation is not required to use all of the above for
its own Security Associations, it cannot be assumed that another implemen-
tation also will not use them. When a Mobile Node sends packets to a
stationary IPSec Node, there is no problem. This is because the Security
Association is owned by the stationary IPSec Node, and therefore the desti-
nation address does not need to change. The source address is often simply
ignored by the stationary node although some implementations do check the
source address as well.
The problem arises when packets are sent from the stationary node to the
Mobile Node. As the Security Associations are unidirectional, the Security
Association owned by the Mobile Node is different from the above one. The
destination address of this Security Association is established during IKE
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negotiation, and is the Care-of Address of the Mobile Node at time of nego-
tiation. Therefore the packets will be sent to the original Care-of Address,
not a changed Care-of Address.
A new version of Internet Key Exchange (IKE), IKE2, is supplemented
with the mobility extension (MOBIKE) that may solve this mobility problem
(Kivinen & Tschofenig, 2005), but it is still in the early stages of development.
Thus a demand still exists that mobility should be provided in conjunction
with the existing protocol. For this reason Mobile IP needs to be combined
with IPSec.
In combining the two, there are two primary questions that needs to be
answered:
• What is the order of tunnels? Thus,should the Mobile IP tunnel be
first and the IPSec tunnel second, or should it be the other way round?
• Where should the Home Agent be deployed? Should it be behind the
IPSec gateway, in front of IPSec gateway, or co-located with it?
As will be seen later, these two questions are not independent of each
other, instead, they are somewhat intertwined.
Before attempting to answer these two questions, some notations are
introduced first, for the sake of future discussion. Some of the notations
were introduced in Chapter 1, and are repeated here for convenience:
• i-MN refers to the Mobile Node (MN) when it is located in the internal
domain.
• x-MN refers to the Mobile Node when it is located in the external
domain.
• i-CN refers to the Correspondent Node (CN) in the internal domain.
• x-CN refers to the Correspondent Node (CN) in the external domain.
• i-Foreign Network refers to the foreign network inside the internal do-
main.
• x-Foreign Network refers to the foreign network outside the internal
domain.
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Besides the above notations, there are others, which uses the same naming
convention:
• i-MIP refers to an instance of Mobile IP that runs inside the internal
domain, which uses public address space.
• x-MIP refers to an instance of Mobile IP that runs outside the internal
domain, which uses private address space.
• i-HA refers to the Home Agent (HA) that resides in the internal net-
work.
• x-HA refers to the Home Agent (HA) that resides outside the internal
network.
• i-FA refers to the Foreign Agent (FA) that resides in the internal net-
work.
• x-FA refers to the Foreign Agent (FA) that resides outside the internal
network.
• i-CoA refers to the Care-of Address (CoA) that is registered with i-HA.
• x-CoA refers to the Care-of Address (CoA) that is registered with x-
HA.
• i-HoA refers to the home address of the Mobile Node in its i-HA.
• x-HoA refers to the home address of the Mobile Node in its x-HA.
Finally, some points about these notations need to be highlighted. Firstly,
note that i-MN and x-MN represent different roles of the same entity, rather
than different entities. When a Mobile Node moves inside the internal do-
main, it is referred to as i-MN. When that Mobile Node moves outside the
internal domain, it is referred to as x-MN: although it is the same entity, it
is fulfilling a different role. From the view of the administrative domain, the
Mobile Node always belongs to the internal domain, regardless of whether
it is located inside or outside. This is represented as a Security Association
between the Mobile Node and the internal domain. In contrast, x-CN always
represents an external domain node, while i-CN always represents an internal
domain node.
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Secondly, i-CoA and x-CoA have the same effect on i-MN and x-MN. At
any point in time, a Mobile Node (MN), regardless of playing a role of i-MN or
x-MN, attaches to one foreign network only. Its CoA is always acquired from
the foreign network currently attached, regardless of it being the i-Foreign
Network or the x-Foreign Network. When this CoA is registered with its
i-HA, it is referred to as i-CoA, and when it is registered with its x-HA, as
x-CoA. Although it is the same address, it has a different name, depending
on the network.
Thirdly, there is only one home network for a Mobile Node, which, in the
context of this study, always resides in the internal domain.
8.2 Two Modes of Combining Mobile IP and
IPSec Tunnels
When combining the Mobile IP tunnel and IPSec tunnel, the original packet
has to be encapsulated into a new IP packet twice. Depending on the order of
the encapsulation, there are two combination modes (Adrangi & Levkowetz,
2005):
• Mobile IP tunnel inside IPSec tunnel, and
• IPSec tunnel inside Mobile IP tunnel.
This section will discuss these two combination modes from the perspec-
tive of their packet encapsulation. As will be seen later, the order of en-
capsulation regarding Mobile IP and IPSec tunnels has a significant impact
on these two modes’ characteristics. There are also many other parameters
that impact on the characteristics of two modes, for example, Foreign Agent
Care-of Address (FA-CoA) or Co-located Care-of Address (Co-CoA), reverse
tunnel or non-reverse tunnel. These will be discussed after introducing the
essentials of the two modes.
8.2.1 Mobile IP Tunnel inside IPSec Tunnel
In this mode, the original packet is encapsulated into the Mobile IP tunnel
first, and thereafter encapsulated into the IPSec tunnel, as illustrated in
Figure 8.1(a). The whole operation flow is described hereafter:
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Figure 8.1: Mobile IP Tunnel inside IPSec Tunnel
• The original packet destined for the Mobile Node (MN) is intercepted
by its Home Agent (HA).
• The Home Agent encapsulates this packet into a Mobile IP tunnel
between the Home Agent’s address and the Mobile Node’s Care-of Ad-
dress (CoA).
• This encapsulated packet is routed to the IPSec gateway to go outside.
• The gateway inspects this packet and ckecks its Security Association
database. When a Security Association is found between the Mobile
Node’s CoA and the gateway, the gateway encapsulates this packet
once again, but this time into an IPSec tunnel between the Mobile
Node’s CoA and the gateway.
• When this packet arrives at the Mobile Node, the Mobile Node’s IPSec
software strips off the outer IP header. The Mobile Node’s mobile IP
software then strips off the inner IP header. Finally, the packet sent by
the Correspondent Node (CN) to the Mobile Node is delivered to the
upper layer.
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Figure 8.2: IPSec Tunnel inside Mobile IP Tunnel
The problem with this mode is that the IPSec tunnel’s end is the Mobile
Node’s CoA address, and, therefore, the IPSec tunnel has to be renegotiated
every time when the Mobile Node changes its point of attachment (Adrangi
& Levkowetz, 2005). Since the tunnel renegotiation is a very time-consuming
and resource-consuming operation, this combination mode in practice does
not provide efficient mobility support, especially for real time applications.
As such, the reverse traffic from the Mobile Node to the Correspondent
Node has to traverse the IPSec gateway to reach the inside Correspondent
Node, as illustrated in Figure 8.1(b). It is worth noting that when considering
compatibility with ingress filtering, described in Section 5.2 on page 113, no
reverse tunnel is required here. The IPSec tunnel alone can have the same
effect as what the reverse tunnel does. Thus no Home Agent is involved in
reverse tunnelling, which can be seen as a side effect of the IPSec tunnel.
8.2.2 IPSec Tunnel inside Mobile IP Tunnel
In this mode, the original packet is encapsulated into the IPSec tunnel first,
and in turn encapsulated into the Mobile IP tunnel, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 8.2. The whole operational flow is described below:
• The original packet destined for the Mobile Node (MN) is routed to
the IPSec gateway to go outside.
• The gateway looks up its Security Association database. It can find a
Security Association between the Mobile Node’s home address and the
gateway. It is worth noting that this is significantly different from the
Mobile IP tunnel inside IPSec tunnel mode where an end of the IPSec
tunnel is the Mobile Node’s Care-of Address (CoA).
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• The gateway encapsulates the original packet into an IPSec tunnel with
the gateway’s IP as source address and the Mobile Node’s home address
as the destination address.
• This packet is routed to the Home Agent (HA) as per normal.
• The Home Agent encapsulates this packet once again, but this time into
an IPSec tunnel between Mobile Node’s CoA and the Home Agent’s
address as the normal Mobile IP protocol does.
• At the Mobile Node end, the Mobile IP software strips off the outer IP
header first. Then IPSec software strips off the inner IP header. The
original packet is delivered to the upper layer.
As another end of the IPSec tunnel is the Mobile Node’s home address,
the IPSec tunnel does not need to be renegotiated when the Mobile Node
changes its point of network attachment. This effectively solves the problem
of the previous mode. However, this is achieved at the expense of leaving
the Home Agent unprotected by the IPSec gateway. Thus the Home Agent
should have its own authentication mechanism in place to defend against
spoofing attacks.
When considering the reverse traffic from the Mobile Node to the Cor-
respondent Node (CN), the IPSec tunnel has the same effect as the reverse
tunnel without Home Agent involvement, as in the previous mode. This can
be seen as an optimization for the combination. Normally, where the reverse
tunnel is required, there should be two tunnels. By making the IPSec tunnel
perform the functionality of the reverse tunnel, this eliminates the necessity
for an extra Mobile IP reverse tunnel.
The outer tunnel plays a different role in each of the modes. In a Mobile
IP tunnel inside IPSec tunnel mode, the outer tunnel (IPSec tunnel) acts
like a hider, hiding the inner tunnel (Mobile IP tunnel) from the outside.
In an IPSec tunnel inside Mobile IP tunnel, the outer tunnel (Mobile IP
tunnel) acts like an expander, expanding the inner tunnel (IPSec tunnel) to
the Mobile Node.
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8.3 Five Scenarios of Deploying HA and IPSec
Gateway
Besides the above mentioned two modes of combining Mobile IP and IPSec
tunnels, there are also five scenarios of deploying the Home Agent (HA)
and IPSec gateway, identified by IETF(Vaarala & Klovning, 2005), where
the above modes can be applied. These scenarios are based on the network
environment shown in Figure 8.3. As this chapter’s focus is on the inter-
operation between Mobile IP and IPSec VPN, firewalls are purposely omitted
from the following scenarios in order to keep things simple.
  	
 	  
  	
 	  

 	
ﬀﬁﬂ
 ﬃ
 "!$# %'&)('*'+$,.-'/0*'1 (
 2
,4305

  	
 	  

  	
 "6	  

 	

 ﬃ
7 (ﬀ# %'&)('*'+,.-ﬀ/0*'1 (

 2

8	96	:  

 

2
ﬁﬂ
 

2
; ﬂ=<
	>.?=@ 	@A
Figure 8.3: Network Environment
8.3.1 Home Agent Inside the Intranet behind a VPN
Gateway
In this scenario, the Home Agent is deployed inside the intranet protected
by an IPSec gateway, thus denoted as i-HA, and is not directly reachable by
the external Mobile Node (x-MN) outside the intranet. Figure 8.4 illustrates
this scenario.
Direct application of Mobile IP standards, denoted as i-MIP in this sce-
nario, is successfully used to provide mobility for the internal Mobile Node
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Figure 8.4: Home Agent behind the VPN Gateway (Adrangi & Levkowetz,
2005)
(i-MN). This corresponds to the communication path i-MN ↔ i-CN. How-
ever, when considering another part of the internal mobility, x-MN ↔ i-CN,
a problem arises. The x-MN can only access the intranet resources through
the IPSec gateway, which will allow only authenticated IPSec traffic to go
inside. This implies that the Mobile IP traffic has to run inside IPSec, which
leads to two distinct problems:
1. When the x-Foreign Network uses the FA Care-of Address mode, Mo-
bile IP registration becomes impossible. This is because the Mobile
IP traffic between x-MN and the IPSec gateway is encrypted, and the
x-FA, which is likely to be in a different administrative domain, can
not inspect the Mobile IP headers needed for relaying the Mobile IP
packets.
2. In Co-located Care-of Address mode, successful registration is possible,
but the IPSec tunnel has to be re-negotiated every time that the x-
MN changes its point of network attachment. This is a very time-
consuming and resource-consuming operation, which in effect makes
mobility impossible, as discussed in Section 8.2.1.
Recalling the 3G scenario in Figure 1.3 on page 10, the above analysis
only involves the communication path i-MN ↔ i-CN and x-MN ↔ i-CN. In
other words the analysis involves the access to the intranet resource regardless
of the Mobile Node being inside or outside the intranet. The Mobile Node,
regardless of being inside or outside the intranet, and i-CN, are both entities
in the internal domain, which has a Security Association with the IPSec
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Figure 8.5: Home Agent and the VPN Gateway on the Border (Adrangi &
Levkowetz, 2005)
gateway. It is therefore not a problem for x-MN or i-CN to traverse the
IPSec gateway. It is referred to as ‘internal mobility’ because all traffic takes
place between the internal entities, as mentioned in Section 1.3.4 on page 14.
Note that this scenario does not provide ‘external mobility’, which covers
communication path i-MN ↔ x-CN and x-MN ↔ x-CN, as described in
Section 1.3.4. This is due to two reasons. Firstly, the Mobile Node uses a
private address. It is impossible for x-CN to address the x-MN. Secondly, due
to the lack of a Security Association between x-CN and the IPSec gateway,
it is impossible for x-CN to traverse the IPSec gateway to address i-MN.
8.3.2 Home Agent and IPSec gateway on the VPN Do-
main Border
In this scenario, the Home Agent (HA) is deployed on the VPN domain
border, that is, DMZ, together with the IPSec gateway, and it is directly
reachable by both the x-MN and i-MN. Figure 8.5 illustrates this scenario.
The Home Agent has a public interface to the external domain, and a
private interface to the internal domain. Similar to the previous scenario,
the standard Mobile IP successfully provides mobility to the internal Mobile
Node (i-MN). In the case of x-MN, besides the “Mobile IP tunnel inside IPSec
tunnel” mode, which only the previous scenario can use, the Home Agent’s
public interface makes another mode possible, that is, “IPSec tunnel inside
Mobile IP tunnel”. The former has similar problems to the previous scenario.
However, the Home Agent’s public interface makes a small difference, namely
that in the Foreign Agent Care-of Address (FA-CoA) mode Mobile IP regis-
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tration can be directly delivered to the Home Agent via its public interface
without being encapsulated in IPSec tunnel, so that it can pass by the IPSec
gateway. This requires that an authentication mechanism must be in place
at registration to protect against spoofing attacks. The registration is thus
not a problem regardless of FA-CoA mode or Co-located Care-of Address
(Co-CoA) mode. However, the problem of renegotiation every time that the
Mobile Node changes its point of attachment still exists.
The IPSec tunnel inside the Mobile IP tunnel does not present these
problems. However, it does require some modifications to the routing logic
of the Home Agent or the IPSec gateway.
The above discussion considers internal mobility only. External mobility
are made possible by the Home Agent’s public interface. Besides an internal
home address (i-HoA), which enables addressability for i-CN, an external
home address (x-HoA) can be assigned to the Mobile Node so that an x-CN
can address it via its x-HoA. In the case of x-MN, this presents no problem.
However, in the case of i-MN, due to the lack of Security Association between
x-CN and i-MN, it is difficult for the x-CN to traverse the IPSec gateway to
address i-MN. Some policy should be put in place so that the communication
between x-CN and i-MN does not compromise the security of the internal
domain.
In this scenario, it is difficult to define the role of a Home Agent, as it runs
in both public and private address space. In this sense, it can been seen as an
i-HA when it distinguishes a Mobile Node using that Mobile Node’s i-HoA,
which presents internal mobility. It can also been seen as an x-HA when it
distinguishes a Mobile Node using that Mobile Node’s x-HoA, which presents
external mobility. For this reason, it is just denoted as HA in Figure 8.5.
8.3.3 Combined VPN Gateway and Home Agent
This scenario is similar to the scenario described in Section 8.3.2, with the
exception that the IPSec gateway and Mobile IP Home Agent are running
on the same physical machine, as illustrated in Figure 8.6.
Running the Mobile IP Home Agent and VPN on the same machine
resolves routing-related issues that existed in Section 8.3.2 when an “IPSec
tunnel inside Mobile IP tunnel” configuration is used. However, it does not
satisfy multi-vendor inter-operability in environments where Mobile IP Home
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Figure 8.6: Combined VPN Gateway and Home Agent (Adrangi & Lev-
kowetz, 2005)
Agent and VPN technologies must be acquired from different vendors.
8.3.4 Home Agent outside the VPN Domain
In this scenario, the Mobile IP Home Agent is deployed outside the internal
domain, as illustrated in Figure 8.7.
The Home Agent has a public interface only. Though, in corporation
with the IPSec gateway, it nevertheless provides partial internal mobility.
The condition is that it must run in an IPSec tunnel inside Mobile IP tunnel
mode. In the case of x-MN, the x-MN registers its Care-of Address with
its Home Agent first. Then the x-MN negotiates with the IPSec gateway
and establishes an IPSec tunnel, with its x-HoA as outer endpoint and its
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Figure 8.7: Home Agent outside the VPN Domain (Adrangi & Levkowetz,
2005)
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Figure 8.8: Combined VPN Gateway and Home Agent on the Local Link
(Adrangi & Levkowetz, 2005)
i-HoA as inner endpoint. In this way, when i-CN sends a packet to its i-HoA,
the packet is routed to the IPSec gateway. The IPSec gateway tunnels this
packet to x-MN’s x-HoA. The x-MN’s Home Agent intercepts this tunnelled
packet, and further tunnels it to x-MN’s CoA address.
However, in the case of i-MN, it is impossible for it to register with its
Home Agent, because the latter does not have a private interface. Similarly,
it is impossible for an x-CN to address i-MN due to the lack of the Security
Association between them. This scenario thus does not support mobility
inside the internal domain.
It is still possible for an x-CN to address x-MN via its x-HoA. This sce-
nario thus also provides partial external mobility.
8.3.5 Combined VPN Gateway and Home Agent on
the Local Link
This is similar to the deployment scenario described in Section 8.6, with the
difference that the IPSec gateway/Home Agent is sitting on the local link.
The IPSec gateway/Home Agent is assumed to be reachable from the external
network. In other words, it is assumed to have a public IP address. The
firewall is assumed to be configured to allow direct access to the VPN/Home
Agent from the external network. Figure 8.8 depicts this scenario.
This deployment can work without any technical problems with IPSec
tunnel inside Mobile IP tunnel mode. In Mobile IP inside the IPSec tunnel
mode, it presents the same problems as reported in Section 8.3.1. This option
is not practical for large deployments because of the extent of the distributed
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security perimeter (Adrangi & Levkowetz, 2005).
8.3.6 Evaluation of Scenarios
Adrangi and Levkowetz (2005) have evaluated the above mentioned deploy-
ment scenarios to identify those most in need of solving. The evaluation was
based on the following two main criteria:
1. Is the deployment scenario common and practical?
2. Does the deployment scenario reveal any problems resulting from Mo-
bile IP and VPN coexistence?
Adrangi and Levkowetz (2005) believed the scenario in Section 8.3.1 to be
the most important and practical because of a rising need for providing cor-
porate remote users with continuous access to their Intranet resources. The
problems occurring in scenarios in Sections 8.3.2 and 8.3.4 are either the same
as those in the scenario in Section 8.3.1 or a subset of them. Therefore, solv-
ing the scenario in Section 8.3.1 will also solve the scenarios in Sections 8.3.2
and 8.3.4. The scenarios in Sections 8.3.3 and 8.3.5 do not introduce extra
functional problems resulting from Mobile IP and IPSec coexistence than
the scenario in Section 8.3.1, and thus there is no need to seek a solution. A
solution for the scenario in Section 8.3.1 is therefore seen as essential, and
can in turn also be applied to solve problems in other scenarios.
Based on this evaluation, the next section will focus on the scenario in
Section 8.3.1 and examine the existing challenges of this scenario towards a
complete solution to Mobile IP and IPSec coexistence.
8.4 Dual Home Agent Architecture
As mentioned above, the scenario shown in Figure 8.4 is seen as the essential
scenario. It provides mobility for the i-MN perfectly using standard Mobile
IP. However, in the case of x-MN, problems do arise, which are repeated
below:
• Registration in Foreign Agent Care-of Address (FA-CoA) mode
• Renegotiation when the MM changes its attachment of point
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Figure 8.9: Dual Home Agent Architecture (Dutta et al., 2004)
The first problem has an alternative solution, namely using only the Co-
located Care-of Address mode. The second problem is seen as an inherent
problem in this scenario due to the nature of the Mobile IP tunnel inside the
IPSec tunnel, namely that an end of the IPSec tunnel is the Care-of Address
(CoA) of the Mobile Node (MN), which will change every time when the
Mobile Node changes its point of attachment.
As discussed in Section 8.2.2, this is not a problem for the IPSec tunnel
inside Mobile IP tunnel mode, because in that case an end of the IPSec tunnel
is the Home Address (HoA) of the Mobile Node, which never changes. Based
on this characteristic of the IPSec tunnel inside Mobile IP tunnel mode, an
extra Home Agent is introduced to encapsulate the IPSec tunnel, which has
already encapsulated a Mobile IP tunnel, into another most outer Mobile
IP tunnel (Vaarala & Klovning, 2005), as illustrated in Figure 8.9. This
architecture has been implemented in a multimedia test-bed by Dutta et al.
(2004).
8.4.1 Network Environment
For the above architecture, there are other parameters that have an impact on
it, for example, Foreign Agent Care-of Address (FA-CoA) or Co-located Care-
of Address (Co-CoA) mode. The IETF has thoroughly investigated various
possible situations, and presented a complete reference network environment
(Vaarala & Klovning, 2005), as illustrated in Figure 8.3 on page 175.
Every subnetwork in Figure 8.3 demonstrates a situation where the Mo-
bile Node (MN) can establish a connection to the corresponding Home Agent
(HA) by using an appropriate access mode. According to Vaarala and Klovn-
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ing (2005), an access mode is defined as consisting of:
1. A composition of the Mobile Node networking stack: i-MIP or x-
MIP/VPN/i-MIP.
2. Registration mode of i-MIP and x-MIP (if used): FA-CoA or Co-CoA.
Each possible access mode is denoted as “xyz”. Its meaning is described
below:
• “x” indicates whether the x-MIP layer is used. If used, “f” indicates
FA-CoA, “c” indicates Co-CoA. Otherwise, absence indicates not used.
• “y” indicates whether the VPN layer is used. “v” indicates VPN used,
and absence indicates not used.
• “z” indicates mode of i-MIP layer (it is always used). “f” indicates
FA-CoA, and “c” indicates Co-CoA.
When combined, they result in four access modes. When the Mobile Node
is inside the Intranet (i-MN):
• c: i-MIP with Co-CoA
• f: i-MIP with FA-CoA
When the Mobile Node is outside the Intranet (x-MN):
• cvc: x-MIP with Co-CoA, VPN-TIA as i-MIP Co-CoA
• fvc: x-MIP with FA-CoA, VPN-TIA as i-MIP Co-CoA
The former two modes are covered by mobility inside the Intranet while
the latter two modes is about mobility outside the Intranet.
8.4.2 Registration
Depending on where the Mobile Node is located, the registration procedure
varies. In the case of i-MN, the normal registration procedure as described
in Section 5.1.2 (see page 106) is performed. However, the i-MN needs to
register twice, once with i-HA and once with x-HA via its private interface.
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Figure 8.10: Mobile IP Registration in the Internal Domain
When the i-MN registers with i-HA, the Home Address field in the registra-
tion request message, shown in Figure 5.4 (see page 108), is filled with its
i-HoA and the Care-of Address (CoA) field is filled with its CoA, which is
called i-CoA in this case. Note that at this time the CoA is a private address.
When the i-MN registers with x-HA, the Home Address field is filled with its
x-HoA. The Care-of Address (CoA) field is also filled with its CoA, but it is
called x-CoA in this case. As such, the associations between an i-MN’s i-HoA
and its CoA, and between its x-HoA and its CoA are established so that the
packets destined to its i-HoA from the i-CN and destined to its x-HoA from
the i-CN can be relayed to its CoA, as shown in Figure 8.10. In the figure,
it is assumed that the Mobile Node has physical address, “89 E3 A2 73 2B
A8”.
In the case of x-MN, the registration procedure becomes much more com-
plicated. It does not only involve the Mobile IP registration procedure, but
also IPSec tunnel establishment if needed. It involves the following main
steps:
• Registers its new Care-of Address, acquired from an x-Foreign network,
with its x-HA. It is called x-CoA.
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Figure 8.11: Interaction of Protocols for Dual Home Agent Architecture
• Establishes an IPSec tunnel between its x-HoA and the IPSec gateway
inside the DMZ of its enterprise network.
• Registers the tunnel inner address (TIA) of the IPSec tunnel with the
i-HA. It is called i-CoA. This will cause the i-HA to tunnel packets
sent to the Mobile Node’s i-HoA to the IPSec gateway, which will then
tunnel the packets through the IPSec tunnel and the x-MIP tunnel to
the Mobile Node.
• When the Mobile Node moves back to the internal domain, the IPSec
and the x-MIP tunnels will be torn down.
Figure 8.11 illustrates how the Mobile IP and IPSec tunnels are set up
during the Mobile Node’s movement from the internal domain to the external
domain.
8.4.3 Handover
When the Mobile Node is located in the internal domain, the handover pro-
cedure is as normal, which was discussed in Section 5.3.2 on page 118. When
the Mobile Node hands over from the internal domain to the external do-
main, the procedure depicted in Figure 8.11 takes place. However, when the
Mobile Node moves from an external network to another external network,
this procedure does not need to take place again. The Mobile Node only
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Figure 8.12: Curved IPSec Tunnel When x-MN Moves to Another Foreign
Network
needs to perform the normal Mobile IP registration procedure to register its
new x-CoA with its x-HA. Since the Mobile Node’s x-HoA remains the same,
the Mobile Node’s IPSec tunnel does not need to renegotiate. It looks as if
the x-MIP tunnel curved the IPSec tunnel and the i-MIP tunnel within it
so that the IPSec packets can reach their new destinations without breaking
IPSec tunnelling, as illustrated in Figure 8.12
8.4.4 Routing
Besides the normal triangle routing rendered by Mobile IP, in the most
complicated case routing in this dual Home Agent architecture requires tri-
tunnelling, an i-MIP tunnel, IPSec tunnel and x-MIP tunnel. This takes
place in the case of x-MN↔ i-CN. The packets destined to x-MN from i-CN
are tunnelled to the IPSec gateway first by i-HA. Then the IPSec gateway
tunnels tunnelled packets to the x-HA. Upon receipt of these packets, twice
tunnelled, the x-HA tunnels them to the Mobile Node’s CoA.
In the case of x-MN↔ x-CN, normal triangle routing takes place between
x-CN, x-HA and x-MN. Similarly, in the case of i-MN↔ i-CN, it takes place
between i-CN, i-HA and i-MN; and in the case of i-MN ↔ x-CN, between
x-CN, x-HA and i-MN.
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the various scenarios of combining Mobile IP and
IPSec. Based on an essential scenario, a dual Home Agent architecture was
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proposed to solve the existing problems, namely registration in Foreign Agent
Care-of Address mode and IPSec renegotiation when the Mobile Node’s Care-
of Address changes. This is performed by introducing an extra external Home
Agent. This leads to triple tunnelling (i-MIP, IPSec and x-MIP). Although it
adds encapsulation overhead, it indeed solves the above mentioned problems.
This achieved one of this study’s objectives, namely incorporating Mobile IP
and IPSec.
At this point, the two parts of the framework, the integration of GPRS
and Mobile IP and the integration of IPSec and Mobile IP, have been dis-
cussed separately. The next chapter will combine these two parts to propose
a complete framework for achieving this study’s goal.
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Chapter 9
A Complete Framework
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this study attempts to produce a framework for
enterprise users that realize seamless handoff between GPRS and WLAN, as
well as seamless global roaming with security in place. Towards this goal,
Chapter 7 discussed one part of the framework: offering Mobile IP service to
GPRS. Chapter 8 discussed another part of the framework: the integration
of IPSec and Mobile IP. This chapter seeks to propose a complete framework
based on the discussion of the previous two chapters, which complies with
the goal of this study.
This framework addresses both internal and external mobility issues. The
following sections will describe them respectively in terms of the mobile agent
discovery, Mobile IP registration, and IP routing.
9.1 Overview of the Framework
A typical DMZ network topology is adopted in this framework. It consists
of the intranet, DMZ, and the external network, as illustrated in Figure 9.1.
Similar to the typical configuration in this kind of deployment, the intranet
uses the private address space while the external network belongs to the pub-
lic address space. The x-HA and IPSec gateway are located in the DMZ. Both
of them have two network interfaces: one connects to the external network
(public address space); another one connects to the intranet (private address
space). As seen later, this subtle difference enables the i-MN’s reachability
from outside. Except for this aspect, nothing new is involved. In the external
network, the combination of GPRS and WLAN described in Chapter 7 are
189
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entirely adopted here. The bottom of Figure 9.1 shows the combination of all
necessary tunnels in the most complicated case where an i-CN communicates
with an x-MN. Note that the combination is different in two directions. The
combination above shows the case of i-CN → x-MN while the combination
below shows the case of x-MN → i-CN. These tunnels will be discussed in
detail later.
9.1.1 Address Scheme
As aforementioned, the private address scheme is adopted in the intranet.
The DMZ connects the intranet to the Internet with security in place. Gen-
erally, the GPRS backbone also uses the private address space except for
the GGSN, which in addition to the private address interface, also has a
public address interface to the Internet. According to this address scheme, a
possible implementation of the framework is illustrated in Figure 9.2.
In this figure, the GGSN/x-FA, IPSec, and x-HA have both a public ad-
dress and a private address, which serve as the gateway between the internal
world and external world.
The MN’s configuration is much more complex than others. It needs two
home addresses, i-HoA and x-HoA, as discussed in Section 8.4 on page 181.
Correspondingly, it has two care-of addresses, i-CoA and x-CoA. Depending
on where the MN is located, they have different significance. When the MN
is inside the intranet where it plays a role of i-MN, it registers i-HA with the
address of the attached i-FA’s address, denoted as i-CoA. For example, if the
MN in Figure 9.2 attaches to the foreign network 192.168.1.0, its i-CoA is
that network’s i-FA’s address, 192.168.1.1. It also registers x-HA with this
address via x-HA’s private address interface, 192.16.3.5. In other words, its
x-CoA also is 192.168.1.1.
When the MN is outside the intranet, denoted as x-MN, it registers x-
HA with the address of the attached x-FA’s address, denoted as x-CoA.
For example, if the MN in Figure 9.2 attaches to the above GGSN/x-FA
(57.23.4.1), its x-CoA is 57.23.4.1. It also registers i-HA with its TIA. That
is 45.2.1.7. In other words, its i-CoA also is its TIA, namely 45.2.1.7.
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Figure 9.2: Address Scheme of an implementation
9.1.2 Protocol Stack
This framework involves a large number of communicating entities and pro-
tocols, which varies in different communication pathes. All possible paths
include:
• i-CN ↔ i-MN
• i-CN ↔ x-MN
• x-CN ↔ i-MN
• x-CN ↔ x-MN
The lower layer network transport technologies also vary, but they all
serve as a bearer for the upper IP network layer. Here, omitting diversifica-
tion between them, they are totally abstracted as a link layer bearer.
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(d) x-CN → x-MN
Figure 9.3: Protocol Stack
Figure 9.3 shows the interaction of various communicating entities and
protocols in each communication path. Note that the figure shows the cases
in the CN → MN direction only. In the reverse direction the interaction is
somewhat different. This will be discussed in detail later in the form of the
packet encapsulation format in Section 9.3 (See page 200) and Section 9.4
(See page 200).
9.1.3 Security Services
In this framework, the security services are offered by IPSec. Consulting
Figure 9.3, among all communication paths only i-CN ↔ x-MN involves the
IPSec gateway. This means that security services offered by IPSec is only
applicable to this communication path. These services includes:
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• Data origin authentication
• Data integrity
• Confidentiality
• Replay Protection
Depending on the security association agreed to by the communicating
entities, the range of security services varies. The detail of these security
services have been discussed in Chapter 6.
Although the intranet is generally considered trusted and regarded as a
safe domain, this is applicable to the wired network only. The wireless link is
considered much less safe than the wired link. Thus security mechanisms for
the wireless link are necessary, especially in the cases where no IPSec is in-
volved, such as i-CN↔ i-MN, x-CN↔ i-MN, and x-CN↔ x-MN. There is an
existing standard for wireless link security, Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
(Schafer, 2003, p. 303). It is a node-to-node security mechanism. Since the
entities in the intranet are considered the trusted nodes, the deployment of
WEP in the intranet offers some degree of security in communication path
i-CN ↔ i-MN. But for two other cases, due to the introduction of the ex-
ternal untrusted entities, WEP alone does not render the necessary security
guarantee. A detailed discussion of the WEP falls outside of the scope of
this study. Many books, though, focus on this topic. One of them is “Se-
curity in Fixed and Wireless Networks: an Introduction to Securing Data
Communications” (Schafer, 2003).
The paths, x-CN ↔ i-MN and x-CN ↔ x-MN, are not under protection
of the IPSec. This is because there is no security association between the
x-CN and Mobile Node, and it is difficult to establish a security association
between them in IPSec. This study suggests that other mechanisms, such
as SSL (Freier et al., 1996) and TLS (Dierks & Allen, 1999), be deployed to
protect the communication in these two paths. However, this study is not
going to focus on these mechanisms.
9.1.4 Hierarchical Mobility
This framework deals with mobility in a hierarchical fashion, including two
levels: macro-mobility and micro-mobility, as illustrated in Figure 9.4. All
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Figure 9.4: Mobility
WLAN Foreign Agents fall in the level of macro-mobility. The GPRS net-
work, GPRS-relative parts, GGSN and SGSN, deal with micro-mobility while
the Foreign Agents, next to the GGSNs, deal with macro-mobility.
9.1.5 Authentication Agreement
When the Mobile Nodes roam between different wireless networks, this in-
volves multiple administrative domains. The intranet, generally, is owned
by an organization. The GPRS network is owned by an operator, which
is mostly not the owner of the intranet as well. Furthermore, the external
foreign networks may be owned by a third party or in some cases it may
belong to the GPRS operator. Authentication agreements need to exist be-
tween different administrative domains to allow the Mobile Nodes access to
the wireless networks. This is a precondition before seamless handover can
be conducted.
This, however, falls outside of the scope of this study. Except for technical
issues, there is also commercial and legal issues to be dealt with.
9.1.6 Handover
For seamless handover between the GPRS and WLAN, the Mobile Nodes
must be able to receive and send the signal of both the WLAN and GPRS
base station. This can be achieved by using a dual network interface card
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Figure 9.5: Handover
(NIC). This card can receive both signals simultaneously and measure their
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). When the Mobile Node moves to the boundary
of the network, depending on the quality of the signal, the Mobile Node
determines the point of the attachment network.
If a handover is required as a result of determination, it takes place in
the link layer first. If this handover leads to a switch from the WLAN to
the WLAN or from the GPRS to the GPRS, it is identified as a horizontal
handover. If it leads to a switch from the WLAN to the GPRS, it is identified
as a vertical handover, and vice versa.
After the link layer handover, a network layer handover is performed.
This is where Mobile IP comes in. The normal Mobile IP initial procedures
are performed, that is, agent discovery and registration.
Figure 9.5 illustrates the concept of the handover. When the MN moves
from left to right, it constantly measures the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of
all possible wireless networks. Based on the measured SNR, it switches from
WLAN1 to WLAN2 to GPRS to WLAN3. Corresponding to the link layer
switch, its network layer switches from FA1 to FA2 to GGSN/FA to FA3.
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Figure 9.6: Handover Scenario
9.2 Network Layer Handover
We expanded Figure 9.5 into more detail and an illustration of a more detailed
handover scenario is found in Figure 9.6. This figure focuses on the network
layer handover only.
Each handover that occurs when the Mobile Node moves from left to
right is numbered. Among them, handovers 2 and 4 lead to an administra-
tive domain switch from inside to outside. Handover 3 leads to an opposite
switch, that is, from outside to inside. Other handovers only switch access
networks in the same administrative domain. This can be seen as another
approach to categorizing the handovers, namely the intra-administrative do-
main handover and the inter-administrative domain handover.
9.2.1 Handover from Inside to Outside
As discussed previously, when handovers 2 and 4 in Figure 9.6 occur, the
Mobile Node attaches to the external domain. At this point, the Mobile Node
is denoted as x-MN. After link layer handover has been performed, the x-MN
needs to register with its x-HA, establish a security association with IPSec
Gateway, and then register with its i-HA. This was introduced in Section 7.2.
What is new to this framework is that the GPRS attachment and PDP
context activation procedures must be performed first, when switching to the
GPRS network before the above mentioned Mobile IP procedure can start.
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Figure 9.7: Sequence Diagram in Handover from Inside to Outside
A detailed description of the GPRS procedures was given in Section 2.4. A
sequence diagram of the combination of the GPRS, Mobile IP, and IPSec
procedures is shown in Figure 9.7.
• GPRS Attachment: its major purpose is to establish link layer associ-
ation between the Mobile Node and the SGSN. Each Mobile Node is
allocated a Temporary Logical Link Identifer (TLLI) to identify them
in the SGSN. The detailed description can be consulted in Section 2.4.1
on page 49.
• PDP Context Activate: the previous GPRS attachment procedure as-
signs an identifer that the GPRS network knows while the PDP Con-
text Activate procedure assigns an identifer to the Mobile Node that
the external IP network nodes knows, that is, the IP address. A GTP
tunnel is established between the GGSN and SGSN. It is identified by
a specific tunnel identifier (TID) for each Mobile Node. Section 2.4.3
on page 53 provides more details.
• x-FA Agent Discovery: after the IP-based communication tunnel has
been established, the x-FA can advertise its presence to the Mobile
Node via this tunnel. Upon the receipt of this advertisement, an Agent
discovery procedure can be conducted in the Mobile Node, as described
in Section 5.1.1 on page 104.
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• Mobile IP registration with x-HA: in this procedure, x-MN register its
x-CoA with the x-HA. At this point a mobile IP tunnel is established
between x-HA and the x-MN’s x-CoA, that is, x-FA’s IP address.
• IKE negotiation: x-MN issues an IKE negotiation with the IPSec gate-
way. Note that x-MN directly communicates with the IPSec gateway
without the x-HA being involved. At this point, an IPSec tunnel is
established between IPSec gateway and the x-MN’s x-HoA. Its TIA is
the x-MN’s x-HoA.
• Mobile IP registration with i-HA: the x-MN registers its TIA as its i-
CoA with the i-HA via the IPSec tunnel without x-HA being involved.
Hereafter, another Mobile IP tunnel is established between i-HA and
the x-MN.
With these procedures completed, the x-MN is attached to the exter-
nal domain. For each handover where the administrative domain does not
change, regardless of it being horizontal handover, like handover 6, or a verti-
cal handover, like handover 5, 7 and 8, the x-MN only needs to register x-HA
with its new care-of address, or in addition launch GPRS procedures in the
case of GPRS network being attached. No extra IPSec security association
establishment procedure is required. In this way, the IPSec tunnel is not
broken when x-MN hand over outside the intranet. A detailed discussion of
this was given in Section 8.4 on page 181.
9.2.2 Handover from Outside to Inside
When handover 3 in Figure 9.6 occurs, it means the x-MN returns to its
intranet. At this point, it is denoted as i-MN. No IPSec is needed in this
situation. The i-MN tears down the IPSec tunnel that was established before.
It then receives the Agent Advertisement, acquires the care-of address, and
registers i-HA with its new care-of address, which is denoted as i-CoA in this
case.
Then i-MN also registers x-HA with its new care-of address via x-HA’s
private interface, which is denoted as x-CoA, although it is the same as the
i-CoA.
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When the i-MN roams inside the intranet, for each new i-FA that it at-
taches to, besides registering with i-HA, the i-MN also registers its new i-CoA
with the x-HA via the latter’s private interface. Consulting the registration
format in Figure 5.4 on page 108, the Home address field is x-HoA, and the
CoA field is i-CoA, which is different from the case of registration with i-HA
where the the Home address field is i-HoA, and the CoA field is also i-CoA.
This establishes the association between the i-MN’s x-HoA and its i-CoA,
which allows i-MN reachability from the x-CN.
9.2.3 Smooth Handover
To support seamless mobility, it is important to reduce handoff delay and
transient data loss during handoff. Establishing VPN tunnels or establish-
ing connectivity to a cellular data network could introduce excessive delays
that are intolerable to real-time applications. This framework adopts make-
before-break handoff mechanisms to reduce handoff delay and data loss dur-
ing handoff.
9.3 Internal Mobility
As described in Section 1.3.4 on page 14, this study limits the scope of the
internal mobility to the communicating entities pertaining to the internal
administrative domain, including the i-CN and Mobile Nodes, both inside
the intranet and outside the intranet. Consequently, there are two possible
communication paths:
• i-CN ↔ i-MN, also known as mobility inside the intranet
• i-CN ↔ x-MN, also known as mobility outside the intranet
The rest of this section will discuss the routing in these two situations,
respectively.
9.3.1 Routing between i-CN and i-MN
Besides two communicating entities (i-CN and i-MN), this scenario also in-
volves other intermediate entities, such as i-HA and i-FA. Since all entities
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(c) Packet Encapsulation in i-MN → i-CN direction
Figure 9.8: Routing between i-CN and i-MN
are inside the intranet, no traffic goes beyond the IPSec gateway. Thus the
IPSec Gateway is not involved in this situation. All the mobility procedures,
such as agent discovery, registration and routing, are performed similar to
how the normal Mobile IP does, which were described in Chapter 5. Note
that the i-MN not only registers i-HA, but also x-HA for the i-MN’s reach-
ability from outside, as mentioned in Section 9.2.2. Routing still adopts a
typical triangle routing as with normal Mobile IP. For completeness, Fig-
ure 9.8 shows all possible routing. Depending on the parameters of Mobile
IP, there are the following routing loops:
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• FA-CoA, no reverse tunnel: A1 → A2 → A3 → B1 → B2
• FA-CoA, reverse tunnel: A1 → A2 → A3 → C1 → C2→ C3
• Co-CoA, no reverse tunnel: A1 → A2′′ → B1
• Co-CoA, reverse tunnel: A1 → A2′′ → D1 → D2
Figure 9.8(b) shows all possible packet formats in the i-CN → i-MN di-
rection while Figure 9.8(c) shows the i-MN → i-CN direction.
9.3.2 Routing between i-CN and x-MN
In this situation, the Mobile Node moves outside the intranet, which is thus
denoted as x-MN. Traffic between the x-MN and the internal entity, i-CN,
spans through the IPSec gateway. Other entities involved includes x-HA, i-
HA, x-FA, as well as GGSN/x-FA and SGSN, depending on whether GPRS
is the attached wireless network. The case where no GPRS is involved was
discussed in Section 8.4 on page 181. This subsection only focuses on the
case where GPRS is involved.
A series of initial procedures relative to this case were introduced in Sec-
tion 9.2.1. After these initial procedures all the necessary tunnels are es-
tablished and ready. All traffic between x-MN and i-CN is transported via
these tunnels. It is worth noting that the routing is somewhat different in
two directions, as illustrated in Figure 9.9. Also note that there is no alter-
native communication, and the FA-CoA mode is mandatory in the case of
the GPRS. A unique communication path is:
A1 → A2 → A3 → A4 → A5 → A6 → B1 → B2 → B3 → B4
The rest of this subsection will describe the routing procedures in both
the i-CN → x-MN and x-MN → i-CN direction.
i-CN → x-MN
In this direction, the packets are routed to the x-MN along the path A1→ A2
→ A3 → A4 → A5 → A6. Their packet formats are shown in Figure 9.9(b).
The i-CN sends a packet A1 to the x-MN with x-MN’s i-HoA as des-
tination address. The i-HA intercepts this packet because the x-MN has
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(c) Packet Encapsulation in x-MN → i-CN direction
Figure 9.9: Routing between i-CN and x-MN
registered it with its TIA as i-CoA, as described in Section 9.2.1. The i-HA
encapsulates A1 into A2 with TIA as destination address. A2 is routed to
the IPSec gateway for going outside because the x-MN’s x-HoA is selected
as its TIA in this framework, which is a public address.
The IPSec gateway consults its Security Association Database, and find
a security association identified by a triple SPI, x-HoA, AH or ESP, which
has been established during the IKE negotiation stage, as described in Sec-
tion 9.2.1. The IPSec gateway encapsulates A2 into A3 according to the
selected IPSec protocol format (AH, ESP, or both), with x-HoA as the des-
tination address.
A3 is intercepted by the x-HA, because x-MN has registered it with its
x-CoA before. The x-HA in turn encapsulates A3 into A4 with the x-CoA
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as the destination address as per normal Mobile IP procedure.
Since the FA-CoA mode is adopted in the GPRS network in this frame-
work, the x-CoA is equal to the x-FA’s address that the x-MN attaches to.
Thus, A4 is routed to the GGSN/x-FA via the Internet as normal IP rout-
ing does. The FA functionality part of GGSN/x-FA then decapsulates A4,
gets packet A3, and delivers it to GGSN functionality part. The GGSN con-
sults its database, and looks for the TID corresponding to A3’s destination
address, that is, x-HoA. As mentioned in Section 9.2.2, the GGSN has asso-
ciated this x-HoA with a TID, which identified a GTP tunnel to the SGSN
attached by the x-MN. The GGSN put A3 into that GTP tunnel, which
forms the packet A5.
A5 is delivered to the corresponding SGSN via the GPRS backbone. The
SGSN strips off the GTP header, and gets packet A3. According to the
association between x-HoA and a TLLI that was established in GPRS at-
tachment stage, the SGSN delivers A3, which is denoted as A6 at this point,
to the x-MN.
The x-MN’s IPSec part validates all protection examination for A6. If
this packet passes examination, the IPSec header is striped off. The extracted
packet is A2. A2, in turn, is delivered to the x-MN’s Mobile IP part. Mobile
IP strips off the outer IP header, and delivers the inner packet, which is the
original packet sent by the i-CN, A1, to the IP network layer for further
processing.
x-MN → i-CN
In this direction, the packets are routed back to i-CN from x-MN along
with the path B1 → B2 → B3 → B4. Their packet formats are shown in
Figure 9.9(c).
The x-MN adds an IPSec header to the original IP packet destined for
i-CN, and forms packet B1. B1 is routed to the IPSec gateway via the
GPRS network and the Internet. The IPSec gateway examines the packet
and validates security requirements. If the packet passes the examination,
the IPSec gateway strips off the IPSec header, and gets the original packet,
B4. B4 is routed to i-CN using the normal IP routing because B4’s address
is i-CN’s IP address, which was set by x-MN.
It is worth noting that no reverse tunnel is required to pass ingress filtering
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as described in Section 5.2 on page 113. The IPSec tunnel itself has this
functionality. The reason was described in Section 8.2.1 on page 171.
9.4 External Mobility
In the context of this study, external mobility focuses on mobility manage-
ment when the Mobile Node communicates with the external entity, x-CN.
This is regardless of whether the Mobile Node is inside the intranet, where
it is denoted as i-MN, or outside the intranet, where it is denoted as x-MN.
Consequently, there are two possible communication paths:
• x-CN ↔ i-MN
• x-CN ↔ x-MN
The rest of this section will discuss the routing in these two situations,
respectively.
9.4.1 Routing between x-CN and i-MN
In this situation, the i-MN is located by its i-CoA from the private address
space, which is not reachable from the public address space where x-CN only
comes from. As mentioned in Section 9.1.3, no IPSec is involved in this
path. Consequently, the IPSec gateway can not serve as a bridge between
two incompatible address spaces. Thus, a question of what can play the role
of such a bridge arises. A private interface is added to the HA to fulfil this
demand. Via the x-HA’s private interface, the i-MN registers x-HA with its
i-CoA as its x-CoA, as described in Section 9.2.2. The x-HA intercepts each
packet destined to i-MN’s x-HoA, and relays this packet to the i-MN’s i-CoA
via its private interface. In this way, the i-MN is enabled reachable from
outside.
Figure 9.10 shows all possible routes in this case. It is worth noting that
the reverse tunnel must be employed in the return direction. Otherwise, the
i-MN can not send the packets to the x-CN.
Because the reverse tunnel is mandatory in this case, only the CoA mode
varies. Consequently, there are the following two communication loops:
• FA-CoA: A1 → A2 → A3 → B1 → B2 → B3
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(c) Packet Encapsulation in i-MN → x-CN direction
Figure 9.10: Routing between x-CN and i-MN
• Co-CoA: A1 → A2′′ → B1′′ → B3
The rest of the section will describe the routing of the packets in two
directions, respectively.
x-CN → i-MN
The x-CN sends i-MN the packet A1 with the i-MN’s x-HoA as the desti-
nation address. The x-HA intercepts this packet, and looks up its binding
cache. It finds an association between the x-HoA and i-CoA. The x-HA adds
a new IP header to the A1 with the i-MN’s i-CoA as the destination address.
In the case of FA-CoA, the i-CoA is its i-FA’s IP address. The A2 is gener-
ated, and sent to the i-FA. In the case of Co-CoA, the i-CoA is a dedicated
address. The A2′′ is generated, and directly sent to the i-MN. Finally, the
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i-MN receives the original packet A1.
i-MN → x-CN
In the reverse direction, i-MN must deliver a B1-like packet so that it can be
routed to the x-CN. B1’s destination address is a public address. However,
this is not routable in the intranet due to the use of a private address space.
Thus, this original packet must be encapsulated into a new IP packet, which
uses a private address. For this reason, the reverse tunnel must be employed.
The end of tunnel is the x-HA’s private address. Depending on the CoA
mode, the encapsulated packet could be B2 if using FA-CoA, or B1′′ if using
Co-CoA. The x-HA then receives the encapsulated packet, extracts the orig-
inal packet B1 and delivers it to the public network. Finally, the packet B1
is routed to the x-CN as per normal IP routing.
Note that in addition to the purpose mentioned above, the reverse tunnel
maintains its functionality, that is, to pass ingress filtering examination.
9.4.2 Routing between x-CN and x-MN
In this case, both two communicating entities are in the external public
domain. Thus, no private address is involved. All Mobile IP procedures
and the parameters’ impact continue as normal Mobile IP does, which was
introduced in Chapter 5. This subsection places emphasis on the situation
where the x-MN moves to the GPRS network.
The FA-CoA mode is mandatory in the case of the GPRS networked
involved. Thus, there is only a parameter, namely the reverse tunnel option,
to impact on the routing. All possible routes are shown in Figure 9.11. There
are the following communication loops:
• Reverse Tunnel: A1 → A2 → A3 → A4 → B1 → B2 →B3 → B4
• No Reverse Tunnel: A1 → A2 → A3 → A4 → B1 → B2 → B3′′
There is no special points that need to be highlighted. The normal Mobile
IP procedures are applicable in the IP network segment, and the normal
GPRS procedures are applicable in the GPRS segment. The readers can
consult aforementioned relevant description to understand Figure 9.11 in
both the x-CN → x-MN and x-MN → x-CN direction.
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(c) Packet Encapsulation in x-MN → x-CN direction
Figure 9.11: Routing between x-CN and x-MN
9.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented the complete framework for seamless handover be-
tween GPRS and WLAN with security protection. The framework adopts a
screened subnet firewall architecture. An IPSec gateway is deployed in the
DMZ to separate the internal domain and external domain. Besides an inter-
nal Home Agent (i-HA) residing in the internal domain, an external Home
Agent (x-HA) is deployed in the DMZ to eliminate IPSec’s renegotiation
problem when Mobile Nodes handover in the external domain. As such a se-
cure Mobile IP framework has been constructed. To make GPRS users enjoy
services provided by this framework, a GGSN/FA is introduced to the GPRS
infrastructure instead of the original GGSN, as discussed in Chapter 7. This
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extends Mobile IP service to GPRS networks. This way, seamless handover
between GPRS and WLAN also is achieved.
The next chapter will evaluate this framework against this study’s objec-
tives and indicate some future work.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
This study presented a security framework for seamless handover between
GPRS and WLAN. To develop this framework, this study demonstrated a
scenario in Section 1.3 on page 9. Based on the discussion of this scenario, this
study defined the scope, the existing problems and objectives for addressing
these problems.
To achieve these objectives, this study introduced GPRS in Chapter 2.
Then, the concept of wireless overlay network was introduced in Chapter 3, as
well as the architectures for implementing this concept. Due to the significant
role of IP in these architectures, Chapter 4 provided an examination of IP’s
various aspects relevant to this study. The deficiencies of IP mobility and
security aspects are addressed in Chapters 5 and 6, which introduced Mobile
IP and IPSec, respectively.
After the necessary background knowledge for understanding the pro-
posed framework was provided, this study started to present its framework.
This was performed through three steps. Firstly, the integration of Mobile
IP and GPRS was discussed in Chapter 7. Then, the integration of Mobile
IP and IPSec was discussed in Chapter 8. Finally, a complete framework
towards this study’s goal was proposed in Chapter 9, based on the previous
two chapters’ discussion.
The rest of this chapter will evaluate whether this framework achieved
the predefined objectives and indicate future work on this framework.
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10.1 Revisiting the Objectives
Section 1.5 (see page 17) presented four objectives of the proposed framework
towards this study’s goal. The following subsections will evaluate to what
degree the framework achieved these objectives.
10.1.1 Effective IP Mobility
To make IP mobility more effective, this framework adopted a hierarchical
mobility structure. In particular, it deals with mobility on two levels: micro-
mobility and macro-mobility. In the case of GPRS, micro-mobility is per-
formed through SGSN and GGSN while macro-mobility is performed using
the Mobile IP protocol. In WLAN, micro-mobility and macro-mobility are
performed through Mobile IP regional registration. This way, the lower level
hides the movement of Mobile Nodes from the upper level. This effectively
reduces the signalling load and latency.
10.1.2 Seamless Handover
Seamless Handover is achieved through exploiting the coverage diversity of
GPRS and WLAN. Generally, the GPRS has a much larger coverage than
WLAN. In the situation where WLAN becomes unavailable, Mobile Nodes
in advance switch to GPRS networks in the form of a vertical handover using
a make-before-break mechanism and vice versa. This allows Mobile Nodes to
always attach to at least an access network and to render seamless handover.
10.1.3 Offering Mobile IP Service in GPRS
Mobile IP service is offered to GPRS via a combined entity, GGSN/FA.
This entity combines both GPRS and FA functionalities. Though a series
of associations between various domain-specific identifers, it performs the
translation between the Mobile Node’s IP address and its International Mo-
bile Subscriber Identity (IMSI). As such, packets sent to a Mobile Node by
Mobile IP are delivered to that Mobile Node and vice versa.
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10.1.4 Incorporation of Mobile IP and IPSec
To solve the problem of IPSec mobility, an additional external Mobile IP
instance is used to tunnel IPSec packets to its current point of attachment.
An internal Mobile IP instance is nevertheless required to function as nor-
mal. This forms a dual Home Agent Architecture. This way, IPSec protects
the traffic between the internal domain and external domain without losing
mobility, in corporation with Mobile IP.
10.2 Future Work
The proposed framework achieved the goal of this study, but future work is
required. The feasibility of the work needs to be verified in practical terms.
An obvious future step would be to implement this as a prototype or through
a simulation exercise.
However, on a conceptual this proposal still suffers from some deficien-
cies. Firstly, it suffers from a double triangle routing problem, which comes
from the internal Mobile IP (i-MIP) and the external Mobile IP (x-MIP),
respectively. This adds extra payload to the traffic and calls for a certain
degree of optimization in future work. Initial efforts could be directed to the
work of Choyi and Barbeau (2005), who investigated similar issues.
Another point worth noting is that in the case of the communication path
x-MN ↔ x-CN, when the x-CN is another x-MN, belonging to the internal
domain, both of them should be considered as internal nodes. Thus a Secu-
rity Association between them exists already. However, the communication
between them should also be protected under IPSec. This presents another
avenue for future work.
As mentioned in Chapter 7, this study adopted “Step 2” as the base of
offering Mobile IP in a GPRS network. Future work can attempt to adopt
“Step 3”, which expands Mobile IP service to the level of micro-mobility.
Consequently, the framework will be all Mobile IP-based.
For future research it would also be beneficial to constantly keep track
of the development of Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) (Kivinen
& Tschofenig, 2005), also called MOBIKE, where the Mobile Node does
not need to tear down its existing Security Association and renegotiate it.
Instead, it can modify the existing security association when it changes its
216 CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION
IP address. This will help mitigate heavy tunnelling overhead due to triple
encapsulation (i-MIP, IPSec and x-MIP).
Finally, this framework should be upgraded to IPv6. The final framework
will benefit from many new features of the new version. For example, in
Mobile IPv6, a Foreign Agent is no longer required. In addition, the design
of Mobile IPv6 incorporates security features that differ significantly from
Mobile IPv4 (Kempf, Arkko, & Nikander, 2004). This will facilitate the
security design of the framework.
10.3 Final Word
In conclusion, this study has developed a framework for security mobility
between GPRS and WLAN with guarantee of security characteristics. How-
ever, possibility exists for further research, that was out of the scope of this
study as discussed in Section 10.2.
Nevertheless, it is believed that this study contributes to the understand-
ing of the wireless overlay networks in terms of mobility and security. The
author also wants to express the hope that this study will fuel further interest
in this domain of discourse.
Part IV
Appendices
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Appendix A
Academic Paper
An academic paper based on the research contained in this dissertation has
been written.
The paper entitled, “Issues When Securely Integrating UMTS, Mobile IP
& IPSec”, will be submitted to a suitable conference.
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